Two Central Intelligence Agency analysts are studying this year at the East Asian Research Center (EARC), and their presence has created a boiling controversy on the relationship between the government and the university and on the moral responsibilities of the scholar.

The controversy is revealed in a correspondence of 15 letters this summer among John K. Fairbank, director of the center; Ezra P. Vogel, associate director; David Riesman, Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences; and two EARC graduate students. The five concluding letters of the correspondence, between Fairbank and student Jon Livingston, appear today; the first ten were in yesterday's Crimson.

11. Livingston to Vogel: Scholars responsible for "use" of their work. 14 Sumner Road   Cambridge, Mass. 02138   August 16, 1968

Prof. Ezra Vogel

Behavioral Sciences Center

202 Junipero Serra Boulevard

Stanford, California 94305

Dear Prof. Vogel,

I would like to respond directly to two very important questions in your letter--the issue of the scholarly search for "truth" and the broader problem of the complicity of China scholars with the government. Then I will try to explain my personal criticisms of the professional syndrome that has produced such complicity and uncritical acceptance by scholars of near genocide, salvation-by-destruction, etc.

On the first point, I am pleased to see that you agree with me generally on the political implications of scholarship and on the emotional, controversial nature of vital political problems. Moreover, I agree completely with your emphasis on accuracy and truth. I have gradually come to accept Noam Chomsky's position on this issue; namely, that truth tends, by definition, to be radical and subversive of the existing order. This may in fact be a rationalization on my part, but it seems to be a reasonable stance. Thus, a political line can never justify the distortion of truth -- I am still enough of a "scholar" to believe in this much. However, I must also say that I believe over-reliance on "reason" is basically escapist. Reason is simply and only a tool, to be used to further whatever ends one wishes.* It is not an end in itself, in spite of the desire by many to worship such procedures as reason, logic, and pragmatism as cardinal virtues. This view fits neatly into American-style utilitarianism, especially since a "resort to reason" is continually used to justify existing conditions, exhort others to be practical, etc. Frankly, I have no use whatsoever for practicality and reason unless they are subordinated to basic human needs. Otherwise, reason is nothing more than oppression (compare the misuse of this concept with the equally distorted "free" in the mythical "free world").

But to get to the immediate issue: Yes, I do think Asian scholars are complicit, in or to be more exact responsible in some sense for, the government's China policy, even though they "quietly ... voiced objection to the China policy while continuing to work within the government in an advisory role." It seems to me that there are two main aspects of this: the moral and the practical.

Morally, a scholar is, quite simply, responsible for the ultimate "use" to which his work is put. There is no room for complaints of misuse when the "output" is so painfully evident in the forms of support for Chiang Kai-shek, containment of Communist China, and the application of scholarship in Vietnam, etc., etc. Logically, those who have contributed to the making of China policy are obligated to make public their part in that sad misadventure and take the knocks that are assuredly coming. More people than Dean Rusk are due credit for the past decade's debacle--lots of academic China experts had their fingers equally much in the foreign policy pie. How to go about establishing political innocence I really couldn't say. But one thing is clear: most of the top academics in Chinese studies have had a hell of a lot to do with arranging the mess we are now in.

Practically, there is much less ambiguity. The discernible results of your (and others') efforts to influence policy from within the system are virtually zero -- more a holding operation than anything else, and hardly a sweeping tide of reform. The Nation of August 19, referring to American support of Franco's Spain, could very easily be pointing at China scholars bent on "subverting" the government:

American spokesmen talk of humanizing the regime from within -- which is what people always claim they are doing when they cannot otherwise justify a distasteful alliance, and which in this case does not seem to have been a conspicuously successful instance of foreign infiltration.

In your own terms, and certainly in any measurable sense, liberal-university subversion of government departments and policies has been a total failure. The only apparent "success" is an ever-expanding government collaboration which results in providing legitimacy and support for government policies. So much for "getting results." There is no need for me to preach about moral purity or evangelistic idealism ... this is plain pragmatism.

One other facet of this situation is what James Thompson convincingly described, in his Atlantic article, as the "effectiveness trap." This is surely one of the most apparent failings of academics when it comes to dealing with the federal government. Virtually everyone is paralyzed by the desire to retain influence and effectiveness; and for many this activity becomes a consuming need, far more important than sorting out rights and wrongs. No one is willing to commit himself morally because that might short-circuit his links with the power center in Washington. It is difficult to decide whether these people are prevented from taking dissident stands by the lures of government funds and being "where it's at," or whether they don't have the minimum moral outrage to even want to dissent. In any event the result is the same: they are silent when silence has a rather damning, not neutral, quality to it.

