War watchers squinting at the light at the end of the tunnel should read a report by Arthur Smithies. It might open their eyes.

Smithies, Ropes Professor of Political Economy and Master of Kirkland House, submitted an unpublished study on economic Vietnamization to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) presidential election.

The report predicts a continuation of the fighting and a massive American presence in Vietnam well beyond the 1972 presidential election.

"There seems no likelihood that negotiation with the North can result in rapid or early demobilization of this force (of 1.2 million South Vietnamese soldiers)," Smithies writes. "The best planning assumption seems to be military stalemate and withering away of the war, a process that can last for a decade or more..."

The study--"Economic Development in Vietnam: The Need for External Resources"--is not Smithies' only report on Vietnam, and other economists and political scientists are doing similar work for the government.

Each uncovered report is another piece in the Vietnamization jigsaw puzzle, providing a glimpse of what is to come.

When all the pieces are in place, the vision of the future promises to be a refined and mechanized version of the past. The improved model will undoubtedly surpass its predecessor in efficiency and popularity. It may also be far more long-lasting.

But the picture is still very incomplete. The Smithies report was first dredged up in a September article by Jacques Decornoy in Le Monde. In that article Decornoy also mentions a study which Emile Benoit, professor of International Business at Columbia, conducted for the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

In his semi-official report--to which Decornoy says "the State Department attaches great importance"--Benoit bases his recommendations on "a Hanoi withdrawal," an elimination of NLF influence in the South, and "the projected ending of hostilities by 1973." Reasoning along lines that resemble those traveled by Smithies, Benoit writes, "If hostilities end without a peace treaty, it seems likely that large defense budgets will persist through most of this decade." Later he notes, "Even at best, Vietnam is going to be militarily top-heavy for quite some time."

The plans of both Benoit and Smithies rest on an implied political foundation: a pro-American, anti-Communist, antisocialist government in the Republic of Vietnam. Such a government would be bolstered by enormous amounts of U.S. aid. Benoit suggests that between 1970 and 1975, the United States should supply the Republic of Vietnam with $4 billion of economic aid and defense expenditure, plus another $9 billion of military aid. Slightly less generous, Smithies proposes a stream of foreign aid amounting to $5 billion during the next decade.

Both men would like to see multilateral agencies lift some of the financial burden from the sweating shoulders of the American colossus. However, the distasteful political system they posit will repel most nations. Smithies' plan takes that into account. "The most suitable multinational arrangement would be a consortium (including) the U.S., Japan, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Korea and the Philippines," he writes. "But the club should not be exclusive. Canada, for instance, should be included."

In his eagerness to graft capitalist enterprise onto the Vietnamese economic organism, Smithies ignores possible rejection reactions caused by the incompatibility of American-style free enterprise with Vietnamese cultural beliefs. As Alexander B. Woodside, assistant professor of History, observed, "All Vietnamese intellectuals, Communist or not, think in terms of the collective management of the economy." Yet Smithies' concern with the "market system" is overriding. Discussing the distribution of a agricultural inputs and sale of outputs, he notes, "The record of government performance so far is not impressive." Some might attribute this failure to government corruption and inefficiency. Smithies sees it as a confirmation of the advantages of free enterprise. "Strong encouragement should be given to private enterprise in this area," he writes.

Insensitivity to Vietnamese culture has been a keystone of American policy. Smithies devotes a few paragraphs to the people whose future he is planning. "The population is hardy and vigorous, particularly those that have come from the North," reads a typical passage. "The Chinese influence and incessant wars over the centuries have produced hardier stock than has (sic) Cambodia, Thailand and other countries that have been subject to Indian influence."

The American influence has overshadowed that of the Chinese in recent years. And while Smithies details many of the disasters--soaring rise in imports, festering corruption, defoliated forests, etc.--he is quick to note the advantages the Americans offer along with their gift of war. "The war has provided Vietnam with paved highways from end to end, with more airfields than it can possibly use, with spectacular harbors, with an elaborate communications system, with power plants, and with potable water in Saigon," he explains, adding, "While it is impossible to make an accurate inventory of the changes in the infrastructure during the war, the impression is inescapable that the plusses greatly outweigh the minuses."

The Smithies report is not a piece of serious academic work; it is more a roughshod analysis scraping along the surface. It is a product of a policymaker, although some of the policies, such as the aid allotments, are clearly unrealistic. Smithies' assumptions are more interesting than his conclusions.