DURING THE LATE SUMMER and early fall of this year candidate Jimmy Carter called together in Plains the group of men who would advise him on foreign policy during the general election campaign. Although they looked out of place in the bucolic surroundings, they were the familiar faces of the elite foreign policy establishment that has traditionally answered the call of Democratic presidents. These men had been biding their time in corporate boardrooms and Wall Street law offices waiting for the moment when they could return to Washington. They had been the "best and the brightest" in their day and they gave their country Vietnam. And now one of their number has been appointed Secretary of State.

Re-introducing Cyrus Vance to the press a little over a week ago, Carter stated that "It would be almost ridiculous to bring someone into the Secretary of State's job who had no experience in international affairs, who had no experience in international economics, who had never negotiated a major conclusion among states and who had very little acquaintance on their own part with other countries." In a very real sense, Cyrus Vance's ticket to power was Jimmy Carter's perceived weakness and uncertainty in foreign affairs and the American politicians' traditional compulsion to seek some additional legitimacy in the company of men of recognized experience and expertise.

In addition to his widely reported experience in foreign affairs, including official service in three administrations, Vance offered a proven diplomatic skill and a low-key professional style. The most frequent adjectives appearing in newspaper descriptions of Vance are "realistic", "cautious", "self-effacing", "a good manager", a "brilliant technocrat", "incredibly loyal". He has earned credentials for negotiating time and again, in Korea, Panama and Cyprus.

The new secretary's record of experience appears to have been sufficient ground for a whole-hearted stamp of approval from officialdom and the press. But it is surprising that Vance should have won his acceptance so easily. Many other questions might have been asked. Is he representative of the diversity of his party and the country he hopes to serve? Will he be responsive to the neglected economic issues of international affairs and sympathetic to the needs of the developing nations? Will he be able to distinguish between a worthy ally and a tyrannical client, between a genuine national interest and the demands of corporate investment? Does he possess a sense of his own fallibility and a healthy questioning of his country's place in the world? Is he committed to openness and honesty in the execution of his duties? In short, is he the best Jimmy Carter could have offered the country after over a decade of deceit and misgovernment in foreign policy?

Unfortunately the public record does not provide the answers to all of these questions. But perhaps more distressing is the failure of the press to seek answers before bestowing its approval and praise. Familiarity is no guarantee of quality, nor technical proficiency an indicator of policy direction. Yet familiarity and technical skill appear to have satisfied too many observers. For instance, in their editorial on the Vance appointment, The New York Times praised the new secretary's negotiating experience, solemnly concluding that Carter had "chosen wisely." In contrast, The Times asserted in an accompanying editorial that Bert Lance, Carter's choice for director of the Office of Management and Budget, was "an unknown quantity," a man who did "not appear to be suited to play the larger role of helping to shape broad national economic policies" despite his reputation as an "accessible and efficient executive." The same sort of criticism might have been directed reasonably against Vance. But where experience and managerial skill had been insufficient qualifications for the president's budget officer from Georgia, they had proved more than enough for the cosmopolitan secretary of state.

A double standard in this case is hardly justified, but it is an easy route to follow, given the lack of evidence in Vance's record. Perhaps sensing the difficulty, Vance has sought to fill the informational void with a series of recent pronouncements concerning important foreign policy issues. Unfortunately, few of these statements suggest a clear direction for foreign policy under Vance. While Vance has indicated opposition to present levels of American arms sales, for instance, he has failed to specify which countries should no longer receive military hardware. Similarly, in his introductory press conference, Vance emphasized the importance of a "concern, and a deep concern for human rights and the problem of human rights" as a guiding principle in American foreign policy. But given his record as a war planner during the Vietnam years, the latter statement seems conspicuously phrased to offer more a prompted declaration of loyalty to Carter's campaign promises than a substantive measure of personal belief.

IN OTHER DISCUSSIONS, Vance has urged understanding and sympathy for the South Korean government as it attempts to weather the recent bribery scandal involving American congressmen. His reasoning is based on the assumption that South Korean survival depends entirely upon the United States. Even if the assumption were true, it hardly sanctions attempts by a foreign government to undermine American political institutions. Vance has also expressed confidence in the ability of American business in South Africa to bring about gradual changes in that country's apartheid policies, presumably because investment is rarely secure during a revolution. If Vance's stated position on South Korea and South Africa is a reliable indicator, it may be concluded that his emphasis on human rights is a short-lived and underdeveloped conviction.

Despite this recent collection of ambiguous policy statements, Vance's record does offer one important indication of his approach to foreign policy--his years of service during the Vietnam War. Robert McNamara originally brought Vance into the Kennedy Administration where he served in a variety of Defense Department positions. By 1968 Vance had become convinced that the time had arrived for negotiations and he served as one of America's top diplomats at the Paris peace talks. Throughout the entire period, both as war planner and negotiator, Vance strengethened his reputation for technical competence but could not be branded as either a hawk or a dove. That is an achievement of sorts, but not one to inspire security or confidence.

THE ABILITY to follow orders effectively without taking a stand is the stock and trade of the foreign policy establishment; it maximizes the prospects for further government service. Even worse than taking a stand on an issue is for a member of the establishment to "go public" with it, for that not only violates the mutual understanding within the club, but it seriously shortens his public life. It is unfortunate, however, that the demands of official survival so often conflict with the public's need to know what its government is doing, especially when the cost is measured in blood and bone and shattered national integrity. There should always be a deep reserve of suspicion for those men who merely carried on in the midst of the storm, content to silently watch the course of its fury.

While the burdens of Vietnam should not be placed solely upon the shoulders of Cyrus Vance, neither should he be welcomed back to government service with unquestioning complacency. That he has been so welcomed is an unsettling measure of how quickly and easily many observers forget the disasters of the past. Vance played his own particular role during the Vietnam years, a role that is not vitiated by his late support for negotiations, which in and of itself offers no evidence of assumptions questioned or lessons learned.

Liberals have sometimes been criticized for holding a grudge in their judgment of those who participated in the prosecution of the Vietnam War. On the contrary, the history of Vietnam is its own harsh judgment. And it is too much to ask that America's future be entrusted for a second time to these men. It is regrettable that Jimmy Carter and those who received the Vance appointment so graciously do not yet realize that the need for experience in foreign affairs must give way if the experience is one we should not wish to relive.