At a time when some of us are on verge of virtually putting our lives on the line in order to halt the crimes our government is committing in our names, the response of faculty members in the profession most intimately tied to the war is revealing indeed. They have, of course, expressed their vague, somewhat inarticulate discontent with what is going on "over there." Yet, there is an unmistakable hint of Business As Usual. Throw the CIA out of Harvard? Don't be immature or rash--let's work this out rationally; after all, we want results, now, don't we....

I cannot presume to decide for anyone but myself what ought or ought not morally be done; for even in the heyday of t.v. and mass culture, conscience still remains an individual activity to the extent that it still intrudes uncomfortably on our consciousness. I simply know that I am incapable of rationalizing away the horror of Vietnam or the related, concrete immediacy of the CIA on our doorstep, and I will have a straight answer 20 years hence when I am asked, "Where were you when...?" I am also beginning to understand what the neutrality of scholarship really means in human terms; its euphemistic clarity is like that of a mountain stream: crystalline and shallow at the same time.   Sincerely,   (signed)   Jon Livingston

*See Bertrand Russell's Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p. viii, for a thorough discussion of this point.

12. Vogel to Livingston: "Moral purity" trap.   202 Junipero Serra Boulevard   Stanford, California 94305   August 21, 1968

Mr. Jon Livingston

14 Sumner Road

Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Jon:

One virtue of disputation is that it clarifies the issues and the points of disagreement.

One issue on which we disagree is the capacity of academics, especially Asian scholars, to influence governmental policy. I believe you underestimate the contempt which most working governmental officials have for the opinions of academic specialists who are not working within the government on current events. I really do not see anything any of us academics could have done that would have made much difference on our Vietnam policy even if we had seen the absurdity of the policy and the course it would take with the foresight we now have in hindsight. Did Roger Hillsman or Jim Thomson or even Arthur Schlesinger's resignation from the government help bring about a change? To be sure, there is an "effectiveness trap," but I think one might say there is a "moral purity" trap too, for the person who remains morally pure accomplishes little except to salve his own conscience.

I think you even miss the role CIA analysts have played in Vietnam. From what I gather from friends in Washington, the CIA analysts come closer than anyone else to getting our government to see the absurdity of the Vietnam policy. Would these men have contributed more to themselves, to policy, to the government if they had left government service?

I agree that scholars' efforts to change government policy from within the government (I would rather say the "periphery" than "within" for they are not given major roles in ordinary decision) has been a failure. But so has the efforts of scholars from without.

You are, of course, right that faculty have often been spineless and that they have not sacrificed themselves to help students escape from military service. But how many students have sacrificed themselves for faculty when faculty faced various kinds of problems (smears in McCarthy days, etc.)? To be sure, everyone is willing to fight harder for things that most concern him than people who face less immediate difficulty. I do think, however, that many of us would be willing to exert ourselves more if we were persuaded we could really help. My point about CIA officials at Harvard is not "don't be immature" or "don't be rash," but that this is attacking the wrong guys and not doing any good in what most of us feel is the main task: getting our governmental policy changed. Not that I have the answer, but I don't think this is it.  Sincerely,  (signed)  Ezra F. Vogel

13. Livingston to Fairbank: A CIA proposal.  14 Summer Road  Cambridge, Mass.  20 August 1968

Prof. J.K. Fairbank

E.A.R.C.

Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Prof. Fairbank,

I apologize for the hyper-moralistic tone of my last letter, but, as you may have guessed by now, the issues I talked about have assumed an importance they would never have in a peace-time situation. For someone directly threatened by his government with a term in the military as indentured killer-mercenary or with a probable jail sentence, these issues go far beyond professional ethics. For the sake of clarification and continuation of the "dialogue," I would like to take the offensive more coolly this time, as I have been doing concurrently with Prof. Vogel in California. But this is not an especially meek apology, for the object was, after all, to foment discussion; and as we all know, you yourself are not above "provocative" tactics....

To summarize my feelings briefly, I believe that getting "good results" when taking action is an admirable goal, but that, in some circumstances, there is an absolute moral imperative to take action that may or may not produce "good results." If there has ever been such a time for Americans, it is surely now. Regardless of your immediate political position on Vietnam (short of unqualified support for the containment of Asian Communism by "any means necessary"), you must admit that the results of our actions have been, in practice, inadvertent genocide. Our original goals may have been decent, although support of an oligarchic dictator is hardly praise-worthy, but we long ago should have admitted defeat; indeed, it is increasingly evident that there is no justification for even having wanted to win. Our cause has never been particularly just; it is now a dark stain on the American conscience.

