While the air war reaches peak intensity throughout Indochina and fighting accelerates in Cambodia, it may be wholly inappropriate to discuss two of the so-called "humanitarian" problems: prisoners of war and forced civilian relocation.

Although Nixon has sanctioned continued bombing, his advisor Henry Kissinger let the French press know (November 17) that the U.S. has decided to reconsider the Provisional Revolutionary Government's seven points of July 1. These humanitarian issues may serve Nixon as a way to communicate flexibility to his Vietnamese opponents. On the other hand, these issues create serious implications for the United States and for the cause of world peace.

In recent months, Nixon has found it more difficult to manipulate the prisoner of war issue. One reason is that since June a group of prisoners' wives has publicly stated their belief that their husbands remain imprisoned because Nixon views the maintenance of U.S. troops in South Vietnam as a prerequisite for the continued existence of the Thieu regime.

In Washington on September 28 in an unscheduled speech reported by the London Times, President Nixon reassured the prisoners' wives that the North Vietnamese are a "savage enemy" devoid of "humanitarian ideals."

Given Nixon's emphasis on "humanitarian ideals", it would be interesting to hear an explanation from him of the following:

In a June 28 press statement, Amnesty International--a British-based organization with a special interest in the cause of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience--announced that a counsellor of the South Vietnamese Embassy had sought Amnesty's help last January concerning North Vietnam's treatment of "persons kidnapped" from the South.

On March 20, the leaders of Amnesty agreed that their chairman, Sean MacBride, should visit Vietnam. "To discuss and examine the treatment of political prisoners in North and South Vietnam; to make representations to the respective governments for the release of prisoners of conscience; and to discuss and examine the conditions, treatment and possible release of civilian and other prisoners detained as a result of existing armed conflict."

On April 2, Mr. MacBride met with the South Vietnamese Ambassador in London. The Ambassador did not refer to the unsuitability of any particular date, and his embassy subsequently sent MacBride a visa application. However, the Ambassador did express doubt that a visa from the North Vietnamese would be forthcoming.

When they learned that North Vietnam had agreed to the visit, the South Vietnamese delayed issuing a visa. When Amnesty attempted to reroute the visit so that MacBride would first go to North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese ambassador in Paris stipulated that MacBride's visit to North Vietnam was contingent on prior issuance of a visa for a visit to the South.

At the beginning of June, the South Vietnamese ambassador wrote MacBride that the timing of the visit was inappropriate, because the officials MacBride would want to see, "were too busy to receive him."

Since the "election" in South Vietnam ended long ago, a visit by MacBride could not possibly upset the political balance in the South. After his visit there, MacBride could proceed to investigate treatment of American prisoners held in North Vietnam. Surely Nixon, who has bemoaned the fate of the prisoners for so long, would not prevent such an inspection trip.

As American strategists envisioned, the intensive bombing of the Indochinese countryside has stimulated the urbanization of the area. In the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, however, people continue to live in the countryside, which is why the U.S. and Saigon sought earlier this year to resettle these residents in areas of the far South. Unfavorable publicity in the U.S. press forced the cancellation of relocation plans.

Why should relocation occur? The U.S. was either planning to step up the conventional bombing of northernmost South Vietnam and-or to use tactical nuclear weapons to stem infiltration from North Vietnam. In either case, but especially in the case of tactical nuclear weapons, it would be more "desirable" to have the civilians out of the way beforehand.

At present, observers in South Vietnam report that no large-scale removal of civilians from northern to southern South Vietnam has begun, although at the October 28 session of the Paris Talks, the delegate of the Provisional Revolutionary Government did report that forced relocation of residents of Gio Linh and Cam Lo districts of Quang Tri province had taken place; on December 2, the same delegate stated that relocation had been stepped-up.

Observers in South Vietnam anticipate that large-scale shifts of population will begin very soon.

As a result of the intensification of the war in Indochina and of the air war in particular, the North Vietnamese government has ordered its people to build bomb shelters in the event of B-52 raids. During a recent visit to Peking, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong hinted that he expects that the U.S. will again threaten to use tactical nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, the prisoners of war languish, and Saigon is planning forced relocation of large numbers of civilians.

Similarly, the fate of the Bengalis slaughtered last March and April mattered little in Nixon's calculations. Now there is a full-scale war in the Indian subcontinent, and another is brewing in the Middle East. Nixon may condemn India and North Vietnam, but he will not gain his "generation of peace" by invoking faded morality or by varying the quantity and kind of bombs dropped.