A WEEK AGO yesterday, amid little publicity, the SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed in Geneva. Despite all of the rhetoric about detente and the need for permanent arms limitations, neither side seems prepared to make any realistic concessions.

Next year's defense budget, submitted to Congress earlier this month certainly reflects an unwillingness on the part of the Nixon administration to halt the arms race. The budget calls for an increase of $6.3 billion over last year's defense expenditures. While inflation accounts for a large portion of the increase, at least $250 million (and a projected $5-10 billion over the next decade) is earmarked for the Pentagon's new family of weapons. These weapons include a larger ther-monuclear warhead for more accurate intercontinental missiles, mobile land-based missiles, jet-powered missiles that can be launched from either submarines or airplanes, maneuverable missile warheads that can home in on a target, and smaller ballistic-missile submarines.

These proposed strategic weapons are part of the administration's new "counterforce strategy," aimed at hitting military targets as well as cities. Smaller, more accurate weapons add a new dimension to the nuclear threat: they make small-scale nuclear strikes feasible, thus eliminating the previous deterrent of vast destruction and increasing the chances that they will be used. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger claims they are needed "to develop a wider variety of options...in crisis situations." But the proposed armaments only lead to a wider variety of options for all-out nuclear war to begin, through conscious choice, panic or negligence.

The significance of "counterforce" weaponry undeniably lies in the administration's "bargaining chips" policy of negotiations, whereby the U.S. seeks to dominate the Soviets at the Geneva conference through greater arms strength.

Defense Secretary Schlesinger justifies this policy by saying that "we must continue to build our peace structure on the hard facts of the international environment rather than the gossamer hopes for the imminent perfectability of mankind." But his argument rests on the assumption that the Nixon administration's theory of a "peace structure" is more sound than anybody else's. And if the expected Nixon appointment of Paul H. Nitze, a member of the delegation at the SALT talks, to the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is any indication of the administration's notions of peace, the negotiations are headed for a dead end Nitze is expected to strengthen the Pentagon's position in Congress. One of the framers of the original containment doctrine during the Truman Administration and an advocate of increased Pentagon spending, Nitze believes that any relations with the Soviet Union are inherently unstable and competitive, that the U.S.S.R. will respond only to strength.

But Soviet technology is catching up. The Soviet Union's recent development of a new line of intercontinental missiles, which should be deployed within the next few months, shows that they are just as reluctant to put an end to the threat of nuclear holocaust.

Ironically the arms race continues to escalate as each side tries to gain leverage over the negotiations meant to stop it.

Ultimately an arms limitation agreement rests on two fundamental principles: a mutual integrity of intention and a readiness to sacrifice the necessary fraction of one's own sovereignty. Since neither the Soviet leadership nor the Nixon administration seems to understand these principles the burden now falls on the Congress. Only Congress can stop the vicious cycle created by the "bargaining chips" policy by stopping new arms production. Congress should not only reject the proposed increases in the defense budget, but also reallocate current defense funds for the improvement of our nation's health, education, and welfare.