Furthermore, it is important at this point to be blunt and honest about what we mean by "reason" and pragmatism. If your definition of them somehow extends a blanket approval to current status-quo foreign policy, to the "responsibility of power," and to anti-communist assumptions, then we are not talking about the same animal. For me, reason and rationality are useful intellectual tools for uncovering the truth and for thinking effectively. Reason has never been for me an end-all, be-all sort of thing: when rationality and pragmatism gain too iron a hold over my life, then it's usually time to get a little "irrational" and break their grip. In short, I don't worship "reason" any more than I go out and prostrate myself before the MBTA subway because it transports me as efficiently through the Massachusetts underworld as "reason" does through the academic-intellectual jungle. Indeed, they both tend to break down with alarming frequency, and are probably not to be trusted too faithfully.*

Still more important, though, is the conflict here between principle and expediency. At what point does a person find himself compelled to say "no" to an expedient (even "reasonable") measure and declare his ethical-moral position? I cannot prescribe a formula for something like this as a doctor might; rather, I am suggesting that (1) there are often cases when a position simply must be taken, fully aware that the consequences may not be very desirable, and (2) there is no doctor; each individual must decide for himself on the proper course of action; no oracle or soothsayer is around who can give even the minimum of advice. Thus, I find myself forced by objective, observable events to recognize what is an absolutely insoluble contradiction: being practical and reasonable is impossible if I am to retain any shreds of sanity or honesty. Is a time of "saving" cities by destroying them one when a thinking person can sit on the sidelines and be "reasonable"? I would suggest a distinct and, if you will, moral "no." In this instance principle and expediency have become mutually exclusive.

What does this mean in terms of immediate action? It translates very simply: this is the time to draw the line. I propose, therefore, the following:

The various Harvard departments and programs concerned with East Asia, in conjunction with the East Asian Research Center, will announce publicly that henceforth their policies with regard to CIA personnel (analysts and operatives) would be to exclude them altogether from participation in any Harvard Asian programs. As long as the government continues to practice genocide in Vietnam, condone oppression in Taiwan, cause subversion in Thailand and Laos, and minister to immoral objectives in its Asian policies generally, that we would feel constrained by our consciences neither to participate in, nor to allow Harvard facilities to be used for, such purposes. "Toleration" cannot justifiably extend to institutions devoted to the destruction and oppression of Asian peoples.

What, in turn, will this produce in the way of results and consequences? Since I am not trying to avoid difficult questions, I will admit that the results may not be entirely pleasant. Perhaps exclusion of CIA personnel might mean a gradual cutting off of federal funds for the EARC, or the rise of barriers to Harvard faculty desiring to enter government service, or a deficiency in the ability of "analysts" and others to correctly determine foreign policy. I hope I have accurately anticipated your worst fears, for to me, at least, none of these would be particularly distressing in the long run, though perhaps momentarily troublesome. In fact, they would actually be welcome because they would lead to a vitally needed reassessment of many problems. For example, just how desirable is it to be financed primarily by federal and federally-minded (foundation) funds? How does an institution maintain its independence in such a situation? Perhaps alternate sources of money should be located. How bad could it be for the government not to be able to make "efficient" policy decisions? Given a Johnson-Humphrey approach to world affairs, the real need is for intellectual sabotage to the point where making foreign policy is as hopeless as ending the farm surplus problem--and its solution as drastic. Until visionary, or even decent and more humane, people retake the White House and the decision-making nexus, our job is to obstruct the government in every conceivable way -- if we do, in fact, have mankind's best interests at heart, and not merely a chauvinistic longing to keep the brainless bureaucracy running at top speed. This doesn't necessarily require a positive commitment to a specific ideology or program, just the realization of what America has in mind for the rest of the world is probably worth trying to prevent.

Does this seem as though I am saying of our government, "presumed guilty until proven innocent"? If so, fine. The past twenty years leave some room for doubts (in Europe, for example), but the case is overwhelmingly against us. A new start can only be made with the acknowledgement of our own implication in the Cold War and with a powerful commitment to sweep the academic environment clean of reactionary atomic idiocy and nonsensical desires to "make the world safe for (American capitalist) 'democracy'..."  Sincerely,  (signed)  Jon Livingston

*See Bertrand Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics, esp. p. viii.