I

CURIOUS is the process whereby, as Nietzache put it, "a concept desoting political superiority always resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority of soul." Curious, and dangerous. In our century this tendency has been manifested primarily in efforts to disparage the character of those in lower socio-economic groups; since the term "soul" cannot meet the rigorous demands of science, we now rely on modern psychology to provide us with labels such as "working class authoritarianism."

Such stereotyping finds an increasingly receptive audience thanks to the efforts of the communications media: the Wall Street eruption by angry construction workers was given more than ample press coverage and post facto moralizing, the film Joe has received both critical and popular acclaim, Psychology Today issues sell like hotcakes titled with such eye-catching alliteration as "Why Hardhats Hate Hairs."

Given these widespread views, it must come as a shock for many to learn that support for America's bellicose Vietnam policy is least significant precisely in those socio-economic sectors where tolerance and good will are ostensibly at a minimum. Yet this is the conclusion reached time and time again in poll studies. In June 1966 Gallup Poll found that 41 per cent of those with just a grade-school education favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam as compared with only 27 per cent of those with a college education; in September of 1970, the figures were 61 per cent and 47 per cent respectively.

IT IS the thesis of Andre Modigliani, assistant professor of social psychology, that Vietnam is far from sui generis in this respect. In a soon-to-be-published study, Modigliani reevaluates poll data from the Korean War, and finds the same surprising divergence of foreign policy views between socio-economic groups. Most important, Modigliani rejects the traditional hawk-dove scale as a misleading oversimplification of public opinion range.

II

MODIGLIANI defines socio-economic status (SES) in terms of four variables--education, occupation, race, and standard of living. He found higher SES to be positively associated with a greater rejection of disengagement from Korea, while the lower socio-economic strata were distinctly more "dovish" in the sense of being more amenable to disengagement.

But while persons lower in SES are thus not exactly "nasty, brutish, and short," it would be a mistake to idealize their position. For Modigliani uncovers a second statistic: there is no correlation at all, positive or negative, between SES and support for escalation, either in Korea or Vietnam. He points out that a desire for disengagement does not necessarily preclude a desire for escalation as a means to end the war quickly: the approval of military escalation is uniformly distributed among all socio-economic strata. Put simply, support for escalation and support for withdrawal are not mutually exclusive. This fact alone is enough to invalidate the assumption that political preferences can be organized along a simple hawk-dove continuum.

A deeper probing sheds light on the anomaly. After examining particular types of survey questions asked during the Korean conflict and the responses to them, Modigliani concludes that there were two distinct dimensions to political preferences.

On the one hand, a tendency toward "international interventionism" was positively correlated with resistance to disengagement from Korea. As Modigliani emphasizes, the overwhelming majority of those who voiced opposition to disengagement from Korea at the same time affirmed their belief in this broad interventionist spirit, which can best be expressed as an acceptance of the premise that the U.S. should intervene whenever it is necessary to "set things right," especially if it means containing Communism. Modigliani adds: "Though this belief often sanctions benign programs such as economic aid, it would be a mistake to view it as an idealistic sort of internationalism that desires to increase mutual understanding...it is rather more antagonistic in tone..." The international interventionist position had a higher correlation with disengagement opposition than any other political posture investigated.

On the other hand, a tendency toward "administration distrust" was the highest positive correlate with support for escalation in Korea; most people who favored escalation were also suspicious of government activities in general. This distrust seems to have transcended foreign policy, reflecting a dissatisfaction with Truman Administration efforts on a wide variety of fronts, and often including a belief that certain officials were disloyal and working against the interests of the country.

WITH TWO independent sets of attitudes (isolationism-interventionism, and trust-distrust), it is possible to subdivide the Korean War public into four groups, and then make the all-important correlations to SES. Modigliani does this, listing the groups in the order of their socioeconomic rank: 1) distrusting interventionists--want to win the war, favor escalation; 2) trusting interventionists--adhere to present policy; 3) distrusting isolationists--desire to end the war quickly, one way or the other; 4) trusting isolationists--favor an immediate withdrawal.

This listing certainly enlarges upon the two initial conclusions reached by Modigliani regarding public opinion on Korea. The interventionists were concentrated in the two highest socio-economic brackets, and this accounts for the positive correlation between the level of SES and opposition to military disengagement. The distrusters, however, were scattered throughout the scale (very roughly represented by groups one and three); hence no overall correlation emerged between SES and support for escalation.

III

WHAT relevance does this analysis hold for Vietnam and the nature of political opinion in America?