GUERRILLAS IN POWER K. S. Karol Hill and Wang; 1970 550 pp.; $12.50 CUBA: SOCIALISM AND DEVELOPMENT Rene Dumont Grove Press; 1970 238 pp.; $1.75

SINCE last year's Venceremos brigades re-opened interest in the fate of the Cuban revolution, many books deluged the market to meet the new demand. Two of the most recent entries, both translated from French, Guerrillas in Power by K. S. Karol and Cuba: Socialism and Development by Rene Dumont, provide seriously interested readers with the most thorough studies of Cuba's revolutionary problems. Although sympathetic to the ideals of the Cuban revolution, both Dumont and Karol remain pessimistic about Castro's leadership.

These books raise significant questions: What was the relationship of Castro's non-communist July 26th Movement to the Socialist Party, PSP, and why was the Marxist orthodoxy in a back-seat position? Because Cuba's soil is so fertile, the island must have faced serious economic difficulty to make rationing a continuous part of revolutionary existence there. One must also examine present Russo-Cuban relations and its connections with the Cuban's attempt to export their revolution to Latin America.

Karol persuasively discusses these political problems and other decisions the Cubans have faced. Although the depth of his analysis cannot be disputed, his book gives no clear picture of the people's daily lives. While Karol criticizes Castro for not restructuring the social relationships, Karol, himself, neglects to delve into the nature of these problems. He only hints, for example, that education and male-female roles are still very backward. That these relationships have survived the revolution indicates some serious misjudgment in priorities.

Despite some of Dumont's arrogant posturing, Cuba: Socialism and Development gives a concise overview of the Cuban economy. Even though the book originated in French in 1964, two afterwards reasonably update the work. And Dumont covers the material with more knowledge than his predecessors. The book rewards, if only because its discussion of Cuba's economic development is in a field whose dearth of information endangers future experiments.

KAROL focuses on why Russian strategy as pursued by the Cuban PSP failed miserably. During the 1930's the Comintern line dictated Communist party coalitions with bourgeois groups, making a united anti-fascist front. Batista, then in power, at American urging welcomed the legitimacy brought by collaboration with the popular PSP. This work-through-the-system strategy, however, meant an ideological retreat for the militants as they had to accept Batista's policy with little power to criticize. Stalin repudiated the PSP, because he rightly felt that this interpretation of the Comintern strategy led to dangerous revisionist theories which would de-emphasize class struggle. Having lost its main support from Russia, the PSP found itself compromised and isolated. Cold war anti-communism and attacks on trade unions, the radical stronghold, dealt a final blow to the revolutionary potential of the floundering radicals.

Castro, surfacing politically around 1952-53, recognized the necessity of forging a completely new alliance based on social justice. The turbulence and speed which characterized Castro's rise to power was to make an important imprint on Cuba's revolutionary reconstruction. Unfortunately, Karol says too little on this struggle or of Castro's role of inspirator and catalyst.

These years of revolutionary activity, 1952 to 1959, culminating in the is land's liberation, clearly demonstrated the pathetic plight of Russia's influence in third world revolutions. In 1956 Khrushchev initiated the new Russian policy of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, especially America, and encouragement of the peaceful transfer to socialism in non-communist countries. Insurrection activities were out of the question for Russia's allies particularly in 1959 during the friendly Camp David phase of Russo-American relations. As a result, the PSP stayed in the background, viewing dimly Castro's armed uprising.

The Castroists found themselves in an unusually good position upon taking power. Their struggle was short and relatively smooth. In 1959 they occupied a fertile island undamaged by war. Yet the quick success of the revolution inclined the Castroists toward equally quick solutions to deeper problems. With past experience as a guide, Castro expected the building of socialism to be little more taxing: popular zeal and good will would surge the country forward in the first days of liberation. This optimism, though illusory in the long run, characterized Castro's new relations with Russia.

These countries became allied closely in '61 for misguided political and economic reasons. Khrushchev' diplomacy hit a new low in late 1960 after the embarrassing U-2 affair. Eisenhower supported his generals over his new ally, washing away the good will of Camp David. Khrushchev, in addition, had just repudiated the Chinese by withdrawing technical advisors. To retrieve his lost stature, Khrushchev was in need of a militant ally. There stood Castro in dire economic need and loudly proclaiming his country a member of the socialist community.

The friendship proved to be a mismatch. Russia poured in experts, goods and equipment with little idea what Cuba needed. The Cubans in turn expected miracles from their new ally and banked on fancy experts to solve their problems for them. But when Karushchev's new cane cutting-machines mangled every stalk they touched, it became obvious that these experts and their machines were just Russian bears. Their pre-set ideas of development based on an Eastern European model could not help agrarian Cuba.

Karol emphasizes that important detailed studies, that could have guided planning, were not made. In addition, this failure characterized the Castroist leadership. As a result, they relied on piecemeal reforms, never reaching the basic problems.

With relations strained, the missile crisis of 1962 marked the end of an era of Cuban domestic and foreign policy.

According to Karol, the Russians forced the missile crisis to make credible their de-Stalinization program based on peaceful coexistence at the international level. Khrushchev's main goal in this adventure was diplomatic recognition of East Germany, hoping, as Karol argues, "to force America to accept coexistence on a world scale." A show of strength on America's doorstep would bring concessions on Russia's border, or at least so Khrushchev thought. Karol emphasizes that Khrushchev lied to make Castro believe America was ready to invade again, scaring the Cubans into accepting Russian military protection. As a result of the fiasco, Cuban-Russian relations soon deteriorated.

To understand the problems Cuba faced alone in 1963 one must turn to economic questions so well covered by Dumont, one of the world's foremost socialist economic experts.