To the Editors of the Crimson:

I was disappointed in the majority position of the Crimson editorial Board (Dec. 8th) on the issues surrounding Professor Richard Herrnstein's "I.Q." article and in the minority position signed jointly by Messrs, Jeffrey Baker, Michael Levenson, and Daniel Swanson. The majority editorial was disturbing because it argued, in effect, that intellectual freedom is not a value in itself, separate from political considerations.

Although the majority editorial paid lip-service to intellectual freedom (e.g., "we uphold Herrnstein's right to publish his theory") in practice the editorial characterized the relationship between intellectual activity (ideas) and politics in such a manner that the former is willy nilly coincident with the latter. For example, the editorial asserts that "the boundary between ideas and actions is an academic distinction," and that "it would be a mistake to think that ideas are less dangerous than actions," Precisely the same assertion is made, though more explicitly discarding intellectual freedom, by Messrs, Baker, Levenson, and Swanson: "The issue," they claim, "is whether there is to be a moral amnesty for mere theorizing, whether an academic community is free to disseminate any idea, consequences be damned."

But the majority of the editorial board and Messrs. Baker, Levenson and Swanson cannot have their cake and eat it too. They must face the fact that formulating the nature of intellectual freedom in the manner they do is tantamount to denying intellectual freedom. Either the intellect is free from extrinsic limitations or it is not. To state, as Messrs. Baker, Levenson and Swanson do, that "political circumstances are not to be ignored...it is political considerations that must decide the terms of any debate," is simply to deprive the intellect of an intrinsic freedom.

The Crimson editorial board and Messrs. Baker, Levenson and Swanson are free to take this position, but in doing so they should recognize that they are in keeping with a long tradition of enemies of intellectual freedom, including the Medieval Church, Fascist Germany, Communist Russia, and the McCarthyites.

In regard to the issue of the modes of opposition or criticism acceptable in a university community, the majority editorial is veritable mishmash. First, the majority editorial is wrong in charging that the signers of the public Faculty statement were seeking "to eliminate acceptable forms of opposition to Herrnstein's though." The Faculty statement was crystal clear in its concern with unacceptable forms of opposition in a university community, which included false and offensive placards and leaflets (as David Landau's article on Dec. 7th fully demonstrated), threats to disrupt classes, and picketing. As a signer of the Faculty statement I consider these thoroughly unacceptable means of criticism in a university community; for it is, after all, in the nature of a university community that formalized means of coercion must be shunned in order not to fetter the primary means of interaction or contest in a university--namely, reasoned dialogue.

There are, no doubt, numerous grounds for criticism of Professor Herrnstein's masterly essay--as he would be the first to grant--but it must never be forgotten--especially by those who grasp the delicate status of intellectual freedom in modern society--that the mode of criticism or opposition is as important as the criticism itself, if not more so. I believe that the mode of criticism chosen by the opponents of Herrnstein's article is not only unacceptable in a university community, but, what is worse, it plays into the hands of numerous detractors of reason, on both the Right and the Left. Alas: I think the SDS and UAG critics are themselves detractors of reason, and it is unfortunate indeed that the majority of the Crimson editorial board and Messrs. Baker, Levenson and Swanson have not had the good sense to recognize this. Martin Kilson   Professor of Government