(When the Faculty of Arts and Sciences voted for the second time in January not to discuss the draft, Thomas C. Schelling, Professor of Economics, organized a 14-member group to study the United States military manpower system.

"I had the impression that no one, including me, knew what he was talking about at the Faculty meeting," Schelling says. The group, organized under the Kennedy School's Institute of Politics, met for 10 Saturday mornings to educate themselves on the selective service system. Initially, it did not intend to release statements, but three weeks ago released the following preliminary report, which was agreed upon unanimously by the 14 members.

"We held widely differing views on military and foreign policy and on Vietnam," says Schelling, "and initially we weren't confident we could settle issues as well as raise them."

Schelling organized the group from interested friends in the Economics Department, the Faculty members who first proposed the draft discussion at the December meeting of the Faculty, and one Professor of Law.

They are John T. Dunlop, David A. Wells Professor of Political Economy; Samuel P. Huntington, professor of Government; John Rawls, professor of Philosophy; Henry Rosovsky, professor of Economics, Charles Fried, professor of Law; Stephen A. Marglin '59, assistant professor of Economics and coorganizer of the group; Gerald D. Rosenthal, assistant professor of Economics; and Lester E. Thurow, assistant professor of Economics.

Three graduate students specializing in military manpower were also on the groups Graham Allison, Jr., Stephen L. Canby; and Robert V. Zupkis, Robert E. Herztein, a Washington attorney, and Jack W. Carlson, a Washington economist also attended the meetings.)

I: Abolish Deferments

All young men whose age, mental and physical fitness, and educational attainment qualify them for military duty should be equally eligible for conscription. Nobody needs to be deferred or exempted at age 19 or 20 on grounds that his career plans and educational intentions make him too valuable a citizen to go into the Army, or make it a national interest that his, and not others', service be postponed a few years.

The economic benefits of discriminating among young men are modest, and largely confined to the young men who benefit. It is even doubtful whether, in the interest of a student's education and career, the best time to do his service is after completion of college.

II: Lottery

If, as should be done, specific deferment of students is abolished, or comparable postponement is made equally available to all young men, the number of men eligible will exceed the number needed by the military services. The means of determining who serves and who does not serve, within this eligible group, must be fair and non-discriminatory and must appear fair and non-discriminatory both to those who are selected and those who are not. We know of nothing but a random process--a "lottery"--that will meet their conditions.

We therefore recommend choice by lottery.

III: Higher Military Pay

Military pay should be increased sufficiently to attract, in the absence of hostilities, at least two and one-half million men. There is no magic in this figure. It corresponds to what, a few years ago, was acknowledged to be the approximate "peacetime" level of the armed forces, less one or two hundred thousand that we believe might be replaced by civilian employees during the coming years. Nobody can exactly estimate the pay scale required to reach this goal; but pay scales must be set with some goal in mind, and this should be the goal.

In time of hostilities, the additional men needed, and any short-fall of enlistments below this goal, should be acquired through the draft, preferably by lottery.