Although the Administration has advanced many explanations for America's military involvement in Vietnam, careful study indicates that fear of Chinese foreign policy underlies this involvement. The aspect of China's foreign policy most frightening to Washington is Peking's encouragement of "wars of national liberation." The Administration hopes that its response to the "war of national liberation" in Vietnam will not lead to war with China.

* How aggressive is China?

* How real is the danger of Peking-directed "wars of national liberation" sweeping throughout Southeast Asia?

* How great are the chances of war with China?

Our analysis, outlined below, shows that it is an exaggerated fear of the potential effectiveness of China's foreign policy which lies at the root of American involvement in the war in Vietnam.

* China has not acted more aggressively than other major powers. Like them, she has countered threats to her borders with vigorous military action.

* Revolutionary "wars of national liberation" cannot succeed without a solid nationalistic basis. Since nationalist revolutionaries do not take orders from China or from any other outside power, successful "wars of national liberation" do not involve a direct expansion of Chinese power, and hence do not threaten America's vital interests.

* If China feels that her borders are threatened, she will not hesitate to intervene in Vietnam--as she did in Korea. The Administration's policy of continued escalation is leading to war with China.

The potential effectiveness of China's foreign policy does not justify the continued prosecution of the war in Vietnam. We believe that American interests would best be served by an early end to the war and withdrawal of American military forces from the area.

During the last twenty years, high American officials have repeatedly misunderstood China's interests, intentions and capabilities. In the 1950's, scholars who saw through the myth of monolithic communism and called attention to the peculiarly Chinese nature of communism in China were denounced as something less than honest, wise or loyal. In contrast to their view, Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, proclaimed that Mao's government was only a puppet of Moscow: "The Peiping regime is a colonial Russian puppet government. ...It is not Chinese." He and his colleagues also insisted that China would not enter the Korean War. They were wrong then, and they are still wrong today.

Chinese Aggression

President Johnson, in his famous speech at Johns Hopkins, told us that our concern with China underlies our war in Vietnam, that "Over the war, and all Asia, is ... the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers of Hanoi are urged on by Peking....The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purpose." The Administration constantly assures us that victory in Vietnam is needed to stop aggression, to stop the spread of Chinese power. How aggressive is China?

Perhaps the most fundamental motif of China's foreign policy has been a concern to secure and defend her borders. When able to attain this end by peaceful and diplomatic means, as in the case of border treaties with Burma and Pakistan, China has done so. But when foreign armies crossed the 38th parallel in Korea and headed for China's Yalu border, Peking ordered its army to stop that threat. And when India refused to allow give-and-take negotiations about a disputed border, the Chinese army took what Peking considered to be her share of the disputed territory. In both cases, when this minimum security was won, China's army was withdrawn inside China's borders. In the absence of direct challenge to her territorial integrity, China's army has stayed at home.

Although the Administration uses words such as "aggression" and "Munich" to evoke emotional support for its policy in Southeast Asia, it readily agrees that there is no oriental Wehrmacht poised to blitz the world. It recognizes that, in conventional terms, China's foreign policy has been militarily very conservative. The Administration does, however, fear that unless it acts decisively in Vietnam, "wars of national liberation"--which it has defined as a new style of "aggression"-- will engulf the underdeveloped world as surely and easily as Hitler's armies rolled across Europe.

President Johnson, speaking at Omaha in June 1966, argued that "What happens in South Vietnam will determine--yes, it will determine--whether ambitious and aggressive nations can use guerrilla warfare to conquer their weaker neighbors." The Administration views the underdeveloped world as a dry tinderbox of social and economic injustice ruled by weak and inept regimes; it believes that a spark from China may engulf the whole third world in revolutionary flames; it fears the emergency of increasing numbers of "regimes responsive to Peiping's will." How tenable are these views of "wars of national liberation"?