THE ON-AND-OFF SAGA of unionizing student shuttle bus drivers during the past three weeks could be mistaken for a case study from Lipsey and Steiner, the Ec 10 textbook.

That's because like Ec 10, the lesson in shuttle diplomacy ended when the principals--in this case, representatives for the drivers--finally ran out of bullshit. Explaining on Wednesday why the drivers would probably' reject the Teamsters' offer of support. Thomas E. Curtis '81, who had coordinated the second phase of the drivers' protest, revealed the key to their strategy.

"We had to give the University a full two weeks of intense bullshit before they would change the schedule," he said, adding, "Now we have a moral victory."

The drivers scored a moral victory over the University because moral victory means defeat.

The shuttle drivers won nothing of importance in their efforts to pressure the University into revising its policy. They could have succeeded, because their string of bluffs finally led them to the Teamsters. The Teamsters are not known for fooling around, and they were ready for action. But the shuttle drivers preferred building a moral victory on individual failures.

The drivers' fundamental demand was that the University recognize their right to unionize. Harvard said nothing. They asked to negotiate with the "real power" of the University instead of Buildings and Grounds. Harvard refused. The shuttle drivers asked for a permanent system of input into the schedule-making process. They got none.

The University made one change in the shuttle schedule--it lengthened the time between runs from 12 to 15 minutes. But the University would not admit that this revision resulted from drivers' demands and thus retained its autocratic control over student workers.

UNLIKE THE DRIVERS, the Teamsters organizers were not interested in three-minute adjustments. "If we came to Harvard we would be fighting for the rights of students to negotiate for conditions of their industrial existence," one official from Local 379 explained.

Unfortunately, the drivers did not seek to improve working conditions for the entire Harvard student community but merely aimed for an extra 50 cents per hour in their own pockets. The confusion which continually surrounded their efforts effectively blurred the fact that the drivers had a greater cause to fight for.

It is doubtful that the drivers ever intended to unionize. Because of several misconceptions, the drivers believed that the University would probably grant their demands before the protest reached the unionization stage. They learned that few Harvard officials back down in public. Instead, the drivers retreated from their announced positions time and time again.

Almost three weeks ago, a group of four or five drivers, headed by Michael T. Crehan '81, threatened that a majority of drivers would go on strike unless the University granted them a pay increase. The University replied that it would be prepared with alternate plans in the event of a strike.

Another faction of drivers led by Curtis, emerged saying Crehan and his following had represented their own views as those of the whole group. Several days later, a majority of the drivers voted to officially call off the threat of a strike. But the drivers also voted to unionize, preferably independently. They hinted at the possibility of joining District 65 of the United Auto Workers, which historically has enjoyed a highly antagonistic relationship with the University.

One problem, though, was that Curtis forgot to let District 65 know the drivers were intent on joining the UAW. District 65 leaders wisely chose to disassociate themselves from the case.

This was not the first time that Curtis had committed an important error of omission. Curtis criticized Crehan's strike announcement, not because it lacked driver support, but because it conflicted with his own plans. Without telling anyone, Curtis had been researching the possibility of the drivers unionizing at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

"Should I have kept my mouth shut on the off chance that Tom Curtis had a secret plan for the drivers to unionize?" Crehan asked.