For the moment, events in Iran and Afghanistan have diverted the attention of both the American public and administration from matters closer at hand: the lack of substantive progress in the implementation of the Camp David accords, concluded between Egypt and Israel, with the U.S. as "guarantor" of sorts, and signed into treaty ten months ago in Washington. While Egypt and Israel have limped along towards some kind of "normalization" of relations, little else has concealed the complete failure of any of the signatories to act decisively as regards the core issue in the Middle East--the continuing frustration of the Palestinians' aspirations for national self-determination. Israel is the only possible exception to this; ongoing settlement of the West Bank, absorption of the West Bank electrical power system into Israel's, and continuing persecution of Palestinian political spokesmen (like Bassam Shak'a, Mayor of Nablus) may be seen as "decisive acts." Unfortunately, by telegraphing Israel's apparent intention of permanently retaining the West Bank (or at least of privileges there--to settlement, stationing of Israeli troops, etc.), these "decisive acts" render in advance any discussion of genuine political rights for the Palestinians utterly farcical.

As the fragile equilibrium in the Middle East and Central Asia deteriorates, the position of the U.S. vis-a-vis these areas becomes ever more similar to that of the man faced with the task of holding a dam which is constantly springing new leaks. Our approach has been to stuff these leaks with fistfuls of dollars, or arms, or both: $2.2 billion as an initial installment on the Egyptian-Israeli treaty (Israel is dissatisfied with a $200 million increase over this in credits; President Carter is seeking congressional approval to send an additional $1.1 billion in arms aid to Egypt, while Sadat is asking for staggering sums to shore up the decrepit Egyptian economy).

The fear that conservative Middle Eastern governments are experiencing because of Iran and Afghanistan may or may not give the U.S. much respite. Dependent on the U.S. for security, countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may press the U.S. less vigorously to respect Palestinian rights in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and may even respond positively to U.S. persuasion to finance with petrodollars the defense-spending of "like-minded" regimes in the area (e.g. Pakistan). On the other hand, as the Arab royal families are perfectly aware, failure to press for Palestinian rights in peace negotiations and closer association with the U.S. are precisely the factors which will expose them to the kinds of attack to which they may be most vulnerable: those impelled by some form of religious ideology.

Given the contraction of the American economy, one wonders at what point one neglected leak will develop into a flood. Consider, for example, the implications of a coup in Saudi Arabia, the potential for which was starkly revealed in the take-over of the Great Mosque in Mecca--or in Egypt, where expectations of rapid economic development following on the heels of peace with Israel have been irresponsibly fueled by the leadership.

The answer to this is not, I would submit, a quantitative change in American foreign policy (i.e. increasing militarization of the region) as some in this country are advocating, but a qualitative change--something on the order of, to extend our previous analogy, draining the water from behind the dam.

In the most general sense, a qualitatively different U.S. policy must begin with the fundamental realization that peoples of the Middle East (as no doubt in every other region of the world) will continue to struggle for what they perceive as their legitimate rights to political and economic freedom. As long as the U.S. is seen as inhibiting the realization of such rights, we can expect to invite the antipathy of the peoples there. Any attempt to prop up governments against their peoples is only a stop-gap measure, as Iran bears witness, and obversely, as Afghanistan is also likely to demonstrate at some point. The retreat into Cold War logic, which views indigenous national struggles as indicative of "communist influence," only leads to further alienation of peoples, whose rights are trampled in our headlong attempts at "containment"--a process which eventually creates the instability against which we sought initially to defend. Instead, we must adopt as a general principle of our policy that equal opportunities to social economic, and political development--not military aid and alliances--are the most basic guarantees of stability in the Middle East, and indirectly of our own national interests in that region.

The temporary lull in the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be mistaken for peace and stability. With the ingredients of discontent left fermenting, it is only a matter of time before violence escalates again. This devolution is not, however, inevitable.

The application of our general principle to the specific case of the Arab-Israeli dispute has several ramifications. Firstly, we must recognize that the Camp David formula, which treats the Palestinians as third party subsidiaries to a conflict in which they are principal protagonists, is fundamentally misconceived. Secondly, we must help to initiate a new peace process in which the Palestinians are guaranteed in advance the satisfaction of their right as a people--no less than any other people, including Jewish Israelis--to national self-determination. Moreover, this right must be extended to all Palestinians, whether in exile from their homeland, on the West Bank and Gaza, or in Israel. Although my personal belief is that this must eventually be accomplished within the framework of a unitary, democratic, secular state in Palestine, that is a matter for the disputants of the conflict to settle. Thirdly, and this follows from the above two points, the Palestinians must be represented in any negotiations pertaining to their future by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which, whether we like it or not, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Any other considerations (whether this should be done under U.N. auspices, in partnership with European nations, etc.) are subordinate to the above.

Of course, the general principle that we should back peoples rather than governments does not offer any precise guidelines for policy makers dealing with immediate crises like Afghanistan. On the other hand, its implementation should diminish the likelihood of our continually facing "Afghanistans;" that is, constantly having to "react' to situations which are already well beyond our control. If beginning with the Arab-Israeli conflict seems overly ambitious, this is justified by the gravity and potential dangers of that particular situation at the real level, and by the fact that at the symbolic level, the value in the Arab and Muslim worlds of U.S. recognition and demonstration of sincere respect for Palestinian national rights would be immeasurable. However, Carter's State of the Union comments on the Middle East seem not to foreshadow a positive policy at all, but only the old reactives behind-the-eight-ball U.S. policy writ large.

The adoption of this type of new policy is not now and never has been easy, principally because of general American public sympathy for Israel, because of the activities of a well-organized and powerful pro-Israeli lobby in Washington--and perhaps most importantly, due to the prevalence within government and military circles of a "strategic" mentality, which saw Iran and Israel as surrogates to American military power in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, if predictably, this line of thinking survives by the tenuous argument that the billions of dollars of arms we sold to the government of the Shah, Israel's and our training of Savak and other military personnel, 40,000 American technicians and "consultants" working for our military or private corporations on contract to the Shah, and no doubt substantial covert CIA activities as well--all of these were somehow "insufficient," and we erred in Iran only by not supporting the Shah more fully!

Neither do the upcoming presidential elections promise to resolve anything; Democratic candiates are heavily dependent on pro-Israeli constituencies, and Republican candidates are the neo-Crusaders of militarization of the middle East. Whether the productive initiatives of some members of the American black community to raise the issue of Palestinian rights continue and expand remains to be seen.

No doubt the political costs of re-orienting U.S. policy in the Middle East would be great for any American politician. Nevertheless, it appears that these political costs can only mount; this in a period when our capacities to effectuate policy change appear to be diminishing. Equally certain is that these political costs, whatever they are and whoever pays them, would be dwarfed by the costs to this nation if such necessary changes continue to be sacrificed to short-term and personal (or other particular) political objectives.

George E. Bisharat is a doctoral candidate in Anthropology and Middle East Studies at Harvard University.