To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

Since there have been several articles and broadsheets on the Development Advisory Service's work in Indonesia a few facts may be useful.

The DAS first sent advisors to Indonesia at the request of the Soekarno Government in 1963. The advisors continued their work until early 1965 when the Ford Foundation, the financial sponsor, decided that it was becoming too difficult and dangerous to have foreigners live in Indonesia. This decision came after the houses of British citizens had been burned (one of the DAS advisors happened to be from the UK). President Soekarno called in the Ford Foundation representative and strongly urged that the Foundation's work, including the DAS project, continue. In fact, the project did continue throughout the rest of the Soekarno regime, but no long-term resident foreign advisors were living in Indonesia.

It was during the period of this project that the only Indonesian military man studied at the Center for International Affairs (or in any other part of the University as far as I know). Colonel R. Pirngadie was sent by the Soekarno government, primarily to study economies and management, since he was slated to be in charge of the government's tin-mining operation. On his return he became director of the nationalized tin mines, and later was in charge of the Indonesian pavilion at the World's Fair for the Soekarno government. Pirngadie was dismissed after the end of the Soekarno regime.

From early 1965 to 1968 the DAS had no advisors in Indonesia. More than two years after the failure of the Communist attempt to seize power the first DAS advisor again arrived in Indonesia. The economists who were one of the influential groups in forming the Goverment's economic policies (groups of senior military officers are also influential) had asked the DAS for a small (4-5 economists) advisory group. Since the economists, unlike the Soekarno regime, were fully committed to economic development and a fight against inflation which had particularly affected landless laborers and the urban poor, the DAS agreed to provide such a team. (Soekarno had many times expressed his contempt for the significance of economic problems.)

So much for the factual background. There are also some points in your October 8 issue which deserve comment.

Many of the stories on the DAS seem to be based on a greatly exaggerated notion of the role of DAS advisors. In Indonesia, for instance, they work with a group of economists who are first-rate professionals, with strong views of their own. Many took great risks, including imprisonment and death, in retaining these views. They may turn to their staff and foreign advisors for help on a broad range of technical problems, from the organization of a works program, to the analysis of an investment proposal, or the drafting of a document, but anyone who has ever seen them at work would regard as ridiculous any implication that they are puppets with foreigners at the other end of the strings. They and the political leadership they advise make their own decisions on whether and how to stop inflation or on policy with respect to foreign investment. It is a bit patronizing to assume that they, unlike American students or intellectuals, make decisions because they are unduly influence by their education and advisors, rather than because they have analyzed their country's situations and decided what would be in its best interest.

Second, your article does not make clear the nature and purpose of the report from which your quotes are drawn. It was a personal report by me on the conclusions I drew about the Indonesian situation after a visit to that country. Written to inform my colleagues at Harvard (not addressed to anyone in the Indonesian or any other government), it included my impression of the people, the economy and the political situation, and speculated on future developments. I am puzzled by the relevance of my personal report on the political and economic situation in Indonesia to the issue of the DAS political "support" for the regime. A reporter is usually not necessarily either a supporter or opponent.

There are a couple of historical statements in the article, which have only a very peripheral connection with the DAS. But for the sake of historical accuracy they are worth pointing out. There are no "industrialists" in Suharto's "retinue," or anywhere else in position of power, since nearly all major Indonesian industrial firms are state-owned. Much more important is that the present regime did not come to power by an "anti-Communist coup." There was an attempted Communist coup, supported by the Commander and officers of the Air Force, the Community party newspaper, armed units of the Communist youth and women's organizations, and so on. This coup group killed all senior generals they could capture and took power in several major cities, including the capital. The Indonesian Communist party had previously (1948) attempted to seize power while the nationalist movement was fighting the Dutch armed forces for independence. The revolutionary forces supporting the Indonesian fight for independence later formed the backbone of the Indonesian Army and many never forgave the Communists this attempted stab in the back. None of this history in any way justifies the widespread killings by Communists of their opponents before the attempted coup, nor does it justify the slaughter of Communists and others afterwards. However, the Communists failure in their 1965 coup attempt does not turn what happened into an anti-Communist coup.Development Advisory Service Center for International Affairs

P.S. The CRIMSON articles raised some important questions, the SDS broadsheet is merely scurrilous. For those who may wonder what the quote from me really refers to: it was in response to a question on the success of the Ford Foundation's efforts to train some hundred Indonesian economists (asked by an interviewer who expressed great interest in technical assistance, for an article that would "probably" appear in "Harpers"). I said that the project was an excellent example of technical assistance - "We couldn't have drawn up a more ideal scenario . . ." for an effective training program.