King Constantine dramatically announced Sunday that the Greek military junta will allow 20 experts to draw up a constitution within six months. Although it represents the first concession made by the reactionary rules since the coup a month ago, the plan does not guarantee a return to a representative government.

There is no assurance that the experts writing the constitution will be anything except puppets of the regime, nor has a date been set for a popular referendum on the proposed constitution. The junta has made no commitment to hold elections even if a majority approves the constitution. And no provisions exist in case the Greek people are allowed to, and do, reject the proposals.

The announcement is already being seen as a tactical victory for Constantine, who has portrayed himself as the major force for stability and democracy in Greece. With the support of Phillips Talbot, the U.S. Ambassador, Constantine has cooperated with the junta (while making known his disapproval) ostensibly in order to apply internal pressure for a return to representative government. Through his friend and spokesman, Times columnist C.L. Sulzberger, Constantine has attempted to convince the U.S. public that he is "pressing subtly but persistently for the restoration of democracy while, in the meantime, rallying potentially discordant elements in order to avoid the risk of violence."

But as past experience shows, Constantine is no champion of the democratic process. In fact, he was largely to blame for the military takeover. During the two years before the coup, he stubbornly refused to allow elections in Greece. He cooperated with the right-wing in setting up a series of puppet governments. When the constitution prevented him from postponing elections any longer, he appointed the rightist minority as the caretaker government to run the elections. During its previous tenure in government in 1961, this rightist party had flagrantly rigged the elections. Despite attempts at another manipulation this year, all indications were that the liberal Center Union party of George and Andreas Papandreou would still win the vote. Both the king and Ambassador Talbot openly opposed the Papandreou party, thus encouraging a coup at least indirectly.

Constantine may be successful in forcing the military to restore a civilian government that fulfills his own notion of "democracy." The U.S. should not be satisfied with the king's very limited concept; nor should this country rely solely upon him to exert influence on the military rulers.

So far the State Department has refused to apply pressure forcefully or openly against the regime. By controlling the Greek press and radio, the junta has led the urban literate and the rural folk to believe that the U.S. was solidly behind the coup. Secretary McNamara's recent warnings to the Greek minister of defense were misrepresented in the Greece newspapers as "understanding approval."

The U.S. has shown disapproval by withholding a few flashy planes and tanks -- a fact which never reached the Greek people. It is the minor hardware and spare parts that constitute the crucial part of America's $78.7 million in annual military aid. These materials must be withheld if the U.S. is to cripple the coup and demonstrate its concern for democracy to the Greek people.

The State Department has been reluctant to hold back essential supplies, and thereby possibly weaken the army, on the grounds that a serious cut-off might also weaken NATO. This argument overestimates the importance of the Greek army in the NATO structure, as well as the long-term effect of a provisionary cut-off. Diplomats also contend that the fall of the junta might lead to civil war. But to buttress the present dictatorship with military aid in the name of stability would be morally wrong and also eventually lead to a more bitter reaction from the oppressed people.

Without directly intervening, the U.S. can apply effective pressure on the junta by halting all military aid until the Greek leaders agree to restore a constitution acceptable to a majority of the people. The U.S. should insist, as a precondition for the resumption of military aid, that free elections and genuinely representative institutions be established within a short and definite period of time.