GEORGE WASHINGTON began the tradition of a two-term presidency and refused the offer of an American kingship, demonstrating that a personality, in his case not power-hungry, can sway the course of a nation. In Tito: The Story From Inside, Milovan Djilas attempts to show that Josip Broz Tito, out of a personal lust for power, established an unstable Yugoslavia that may not long survive his death.

Djilas has a unique perspective on Tito's life, having helped him make Yugoslavia a communist state in the 1940s and 1950s, before they split in 1954. Moreover, many had considered Djilas to be Tito's heir-apparent. But since 1954, he has spent a total of nine years in jail for advocating democratic changes in the political process and is still unable to travel outside of Yugoslavia. His theory of personality determinism, however, merely strengthens the argument that Tito-leading a nation caught in an American-Soviet vise-centralized power in Yugoslavia for the good of the country. Yugoslavia's fate cannot be simply attributed to Tito's character as Djilas believes.

Djilas was and is an idealist, which partially explains his faulty reasoning. At first a die-hard communist, he wholeheartedly supported Tito's suppressions of civil liberties. Idealistically, he thought he and the rest of the elite knew what was best for the people. And again, when he wanted to return civil liberties to the people to bolster creativity, he didn't understand the practical realities of the era. Neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. would allow free elections; they would have preferred to a make Yugoslavia another Latin American-type political chessboard with commensurate violence between the vying ideologies of each superpower. Tito did avoid this dilemma by the questionable method of limiting freedoms, but Djilas falls short of substantiating that a better state had been possible.

In the book, Djilas describes several abominable and not-so-well-known elements of Tito's regime. The concentration camps, the one-party system, the purges of the opposition, and the eradication of the democratic movements destroy any image of Yugoslavia as a utopian state. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was certainly superior to other developing non-aligned nations of that era in civil liberties permitted.

BECAUSE OF HIS FAMILIARITY with Tito, Djilas elaborately portrays Tito's love of power and the adulation, the command, and the high living available to him. The details--he took over some of the king's villas and even some of the royal customs, such as being godfather to the ninth child in every family--are objectionable, but these personal weaknesses cannot alone destroy a country. Ignoring the forces inside and outside of the country can lead to the country's deterioration, and, Djilas concedes, Tito cannot be accused of this mistake. For Djilas sees Tito as a "politican of formidable resources, unerring instincts, and inexhaustible energy."

The book, an easily read translation, uses Tito's rise to power as the background for the analysis. Djilas assumes some familiarity with Yugoslavian history on the part of the reader, and at times the details are confusing. Yet to follow Djilas's criticisms of Tito--the major goal of the book--one only needs a rudimentary history knowledge.

The author poses two broad questions which can be used to examine many rules. First, did Tito--or any other leader--have to accumulate so much personal power for the benefit of the state? Second, after the ruler leaves, what happens to the country and is he responsible for the result?

Tito "was so attuned to personal power," Djilas writes, "that, in crucial moments he suppressed the forces that would have enriched life, made it more open for the individual and for society." But even were this true, Djilas does not prove that a realistic alternative to Tito's power centralizing existed. Could the state have survived in that era without a strong-handed Tito, when nearly all other developing countries were experiencing continuing civil strife? Djilas must establish this before he can expect better from Tito. Perhaps no one could have improved on his governing.

Moreover, Yugoslavia did prosper during Tito's reign. And though Djilas does not credit Tito with these successes, his reasoning lacks credibility. In one paragraph he discounts the nation's economic achievements as compared with the Soviet bloc countries. Djilas says Tito's workmen's management system and all other economic programs did not help; instead, he attributes all of Yugoslavia's prosperity to its superior resources. And he doesn't even mention that Yugoslavia had 35 years of relative peace under Tito. Almost any other country would accept that kind of record.

YUGOSLAVIA'S SURVIVAL without Tito will not be solely the result of the old man's actions. All Latin American rules are not judged incompetent simply because their countries have experienced non-stop turmoil. Yet Djilas uses this faulty logic to conclude that "the achievement makes the man, not the man the achievement." This is false--in any nation. To judge Tito without considering his environment is poor analysis and this is where Djilas fails.

George Washington helped establish the United States as a lasting representative state not only because he was a magnanimous man, but also because his era allowed him. Tito may have failed to create a lasting Yugoslavia, but his era did not permit him completely to impose his personality on the country. His worth as a man and as a leader cannot be determined merely by looking at Yugoslavia, as Djilas asserts. His goodness can only be decided by looking at what course he chose among his alternatives.