IT'S AN OLD cliche to say that we live in confusing times. But it is no help when history books tell us that America's "right" to expansion is merely its "manifest destiny." Given such euphemisms, it is little wonder that the reality of America's heritage remains obscure.

In search of a better understanding of twentieth century imperialism and the rise of socialism, Ramparts editor David Horowitz has written Empire and Revolution. In it, he manages to condense turgid material into a very readable overview of these problems.

His thesis begins with a standard radical analysis of the two major world forces: capitalism represented chiefly by America especially after the second World War, and the communism of Bolshevism and Maoism. Horowitz stresses the nature of these ideologies and various misinterpretations and myths. Following the critique of his mentor, Isaac Deutscher, to whom he dedicates the book, Horowitz outlines Bolshevik theory, the interaction with the bostile West, and the ensuing revisions in Russian policy and goals.

The Russian Revolution, runs the argument, caused a direct and prefound reaction in the capitalist world. Though the Bolsheviks'inteniton was not so much to cut Russia off as a market but to incite European revolutions, Horowitz shows how England and America directly intervened to organize the counter-revolutionary White-Guard to lead the civil war. His discussion reopens a controversey closed by historians for many years. Recent interpretations have vastly underplayed the role of the Allied interference in the Russian Revolution, but Horowitz resurrects much of E. H. Carr's classic three-volume work (1953), The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923.

Considering also Deutscher's studies of Russia, Horowitz shows that the intervention did not stop the revolution itself but did succeed in freezing European revolt. The consequences rebounded back to Russia provoking Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country." In effect, Russia had to rethink completely the role of its revolution: Russia would have to stand alone despite Lenin and Trotsky's earlier admonition against such prospects. Above all, the Russian Revolution succeeded in turning the focus of revolution from industrialized Europe to the third world: the center of imperialism.

Horowitz outlines the causes of the Second World War through class analysis, synthesizing works of such Leftist scholars as Barrington Moore Jr., Franz Neumann, and A.J.P. Taylor. Much clarification of this subject is needed as World War Two has seemed to contradict class analysis; one would expect that the capitalists would have united against Russia. Horowitz, however, shows that the contradictions within capitalism itself were of paramount significance. While Russia was a central focus of Germany's attack, the war was, in fact, fought to contest imperialist hegemony. Class alliances were forfeited during the war as Western experts expected Russia to collapse quickly under German onslaught. At conflict were two social systems, one based on bourgeois-democratic forms, the other feudal-military. The belated bourgeois revolutions of both Germany and Japan were challenging the established domain of the technologically advanced West. Although this section of his argument is too brief to stand as a convincing analysis, many of the questions Horowitz raises are dealt with more thoroughly in other works (of Frank Neumann's Behemoth which Horowitz often cites).

Rearrangement of alliances soon after the end of the conflict resulted in the Cold War. The reconstruction of Germany and Japan was to be effected under Western guidance. America, meanwhile, arose as a super power, with the result that both England and France were forced either to set their empires free or turn areas, such as Southeast Asia, over to American forces. Given this analysis, the new industrial struggle with Japan becomes clear. By means of protectionist policies Japan has rebuilt its economy to challenge American markets both domestically and in developing countries. If Japanese militarism widens, problems between these two super-powers are likely to expand beyond the present tariff war to a major clash. Unfortunately Horowitz doesn't deal sufficiently with the substance of this new struggle with Japan.

In pursuing the Cold War in Europe it became necessary for the West to focus on the "Red Menace" which had survived Germany's pounding. The "Truman Doctrine" constituted reaction against this new threat to international capitalism. Coupled with this ideological war, Horowitz continues, was the essential problem of rebuilding the old socio-economic system. The Marshall plan provided the necessary flood of funds for such a reconstruction.

HOROWITZ'S provocative discussion unfortunately opens more questions than it could ever answer, as indeed it must. A 258 page book which attempts to deal with sixty years of world history can at best try to be an overview of the subject. While Empire and Revolution is a credible and generally successful attempt, there are many problems with the book.

Inherent in the immensity of the task are organizational problems. The topical structure of the book necessitated much repetition of discussions such as Nazism and Bolshevik ideology. This often gives the analysis a vague and rambling quality.

More importantly Horowitz fails to discuss two important themes related to socialist revolutions which have occupied much attention by Leftist writers recently. Why do bourgeois (capitalist) revolutions fail in some countries? And what problems arise out of differences in the economic development models of socialist countries?

Trotsky's concept of "permanent revolution" challenged capitalist hegemony in Third World countries. It stressed the possibility of by passing the bourgeois economic stage moving directly from feudalism to socialism. Belated bourgeois revolutions could be directly challenged instead of promoted by communist revolutionaries.

In China this capitalist drive for power was undermined by foreign imperialism which destroyed the old Confucian system and worked to inhibit the growth of an independent bourgeois class. Only the CCP, the strongest domestic force, could unify the country. Across the Sea, Japan stood as a classic counter-example. How could Japan achieve isolation and peacefully transform to an industrial power? Horowitz only circles this basic question. He mentions the belated bourgeois development in Germany and Japan in his discussion of fascism, yet he ignores the unsuccessful bourgeois revolutions in Russia and China.

The problems and crises of the Russian and Chinese revolutions necessitated different answers which reflected, in part, two economic development models. Russia chose to use bourgeois incentives of pay differentials to create an industrial elite of management and trained experts. Mao, on the other hand, challenged Russian socialism in his 1956 commune program. In effect, he said that rapid industrialism was not necessary to achieve security and that moral exhortations alone were sufficient to rouse the populace to work. Thus, a new ideology developed alongside Russia's. Third World politics among socialist nations such as North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba have since been dominated by debates over these two ideologies. But while Horowitz's last section deals with the prospects of Third World revolutions, it fails to show the effect of this Sino-Soviet ideological split.

It is unfortunate that Horowitz's Empire and Revolution will only arouse attention in radical or academic circles. But given America's ideological composition, it seems hardly accidental that there is such a dearth of radical historical analyses in the public educational system.