PRESIDENT FORD'S admission, in his September 16 press conference, that the United States had intervened in Chile's internal affairs with the intent to "destabilize" the democratically-elected government headed by Salvador Allende--and the international furor which had resulted from previous unofficial disclosures--may well, ironically enough, have had a positive effect on American foreign policy. Ford's blundering explanation of American activities in Chile was a remarkable example of political naivete. When asked whether intervention in another nation's internal affairs designed to weaken the foreign government could be justified under international law, and whether the Soviet Union could feel free to do the same thing in Canada or in the United States, Ford answered very straightforwardly. Failing to appreciate the sarcastic tone of the question, he responded: "I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's permitted or authorized under international law. It's a recognized fact that historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved."

At another point, in an effort to be more specific about U.S. expenditures for covert activities in Chile, Ford claimed that Allende had taken steps to muzzle opposition parties and press, although it was already known that the single incident which the administration could cite was the case of the newspaper, "El Mercurio," shut down for one day and then reopened by court order.

It is not particularly instructive to dwell on the ludicrousness of Ford's attempts to justify America's insidious role in toppling the Allende government and creating the present terrorist regime. The facts speak for themselves, and as more become available through Congressional hearings and investigative journalism, we can hope Americans will listen.

In any case, there is some reasons for optimism. Last week, two senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New York Republican Jacob K. Javits, and Rhode Island Democrat Clairborne Pell, flew to Cuba, ostensibly against the wishes of the State Department. The two Senators had originally informed the State Department--which continues to implement the U.S. policy of non-recognition of Fidel Castro's government--of their desire to make the trip in April. Their request for clearance was rejected in August, according to a Javits aide. Only last month did the Department, though continuing to maintain that it was opposed to the mission, suddenly reverse itself and grant them the necessary clearance to travel to Cuba.

The abrupt change in policy by the State Department regarding the Javits-Pell trip can be understood in light of the explosive hostile reaction of the American news media, and segments of the Congress, to the developing Chilean story. It is possible that the trip was permitted simply for tactical reasons. Perhaps government officials were unwilling to further antagonize the Congress and the press by restricting the right of two Senators to travel, the Administration position having been seriously eroded by the Chilean revelations. Hearings had begun before the Foreign Relations Committee, and it was apparent that perjury indictments against high officials were being considered, and thus it was simply an inopportune time to prevent two members of the committee from visiting Cuba, another nation which suffered--but weathered--malicious American intervention.

If this was indeed the reason that the trip was permitted, if it was purely a political move made by the State Department due to the precariousness of its internal position and the erosion of its credibility, it would still be a positive outgrowth of American crimes in Chile. But there may well be a more fundamental reason. President Ford has not yet publicly commented on the trip, and an aide to Javits said that the President had made no efforts to contact either Senator to prevent it. This appears to indicate that Javits and Pell at least had Ford's tacit approval.

Perhaps the new President, convinced by the uproar over his predecessor's policies in Latin America, has decided that the time has come to implement detente in this hemisphere. Though Ford took a standard rightist line toward resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba while serving as House minority leader, there is no reason to doubt that he might not alter his stance, as he did on both China policy and the amnesty issue. It is reasonable to think that Ford is aware that the continuing exposure of American intervention in Chile can only hinder U.S. foreign policy. By allowing Javits and Pell to go to Cuba, a possible first step in an eventual detente with the Castro government, the President may be seeking to ameliorate the negative international reaction to American involvement in Chile.

Upon the conclusion of his Cuban visit, after meeting with Castro, Javits said that it was obvious to him that the Premier wanted an improvement in U.S.-Cuba relations. It remains to be seen whether the American government will come to its senses and take steps in this direction.

Herbert L. Matthews, a former New York Times correspondent in Cuba who was immortalized by William F. Buckley when the latter charged that Matthews negatively influenced State Department policy toward Fulgencio Batista and thus abetted Castro's rise--as unfounded a claim as Buckley has ever made--recently wrote.

Cuba is now trading with every developed country in the world. Her credit rating is high. There has been far greater progress than in any Latin-American country in education, public health, and social services. The regime has never been more popular and it has a powerful military and police structure to back it up.

Clearly the time has arrived for America's twelve-year policy of hostility towards Cuba to come to an end. Perhaps the Chilean developments accelerated U.S. realization of this imperative.