LAST MONTH'S Common Market crisis sent observers back to the history books. As cartoonists busied themselves rearranging French ministerial noses to fit that of the Generale who wanted France to defy Europe and stand alone, one European weekly's headline begged the question on everyone's mind: 'Shades of the Fourth Republic?' Gall could suddenly be spelled three ways.

The historical punning proved misguided. The crisis fizzled with a whimper, euphemistically dubbed a "minor realignment" of the exchange rates crucial to European trade. Yet the image lingers: French Finance Minister Jacques Delors attacking the "arrogance and insensitivity" of his German colleagues while threatening to leave the European Monetary System (EMS), float the franc, and follow a franc and jolt France's trading posture into chaotic disrepute. It

The bluff worked. And bluff it was. Abandoning the EMS for isolationism would have been as close to collective suicide as France could engineer. Delors, a free trader, realized this. Going its own way in the delicate world of European trade would only ravage the franc and jolt France's trading posture into chaotic disrepute. It would be costly, as well. Artificially propping up its currency would deplete already dwindling French foreign reserves. The franc would turn soft; the French economy would strangle itself.

Delors' threat now seems hypothetical in a world increasinglycolored by European economic interdependence. The question follows: Why the pluck, the French brinkmanship? German displeasure with France's economic direction had been the initial bone of contention. France's 1982 trade deficit with the German Republic--some $5.5 billion dollars--caused more than a little irritation on the German with side and spurred a late March demand that the French clean up their act. That demand was enough to get the French goat. A third devaluation of the franc in 17 months, as called for, could only embarass the Mitterrand government politically, further ammunition for the centrist opposition claiming the Socialists were fiscally inept. More pressing would be the inflationary effects of any devaluation; some kind of austerity program would have to follow. For a government still bent on spending its way out of recession and into popularity, this was unacceptable.

Delors finally acceded to a devaluation of 2.5 percent. But the French saved face by shrewdly sizing up the German position before they made their threat. With one out of every four German jobs dependent on export, the Germans had almost a greater stake than the French in the EMS's future. For the French to pursue protectionism would have spelled disaster, derouting the Germans' own free-trade successes. Such worries made the economically robust Germans give in to the French. In the end, while Germany achieved the French devaluation it wanted, it also agreed to a 5.5 percent revaluation of made the major move.

It is easy to forget that five other European countries are affected by any realignment of the EMS. This was a Franco-German battle, testimony to an emerging right between the two nations unseen since before the days of the good relations between Adenauer and DeGaulle. Delors' undiplomatic words reflected not just French pluckishness, but growing tension. Present French economic doldrums can't compare with German high performance. With new economic goals diametrically opposed, it is no surprise that dialogue is becoming increasingly difficult. Technically, the two nations--whose alliance forms the cornerstone of the EMS--do not form a feasible trading and currency bloc.

ONE PROMINENT MONETARIST has called the EMS "a fundamentally flawed idea," arguing that it is untenable to align foreign exchange rates without fixing monetary growth rates. Statistics support the observation. The free-spending socialist government has allowed the French money supply to grow at a 14 percent clip in the past two years. The German rate snailed at 2 percent for a similar period, partly because of conservative fiscal policies. A high French inflation rate (9.5 percent) and staggering external trade balance ($13 billion) have slowed the French economy while the German trade balance sprinted ahead, reporting a $3 billion surplus.

Fixing rates among ideological antagonists is not practical; nor can it inspire currency and trade confidence. By agreeing to a compromise this month, Mitterrand put economic stability--in short, the European alliance--ahead of domestic policy. French travel agents last week, demonstrating to protest the resulting austerity measures, illustrated a final irony to the whole affair. The price of enjoying European 'interdependence' is to be literal economic shut-ins.

The political base of the EMS evaporated with the demise of Giscard D'Estaing. The implicit aims of the system set up when Franco-German policies were converging now seem outdated. Despite the temporary fix, the shadow of a fracture icons.

Political ideology has jeopardized the present arrangement of the EMS. Yet in order to secure its still essential aims, the Europeans must broaden its scope. Lingering in most European minds is the desire for American participation in currency talks and alignments. The U.S. dollar is a bit of a colossus to European, and an indifferent one at that. Reagan's strong-dollar stance has been insufferable, for a mighty dollar makes any cut in oil prices of a windfall for Common Market countries. France alone stood to have gained $3.5 billion from the recent OPEC slash, but the devaluation has dashed those hopes. European currencies fight tooth and nail against the kind of U.S. intervention to moderate the instability of the world market should bring certainty back to world currencies; the cooperative spirit of Bretton Woods, where Western nations overlooked differences to establish a world currency system, has been unnecessarily obscured.

Months ago, Reagan asked the Europeans to curtail trade with the East bloc, overlooking the more pressing difficulties with European trade in his own backyard. This month American imports will be more expensive in France, German exports more costly to buy here. If the uncertainty continues, U.S.-European trade may itself be in jeopardy--an ironic predicament for the man with the Adam Smith tie, about to host his first international summit.