The Report of the President's Commission on an Air-Volunteer Armed Force. 1970.

SINCE 1948, when the present draft law went into effect, numerous suggestions have been made on ways to reform the draft. Those who object to the arbitrary workings of draft boards have advocated a more standardized system of draftee selection, such as the lottery. Others, concerned with the injustice of deferments for the rich and privileged, have recommended an end to college deferments. Neither step leads to equity, however, for even in a no-deferment lottery system, some must serve while the vast majority of eligible males need not.

Since conscription is basically unjust, programs requiring everyone to serve are hardly the solution. The answer is not to reform the draft but to repeal it.

Without promising that he plans to do so soon, President Nixon has said that he hopes to replace the draft with an all-volunteer military. Shortly after his inauguration, he appointed a commission chaired by Thomas Gates (a former Secretary of Defense) to study the feasibility of an "all-volunteer armed force."

This commission, in its report last February, recommended that pay scales for first-term officers and enlisted men be raised, on July 1, to typical civilian levels for men of the same age and with comparable skills. Estimating the cost of this step at $2.7 billion, the commission predicted that the pay raise would attract enough new volunteers during the year to make ending the draft possible on July 1, 1971, when the present draft law expires.

The commission estimated that the pay raise was sufficient to maintain a volunteer force of 2.5 million men-the size which Nixon has declared to be optimal for the post-Vietnam situation. In its report, the commission considered the possible costs of forces of up to 3 million men. A force of that size would cost considerably more than a force of 2.5 million, the commission estimated, since additional volunteers above the 2.5 million level would become increasingly hard to attract.

Since the military presently includes almost 3.5 million men, it is hard to understand how the commission could predict an end to the draft by 1971. especially with pay increases calculated to maintain a force of only 2.5 million. Even earlier this year. when the commission's report was completed, significant reductions in the size of the military seemed unlikely in the near future.

But if the report provides no logical basis for anticipating an early end to the draft, it does offer some encouragement that the draft could be ended as soon as the war is over.

The draft has become a very important mechanism for providing the men needed for a military as large as the one we have now. But, the commission shows that the draft becomes much less important in a military of 2.5 million men. In the early sixties, when the military was only slighter larger than this, over 70 per cent of new enlistees each year were volunteers. Raising military pay-and depending a little more energy on recruiting-could probably be sufficient to maintain an army manned entirely by volunteers.

THE GATES Commission was very careful ??mine all the present objections to an all-volunteer army. One criticism is that an all-volunteer military would consist largely of the poor and the black the commission pointed out that even at present lattes of pay, these groups are already motivated to enlist in disproportionate numbers and that an army paying salaries comparable to those in civilian life would, in fact, attract somewhat more well-to-individuals who have less trouble now getting job in the civilian market. The commission estimated that the percentage of blacks in an all-volunteer army, although greater than their percentage of the population, would scarcely exceed their membership in a military retaining the draft.

Another objection to an all-volunteer army is that it would not be flexible enough to meet our security needs." The commission did recommend the institution of a stand-by draft for cases of emergency, but pointed out that a draft is of little use in a short-run emergency anyway, since it requires six months to a year to train new recruits. In national emergencies like the Berlin crisis and the Korean war, it was the Reserves who allowed in immediate expansion of the active military. the commission noted.

The draft's usefulness as a mechanism for gradually expanding the military is one of its chief dangers. Under present draft law, the President is able to establish draft quotas by executive order. Without permission from Congress. Presidents Johnson and Nixon were able to enlarge the military by almost one million men. The Gates Commission recommended that activation of the proposed stand-by draft be made possible only with Congressional approval. This restriction would enable Congress and the public to debate any large-scale expansion of the military, and therefore, any decision to engage the country in a large-scale undeclared war.

One further objection to an all-volunteer army is that a "professional military" would be out-of-place and dangerous in our democratic society. The Gates Commission dismissed this objection by noting that the present military-especially the officer corps-already includes a large proportion of career soldiers.

The draft has been a major cause of dissent in this country and its repeal may weaken this dissent. This danger does not justify a retention of the draft. But repealing the draft will not end the militarism out of which the draft arose, and the Report of the President's Commission for an Effective All-Volunteer Armed Force should remind us of that.