A FEW STUDENTS in a dorm room last week were calmly debating the pros and cons of the United States invasion of Grenada. They argued tactics and strategy, some supporting the American initiative, others opposing it. Then one man spoke up, and silenced the room. "A friend of mine in the Marines was sent to Grenada," he said. "And every morning I check the paper and pray to God he isn't listed among the dead." For a moment, the proverbial Ivory Tower crumbled, and the students faced the bitter reality that men their age and younger were dying in a place far away. All the ensuing argument couldn't make sense of that fact.

On a purely unemotional, pragmatic level, this Administration's policy toward the Caribbean Basin in general and Grenada in particular has been a paradigm of idiocy. Before the coup in Grenada two weeks ago, the island was already ruled by a Marxist, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. Although Bishop was hardly a proponent of American-style capitalism-perhaps with reason, given widespread rumors of a CIA-backed coup to depose him several years ago-he nonetheless realized it was in his country's interest to have cordial relations with the United States. To that end, he travelled to Washington last spring, only to be ignored by the Administration. The Prime Minister's death warrant was signed de facto there and there. Had Washington given Bishop the chance to establish a positive working relationship with his country, he might very well be leading Grenada on a moderate leftist course today, supported by some to the light he had previously spurned. Instead, the myopic U.S. policy squashed whatever hope there was for a center-left government in Grenada, and gave impetus to the more extreme Marxists who overthrew Bishop. Such criticism of past U.S. foreign policy mistakes may be irrelevant for the present problem in Grenada, but it should serve as a powerful warning to avoid similar blunders elsewhere in the future.

The ongoing U.S. invasion is the most immediate concern though, and it constitutes a terrifying precedent. Had the several hundred American citizens on Grenada been hostages of the new regime, the United States could have justified a rescue mission. But by all accounts-and admittedly, there are not many, because Washington made Grenada off-limits to the press-U.S. citizens on the island, though in the middle of turmoil any coup necessarily creates, were not being directly threatened by the regime, nor were they hostages. The invasion, a violation of several international treaties that this country allegedly adheres to, indicates that preemptive military operations are acceptable. As long as the possibility for an unwanted situation involving American citizens exists, we have a right to take action, or so Washington seems to be saying. In short, it's open season on any country fueled by an ideology opposed to ours. Thankfully, most nations that fit that description-Nicaragua for example-are a lot bigger and hence more costly to invade than Grenada.

Beyond that, the Administration lied to the American public. Ostensibly, our mission was to rescue American citizens. Even accepting the proposition that they were in imminent danger doesn't justify sending in 2000-plus combat troops who stayed in Grenada after the American civilians were evacuated. Clearly, the Administration knew of the Cuban presence on the island and used the protection of Americans as an excuse to engage the Cubans, topple an unfriendly regime, and ultimately install a puppet government. Such tactics are usually associated with the Soviet Union-for example, in connection with the invasion of Afghanistan. And at least the Soviets can claim Afghanistan is of essential strategic importance to them. Grenada-as Marxist two weeks ago as it is now-hardly constitutes a danger to U.S. security. By invading Grenada, we've lost a large chunk of the moral high ground we held in our ideological duel with the U.S.S.R.

But beyond tactics and strategy, one has to wonder whether it was worth a dozen dead Marines-or even one dead Marine-to show the Cubans and Russians we mean business," as one Administration official described our real role in Grenada. Any premature death is a tragedy, be it by accident, malnutrition, or illness. But the Marines in Grenada were healthy Americans all, sent intentionally by their Commander-in-Chief into a situation where the only purpose they are effectively serving in symbols. The fact that at least 12 Marines will return home in markets is very real.

What it comes down to is that this Administration is playing a game of geopolitical chess with live pawns. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is just as much an Ivory Tower as this or any other university. Casualties are numbers to the policymakers in Washington, not people. Were the invasion of Grenada a just cause, we wold feel saddened by the loss of life but still understand. As it is, all we can feel is shame. U.S. out of Grenada now.