FOR IAN SMITH, the game is drawing to an end. It was 13 years ago last week that Smith and his Rhodesian Front Party raised the green-and-white flag of independence over Government House in Salisbury; today, few governments in the world have recognized that flag, and 15,000 armed men wait across the border in Zambia and Mozambique for the right moment to attack. Two months ago, the guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front shot down a Rhodesian airliner, and last week armed insurgents made their first foray into Salisbury itself. Some observers think the government will fall any day now.

But they are probably wrong. Smith and the white minority of 240,000 who rule over Rhodesia--and over the nearly six million Africans who reside within its boundaries--have beaten the odds for 13 years, and they are doing their darndest to stay in power. True, Rhodesia is closer to a change in rule--either through the domestic process outlined by an "interim agreement" signed in March, or by the intervention of Front troops led by Joseph Nkomo and Robert Mugabe--than it has ever been. But it is likely that Smith and his cohorts will hang on a while longer, both by holding off the guerrilla forces and by poking enough loopholes in plans for "transition to black majority rule" to make them more nominal than real. And when the end does come for Smith, the story will still not end happily: instead, a host of black groups will vie for control of an independent Zimbabwe, with violence a possibility and confusion assured.

Rhodesia's ability to continue holding the Front forces at arm's length though apparently eroding as the weeks go by and the guerrillas become more and more daring, is still considerable. Consistently, ten guerrillas have fallen for each Rhodesian soldier who died in the fighting of the last few years. And Smith is counting on his 7900-man army and 35,000 reserves to improve that standard in future battles. The loyalty of black Rhodesian troops--who make up over half the active soldiers--has already been tested and not found wanting.

While the soldiers hold off the guerrillas, Smith and his cohorts are making sure that the white minority will hold many of the strings of power in the domestic settlement for transition to black rule. The provisional accord Smith signed this spring with three black moderates--Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau--guarantees whites a 28-member bloc in the future parliament, enough seats to block any constitutional changes. An equally significant clause promises that whites will retain control of the national army, police force, and civil service for at least ten years. Blacks will get the vote on an unrestricted basis for the first time in Rhodesian history, but the rest of the agreement makes one wonder what they will be able to do with that vote.

Smith's hand is strengthened by the fact that his black partners seem more concerned with jockeying for political position in the future government than making sure that government will have power independent of the whites. Muzorewa supports the current settlement because he feels assured of winning the popular elections; Sithole and Chirau are along for the ride. Muzorewa even accompanied Smith on his unsuccessful lobbying mission to the U.S. last month to drum up support for the interim agreement.

Meanwhile, external opposition to Smith is tied up in knots. The "front-line" states that are the Patriotic Front's chief backers--namely Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania--have been distracted lately by domestic matters and quarrels among themselves. All of them have suffered ravaged economies because of the curtailment of trade in the region caused by the embargo on dealings with Rhodesia; in fact, the embargo has hurt African states more than it has affected the Smith regime. Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda even had to reopen the border with Rhodesia this month to make possible importation of badly-needed fertilizer for his country's planting season; this incensed president Samora Machel of Mozambique, whose relations with the less radical Kaunda have been slipping anyway. And Tanzanian president Julies Nyerere is too busy fighting off Ugandans to mediate such disputes and coordinate front-line activity against Smith.

Surprisingly, the West has proved one of Smith's more effective opponents, though it has done little to encourage a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem. For example, the U.S. currently backs an Anglo-American plan pieced together by U.N. ambassador Andrew Young and British Foreign Secretary David Owen. The plan marks an attempt by the British to atone for their weak-willed opposition to Smith's "colonial rebellion," and by the U.S. to undo the effects of the Nixon administration's "tilt" toward the apartheid states in the early '70s. Unfortunately, it calls for the participation of Nkomo and Mugabe in negotiations for a political settlement, a proposition which could precipitate bloody civil war between the Front and domestic black groups after the fall of Smith. There is enmity between Nkomo and Sithole, and little love lost between any of the moderates and the Front; in fact, even relations between Nkomo and Mugabe have been somewhat less than cordial, and there are hints that the two might pit their armies against each other in competition for total control of an independent Zimbabwe. Neither of the guerrilla leaders will promise to hold elections before proclaiming an independent black-ruled state.

ULTIMATELY, most factors point to the dissolution of white rule, although this dissolution will be slow in coming. It is not likely that peaceful black rule will follow, however. Despite his strength, Smith cannot hold out indefinitely, especially since his white constituents are leaving in massive numbers: 1490 whites took the "chicken run" out of the country in September, and 11,000 have left since January. Unfortunately, whites are taking with them much of the technical expertise and capital--the latter smuggled out despite restrictions--that will be needed to run a future majority-ruled black state. Escalated guerrilla attacks will only further damage the national economy and the lifestyle of those citizens who remain. Of course, war could be averted if a credible, autonomous black government with the backing of the West and the approval of moderate Africans were to emerge; but this appears unlikely given the present settlement. Instead, the most likely occurrence will be the eventual removal of Smith by the guerrilla forces, followed by a civil war with different black groups pulling and tugging at Rhodesia until little is left. And that can only be bad news for the six million Africans who hope to inherit an independent Zimbabwe.