When the biggest and baddest at the Kennedy School of Government lumber into a seminar room to work over a major political problem, you expect some noise--if not national media chatter or awed applause from Washington, then at least the venerable murmurs of academe. If the heavyweights square off against an issue as imposing as the transition of presidents, you might even look for Howard Cosell at ringside, narrating the blow by blow. But the presidential transition is just the problem that Institute of Politics (IOP) director Jonathan Moore, K-School professor Ernest R. May and several of their colleagues are now confronting. And almost no one knows about it.

From the presidential challenger's vantage point, preparation for a possible transition is a sticky business. The would-be chief executive must concentrate far more on winning the general election than on agency reorganization or new Oval Office drapes. He must guard against overcommitting himself, both to prospective policies and to job seekers, but still display the confidence of a man who already sees himself lounging on the East Lawn.

Since they are butting into this delicate situation uninvited, the K-School gurus say they do not want to pile added pressure on the challengers. They keep their research and results private, submitting ideas and observations without attracting much attention.

The seven-man IOP Study Group on Presidential Transition will produce two approximately 150-page studies by November. One will go to either Rep. John B. Anderson R-III.) or former California governor Ronald Reagan if President Carter slips from the throne. "The purpose is not to make substantive recommendation on how to manage a specific transition," Moore says. "We look at past experiences, dating as far back as Eisenhower, and try to draw together the lessons which apply to the current conditions of society and the federal government.

Our advantage is that we have a backlog of information and the time to analyze it," May says, adding that, "The professionals' memories will be partial; we provide a context for their decision-making."

Moore and other participants in the project emphasize that their research is done without interference from the Reagan or Anderson staffs. Although "there obviously ought to be some communication between the scholars and the professionals they are assisting," Moore says that as in 1968 and 1976, when the IOP sponsored similar studies, partisanship is taboo.

Most of the researchers have had extensive experience in national government under more than one administration. May describes his own political career as ranging from Pentagon work under Truman and Eisenhower to being "one in the hundreds" who wrote speeches for John F. Kennedy. "We don't have a problem drawing the line" between scholarly advice and political advocacy," May adds. While other Harvard faculty members have declared support for a specific camp, the transition team strives for "an objective approach to what is good governance," Moore says.

Addressing a problem such as the staffing of the enormous executive branch, the IOP study group does not distinguish very much between the Anderson or Reagan camps. Because of the general nature of their analysis, "the presentations really do not need to be that different," research fellow Al Alm, another committee member, says. Moore, carefully avoiding an answer which would classify Reagan as the current statistical frontrunner or Anderson as a third party long shot, says the studies will be "similar, though not identical in all aspects." "We do not have to worry so much about ideology or the latest party politics; we are talking about a historic, procedural emphasis," he adds.

The last recipient of the IOP's transition primer is no longer eligible for such help. If reelected, Jimmy Carter--whom Moore says the committee "is in no way counting out of the race"--will have to spend the winter between his two terms without the wisdom of Harvard. Four years ago, however, Carter did possess a bound volume embossed with the IOP seal--and his move to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave was still far from smooth. Many have cited the early feuding between Hamilton Jordan's Hatfields, who planned the Carter election, and the McCoys under Jack Watson, who handled the transition, as the first hint of the disorganization and confusion that has haunted the administration since.

"There's no way in the world we can know if this kind of thing gets implemented," explains Alm, who was in the Carter administration in 1976. "The new president has hundreds of looseleaf notebooks on his desk telling him about how to get going; he cannot read them all," Alm says. "But if I were president, I seriously think I would read this one, because most advice comes from people who are themselves jockeying for position."

The researchers are not only uncertain if all their planning helps anyone, but they are also hesitant to describe the criteria for a truly successful transition. "You can evaluate it procedurally, but even if that looks good, something can go wrong," he adds. "The Kennedy transition seemed successful in 1960-61, but look what directly followed that: the Bay of Pigs." Unlike Moore, who declines to discuss the Carter experience in 1976, May points out the "procedural flaw" made in trying to separate officially Watson's staff from Jordan's. Remembering and explaining such as lesson in this election and in the future is the job of the IOP committee, May adds.

No one on the panel wants to discuss the specific areas covered in the report, but Moore explains that they have made an important adjustment since 1976. "This time we will be less prescriptive," he says, adding that the change does not reflect the results of the last report, but is part of "a continuous process of experimentation." The IOP director describes the group as "aware of our limitations. This is one way of refining our efforts."

One characteristic of the transition project that has not changed is its low profile on the political landscape. Moore openly admits that he would prefer that it receive no publicity at all: "The likelihood of its being used, of the scholarship being translated into action, is increased if the whole thing is kept quiet." He adds, however, that the project "has never been an outright secret." If one of the two challengers wins in November, the IOP will send him the study, but if Carter prevails, the report will remain at the IOP and will be used for further research within the K-School Moore says. Copies are not made available to the public.

Neither of the two challengers' camps is any more eager to discuss publicly a possible transition. Mark Rosenker, a Reagan spokesman, declines comment on the work underway at the IOP, insisting that "right now we are only in the business of getting a man elected." Two weeks ago, in an interview with The New York Times, Edwin Meese, chief of staff of the Reagan campaign, mentioned the IOP's study as one of several outside research projects that will complement the campaign's own planning. Rosenker says that a three man group is heading a small staff of transition planners within the campaign, but he refused to name any of these staffers. "We would be inundated with hundreds and hundreds of job applications; we don't need that right now," he says.

The Anderson campaign will postpone all transition planning until the independent candidate is certain he'll be changing addresses, Alton Frye, Anderson's policy director, says. "We are glad they [the IOP] are helping," Frye adds, agreeing that the specifics of such outside counseling should not be made public.

Within two weeks Frye expects Anderson to announce the formation of a 20- to 25-man National Advisory Council which could eventually help a new Anderson administration settle in. "The usual problems of transition will not be acute for us because we will operate sequentially; the same people who might help elect the candidate will continue as the transition staff," Frye explains. "Our disadvantage is that we will start very late."

"Preparing the transition report is certainly a high-risk business." Alm says. "It can have a high payoff if we can clear something up for the new administration, though. In any case, it is a good exercise for the Institute of Politics, and in the long run, worth the time and effort."

"This particular problem [of presidential transition] is unique to our system," May says. "We change the entire leadership of the nation, not just the top... We think we can pull together some ideas that will help."