FOR THE FIRST TIME since the withdrawal of the last foreign troops from Vietnam in 1975, combat in the region raised the specter of superpower nuclear exchanges. But this time, no American families will receive form letters beginning We regret to inform you that..."

While the United States can bask in its unaccustomed role as an uninvolved bystander, the complete inability of the U.S. government to pursue its own foreign policy goals or exercise any mediating influence in this crisis reveals a basic weakness in the way that the United States has developed and pursued foreign policy throughout Asia and in much of the world.

The recent double invasions--Vietnam into Cambodia and China into Vietnam--have demonstrated conclusively that the United States has no leverage in Southeast Asia.

Since 1973 when the Paris peace accords marked the beginning of the end of U.S. presence in Vietnam, U.S. Asian policy has turned to China. The 1973 Shanghai communique set the establishment of normal relations with the People's Republic as the primary task for the two nations. And in the entire debate concerning recognition of China, of Vietnam, and in fact of any nation that undergoes a major political change, a basic confusion of means and ends fundamentally weakens any U.S. moves to achieve its legitimate foreign policy goals. Throughout the debate surrounding diplomatic recognition of Vietnam and China, recognition has been viewed as a fundamental statement of support by the United States for whatever government it proposes to recognize. Both Carter's dramatic announcement of the normalization of relations with China, and the conservative response to that decision were based, at least in part, on that assumption.

For Carter, as for those who framed the original China policies in the wake of Nixon's visit in 1972, the exchange of diplomatic relations formed the cornerstone of a new Asian policy. With that exchange--the playing of the "China card"--the United States seemed to have achieved a major foreign policy objective--that of re-entering the Asian continental political arena.

Conservative critics, meanwhile have focused their anger on the breaking of diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) government. They accuse Carter of committing an act of base treachery by sacrificing Taiwan in its support for soulless Communism. George Will in the Washington Post claimed the "Taiwan question is: How shall Taiwan's liberty be extinguished?" For both supporters and opponents of the new ties with China, the relationship represents a fundamental shift in United States goals in Asia. The conservatives believe the recognition of the People's Republic signals the end of U.S. attempts to contain Communism, while supporters of the move have been able to see no further than the act of recognition itself. The recent outbreak of war in Southeast Asia demonstrates the narrowness of that perspective.

Certainly U.S.-China ties in themselves do not allow the U.S. free reign to influence events in Asia--China made it clear throughout its history that its relations with any country can be sacrificed if they conflict with the Peking leadership's political strategy.

AND IF THE U.S. read too much into the restoration of normal relations with China, it made the same mistake with Vietnam. Because the U.S. has refused to recognise Vietnam, it has forfeited any ability to ameliorate events in Southeast Asia. Again, American policy makers have held that the U.S. should establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam only after Vietnam meets all the preconditions normally worked out in the context of diplomatic relations.

In fact, diplomatic relations never represent a statement of principle of support; they are only a pragmatic tool to achieve political goals. Indeed, Carter's speedy recognition of the Khomeini-appointed government in Iran followed this very principle. While the U.S. may be uncomfortable with Khomeini's brand of Islamic rule, and should object to such actions as the seizure of the Israeli embassy and the secret trials and executions of pro-Shah officials, the recognition ratifies none of those actions. Instead it marks the awareness of American officials that the U.S. has a political and economic stake in Iran that it will lose entirely if it refused to talk with the Iranian government. And beyond the pragmatic considerations of ensuring the steady flow of Iranian oil into the United States, any larger political and moral influence would be sacrificed if the U.S. witheld recognition of any nation solely because it objects to the country's political practices.

This is not to say that moral considerations should not enter into the making of foreign policy. But moral considerations, such as Carter's vaunted human rights policy, must be defined solely as an end, not a means, of U.S. foreign policy. Expressions of concern for human rights violations should not be used as a lever designed to knock a government off balance or to make short-term political capital. Too often the United States has callously and inconsistently used its human rights policy as a geopolitical bargaining chip without regard for genuine human suffering in many nations.

The battles now being fought in Vietnam and Cambodia blatantly disregard such concern for human rights. The danger to world peace and the suffering endured by the people in those countries remain beyond the scope of possible U.S. influence because of the confusion of means and ends in U.S. policy formulation. The means have been lost, sacrificed because American policy makers mistook the tools of foreign policy for a positive statement of policy in themselves. Having played its China card, the U.S. holds nothing--no Vietnam card, no Cambodia card, and no control over a game in which it is vitally interested. That lack of control will be a constant for many years to come--until the United States builds up the complex of ties and relations that will permit it to articulate its political goals and moral aspirations to the nations of Southeast Asia. And, given America's bleak record in the region, it will take far longer for those nations to care to listen.