Q: How great a role do you think the desire for American help in deterring the Soviets played in the Chinese decision to normalize relations with the U.S.?

Thomas P. Bernstein '59, visiting associate professor of Government: It clearly played a significant role. I think the Chinese--and this was partly precipitated on our side--are asking for American military help. They do want us to deter what they see as the rising Soviet threat. In that sense, they expect us to do our part as the other superpower. China really is not in the same league militarily as either the Soviet Union or the U.S., and their latching on to us is really a reflection of that.

Q: Then what do you feel was the major Chinese motive for normalization?

Bernstein: I'm not saying that a hoped-for relationship in which the U.S. will at least indirectly balance off the Soviet Union and help China is not a part of normalization. I won't disagree with that. On the other hand, normalization itself was brought about by a configuration of circumstances involving Taiwan. Both sides seemed to be ready to make concessions on the Taiwanese issue, and that made normalization a distinct possibility. The foundations of the overall relationships between the Soviet Union, United States and China were laid in 1971, and there have not been that many changes since then, at least as far as I am concerned.

Paul F. Walker, research fellow in the Center for Science and International Affairs: I would agree with Professor Bernstein on that. But there was really a three-pronged reason for normalization. Number one was the inherent Chinese fear of Soviet military forces massed along the Sino-Soviet border, and Chinese desire to play the "American card" in a sort of balance of power game. I think the second reason was clearly Taiwan, to entice the United States away from the Taiwanese--certainly to the detriment of Taiwan, from the Taiwanese viewpoint. The third reason is that the standard of living in China is still very, very low in comparison to the United States and even to the West and the Soviet Union. I think the Chinese were quite clear in pointing out in their recent visit that they want American technology--particularly in the agricultural sphere--to try to wean away the 80 per cent of the Chinese population which is now engaged in agricultural production to feed the one billion Chinese.

Q: How much do the Soviets really fear a friendly Sino-American relationship? Is this fear strong enough to act as a deterrent to Soviet ambitions worldwide?

Walker: The Soviets have mixed feelings on the Chinese-American rapprochement, and I think it is hard for us in the present to really know what the final outcome will be. On the one hand they do fear that the Americans are very adept at handling balance-of-power politics and could very well play off the Chinese against the Soviets; they also feel that Chinese are very adept at balance-of-power politics and could play off the Americans against the Soviets. As we have seen from [Chinese Vice-Premier] Teng's visit this past week, he called the Soviets everything from 'warmongers' to the 'chief threat to our society.' On the other hand I think they do realize that it is long time that the greater superpower, the United States, recognized the most populous nation in the world, and they can see some positive aspects to that. So it's a mixed bag, both positive and negative.

Q: In the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict, could the United States avoid getting involved? Or should we allow ourselves to get involved?

Joseph S. Nye, professor of Government and former Undersecretary of State: I don't necessarily think the United States has to get involved in any military sense in the case of a Sino-Soviet conflict. I think politically the American role has to be at least a background factor in any conflict. The uncertainty about how the Americans will react--since they are the background factor in any three-party game--will be felt. But I don't think it follows that we have to get involved directly in any military sense.

Q: Do you see a conflict between the Soviet Union and China as something that is inevitable, or as something that can be avoided?

Nye: I think a large scale nuclear exchange is certainly not inevitable. I think the deterrent effect in that direction will certainly remain present. The difficulties along the border, and rivalry for leadership in the Communist movement will probably continue for some time.

Q: What effect will China's normalization of relations have on Chinese Relations with the Third World, and with Communist countries or movements?

Bernstein: To an extent, I think this is something of an embarrassment. It undermines the old identification of China with the anti-imperialist movement; this is something the Soviets make a great deal of. In fact, the Chinese have until fairly recently carefully avoided the appearance of being too close to the United States. As far as Communist 'movements,' there really isn't much of that left. There are various liberation movements supported by the Chinese or the Soviets--in South Africa, for example--but these are insignificant in terms of a solid movement.

Walker: I think the Soviets have always looked at the Chinese as competitors in the Third World, particularly since the Soviets have converged towards a less idealistic Communist society, and Maoist China has converged to less radical positions. You recall that in Teng's visit to Washington last week he was condemned by the idealistic Maoists for opening up relations with the capitalistic empire of the West. I think competition between the two will go on in the Third World. I think in order to maintain credible leadership and compete for leadership in the Communist world both the Soviets and China have to maintain that they are heading towards the ideal Communist society. But I think it's quite clear that both the Soviet regime and the Chinese regime, are a far cry from ideal Communism.

In opening up their relations with the West, in allowing, of all things, the entry of Coca-Cola and Levis into Peking, they are deviating quite a bit from the ideal Communist model, and I think that will disturb the purists in the revolutionary movements in the Third World.