IT HAS BEEN five years since Richard Nixon stepped off Air Force One into the forbidden city of Peking. The expectations of a quick renewal of the "special" historical U.S.-China relationship have not been fulfilled in the intervening period. Now, China is knocking on the closed door of United States-East Asian relations. But, as our record of contacts with the Middle Kingdom shows, the U. S. does not always listen when opportunity knocks.

President Carter's failure to return the rhetoric of the Shanghai Communique is grounded partly in his fear of a pro-Taiwanese Congress. More significantly, perhaps, China offers Carter the perfect foil against what he sees as an increasingly antagonistic Soviet Union. When he visited China last spring, Zbigniew Brzezinski stood on the Great Wall and pointed to the north, hinting of an alliance against "the polar bear." But in the balancing process, an effective independent China policy has been sacrificed to the game of superpower diplomacy.

Carter's view of China as an inclusive part of U.S. policy to the Soviet Union has blinded him to realizing the potential benefits of a strong bilateral U.S.-China relationship. By ignoring recent events, in fact, he may be destroying the finest U.S. opportunity since the Korean War for establishing bonds with a government which controls one-quarter of the world's population.

In the last six months, through a series of events barely mentioned in the U.S. press, China has demonstrated her willingness to consider diplomatic relations with the United States on terms believed unattainable as little as a year ago. As one former State Department China specialist said in September, "It's been a hell of a summer. It's too bad we just weren't watching."

In July 1978, the People's Republic established full diplomatic relations with Libya, without requiring that country to repudiate its recognition of Taiwan. Most observers saw this as another in a series of Chinese moves to assure a continuous flow of Mideast oil. But more importantly, this was the first instance since the founding of the People's Republic that any nation has been allowed to maintain relations simultaneously with the governments of "both" Chinas. The implications for the United States, currently grappling with this dilemma, are significant for those who fear a "sellout" of Taiwan.

In August, Chinese Communist Party leaders left China-watchers dumbfounded and Taiwanese leaders baffled when representatives from Taiwan and the PRC took part in an international meeting of physicists. The Tokyo meeting marked the first time in nearly 30 years that Peking had even tacitly accepted Taiwan's existence.

Later that month, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng jetted across three borders of the Soviet Union in what was seen as an attempt to bait the angry polar bear. But Hua's message was far more than simple anti-Sovietism. By proclaiming the reemergence of the People's Republic as a major actor on the international stage, he threw the ball back in the U.S. court. The question is now whether the U.S. will respond by developing a policy based on the significant Sino-U.S. ties that the PRC is attempting to create.

CHINA HAS moved quickly to consolidate these ties. Discussions with four major U.S. oil companies on the exploitation of her offshore resources rattled China traders. Never before has the PRC ventured to negotiate development of its strategic energy supplies. Now they have entered into frank discussions with U.S. technologists and dealers.

Talks between Frank Press, the President's science advisor, and Vice-Chairman Teng Hsiaoping resulted in the founding of the first comprehensive U.S.-Chinese student exchange program since 1949. By January, more than 250 Chinese will enter various technical and management schools in the U.S. for further training. The Chinese seem to be swinging back to following the maxim of Imperial China of "making things foreign serve things Chinese."

But the events of the summer have left Washington's foreign policy establishment far behind, and official action to reap the benefits of a vigorous and directed East Asian policy have been blocked. If nothing else, normalization would certainly add a new dimension and a new flexibility to U.S. foreign policy. It is clear that the Chinese, if not viewed as a dependent factor in U.S.-Soviet policy, are willing to experiment.

In the long run, however, recognition of China is vital if the United States is to destroy the awesome level of ignorance that has pervaded its policies in the Far East. Since the McCarthy era's purge of the State Department's China hands, infrequent reassessments of U.S.-China relations have fallen upon an ignorant, almost immature, China desk. The costs of this ignorance have been staggering. While it is more dramatic to suggest proximate solutions to redress the triangular balance of power, it is this deep-seated myopia that must first be corrected. Until full diplomatic relations are established, the U.S. will remain blind as it develops a haphazard, episodic Far-Eastern policy.

Since Hua's assumption of power in the fall of 1976, China has displayed an increasing flexibility in its willingness to deal with the outside world. In recent months, Chinese rhetoric has been matched, to the surprise of many, by concrete actions. It seems that the China we once "lost" is now in search of us. Unfortunately, it also appears that we are assiduously avoiding their quest.