(Following are excerpts from the "Boston Memo," a statement circulated by 13 Harvard and Boston area SDS members to SDS chapters at Eastern colleges. The paper served as a focus for discussions in the conferences which preceded last weekend's Spring Mobilization.-Ed. note.)

With extension of the ground war to North Vietnam impending, the opportunity has come for us to expose the consequences of the Administration's actions before the fact, before the country has been prepared to accept this further escalation. Up to this point, as American involvement in Vietnam has been a series of incremental steps, most of which have seemed to flow logically from previous steps and to be, in themselves, rather small, the progression of increasing destruction has come to be accepted almost as a matter of course by the American people and even by the anti-war movement. There has never been a clear confrontation of what these steps taken together mean for us and the Vietnamese. It is now time to make this confrontation.

Many of us writing this memorandum have not been specifically involved in the anti-war movement for some time. Our common criticism of it has been that it is too preoccupied with middle-class protest activity. This activity, while encouraging in some respects, has failed to educate and organize a powerful base even in its own constituency; much less has it established links with the working-class and low-income people who also object to the war. Many of us have been working through community and labor organizing and related activities to build a base among these people. We feel now, however that while opportunities to do this kind of organizing still exist (and may, at the moment even be increasing), both the probable course of the war and the low level of personal commitment in the anti-war protest movement seriously threaten the growth of the kinds of political activity that will be crucial in the next year.

While the anti-war feeling in this country has grown, the anti-war movement itself has failed to produce large numbers of politically educated people who are seriously committed to doing the organizing necessary to build a base which, and only which, can sustain a radical movement.

At the same time, we think that the next qualitative escalation and intensification of the war will shape the politics of this country in a way that not only will require an even greater commitment from those who oppose the war but, indeed will affect the very possibility of our continuing the work we consider most important.

In the last few weeks, substantial evidence has come to light which indicates that the Administration has decided to escalate the ground war to North Vietnam....The Administration seems increasingly to believe that only withdrawal or substantial concessions by the North can open up the possibility of an American victory in the South and it is pressing this view through greater escalation including, we are convinced, sending ground forces into the North. New means of bringing pressure include the continued expansion of bombing target (although there are fewer and fewer of these left), and bombardment from the fleet of the Northern coast and artillery based at the edge of the DMZ. We can only guess what is to follow, although North Vietnamese attacks against the artillery positions suggest that a "counter-attack" may come soon.

The evidence suggests to us that: 1) Johnson is committed to total military victory in the South: 2) he believes that decisive military pressure on North Vietnam holds out the only hope of victory: 3)ground troops are already anticipated and will undoubtedly be necessary to effect such pressure.

We believe that this new escalation, if pursued to its logical conclusion will mark a qualitative shift in the war because: 1) it must lead almost inevitably to general Asian land war, since it seems unlikely that the North Vietnamese will back down or, in turn, that the Chinese will permit the U.S. to destroy the North: 2)it will thus fundamentally alter the possibilities for political organization in this country by destroying the limited war mythology which has been the basis for the liberal peace movement. As many more millions of people feel the direct life and death consequences of the war, there will arise a wartime atmosphere of crisis and political repression, affecting not only the peace movement but all other attempts to organize in the society. As the strategy of the Administration, though backed by enormous resources, is nonetheless a strategy born of desperation, the impending escalation and preparation for an extended land war will result in serious internal political consequences. Although most of us organizing in communities have only been marginally affected by the war thus far, we will soon find that when national solidarity becomes of paramount importance to those waging the war, they will not tolerate internal dissent-about anything. Within our own and other organizations we must begin to prepare for this eventuality. Extended escalation will affect the character of domestic politics on another front as well: with or without a declaration of war, dissent will soon be regarded as treasonous. Strikes will basis for the liberal peace movement the trickle of federal dollars for social projects will be shut off completely. Certainly, on the one hand, these conditions will open up new fronts for organizing but as we have noted above, the government will be unable to tolerate any dissent, as its grip on a domestic consensus becomes even more tenuous....

Until recently, the worse the war became, the more vocal opposition it created. Now, Johnson's "hard line" has pulled the props out from under the liberal-moderate congressional objectors who in their image-conscious way have depended for much of their legitimacy on the President's propaganda about limited objectives, early withdrawal and desires to negotiate.

...Unfortunately, the anti-war movement itself is involved in these public-relations images, and is likely to be seriously demoralized, both by the escalation and by the disappearance or substantial retreat of Congressional opposition and other established dissent....There is a very real danger that frustration is leading to feelings of imponence which may immobilize potential organizers. Nonetheless, we believe that the anti-war movement is capable of making a significant, immediate response in the face of the new situation and that it must do so if it is to maintain its integrity and its identity as an independent force that cannot be turned off by Johnson. We believe that, for the first time since the bombing of the North began, we are at a point where, the anti-war movement could draw the line and confront itself and the American people with the consequences of further escalation. If we fail to do this now, no matter what kind of long-range projections we make, we lose an opportunity, essential to our future, to force people to give basic reconsideration to what they have been doing in and out of the anti-war movement.And it is that consideration, that penetration of consciousness, that creation of a new sense of urgency that is needed if we are to be able to master a significant, long-range response.

To us, that response should be largescale, staged civil disobedience, followed by a long-range, concerted effort to develop a political and organizational thrust to the anti-war movement. Schematically, we should propose the following sequence for civil disobedience. First, everything should be done to bring home to as many people as possible the fact that a qualitative shift in the war is occurring. In addition to mustering and expanding the factual information we have the individuals who are receiving this memo should begin to gather groups to discuss the current situation and contemplate local and national responses. Our experience in Boston has been that it takes a long time for the importance and gravity of the current situation to sink in; most of us have had a tremendous resistance to coming to grips with that.

The argument must be made that now is the time to draw the line....Our approach is and should be to ask people for maximum commitment.

Tactically: We are divided about the specific form of our tatics; it is still debatable, still to be decided. Some of our thinking is that civil disobedience should be organized around the demand that Johnson make an unequivocable statement directly to the American people that he will not send ground troops into North Vietnam, for it is at that point that most Americans will be able to see the direct threat to their lives posed by the present policies. In no case, however, would we avoid condemning the war as a whole or retreate from our long-standing demand for withdrawal from Vietnam.

Organizationally: The program should be staged over time. Our first step should be to prepare to use the Spring Mobilization as a recruiting ground. Ideally, the need and the plan for civil disobedience should be made from the podium with a period of time during the rally devoted to actually committing people to civil disobedience, according to the plan above, so that by the end of the day it could be announced that a thousand people were committed to go to jail if our demands are not satisfied. People would also be committed back to their communities to organize others to join them.

The next week would be devoted to just that, through meetings, teach-ins, contacting community groups, etc., to recruit people for civil disobedience. Then after a week of mobilization the first wave of people would go to jail-probably in Washington, in demonstrations aimed at the Executive. Starting with perhaps fifty or a hundred people would be sent in waves each day, increasing in number. There would be a serious attempt to have each wave led by prestigious people and to use the press and the media as much as possible. Jail without bail for many is important, probably critical. People should be psychologically prepared not to back down should long sentences be made a threat or a reality.

Local demonstrations should be organized including possible local civil disobedience but with a special emphasis on involving and reaching people beyond the usual anti-war constituencies. Petition campaigns might be used to provide popular support for the demand against invasion and to interpret it to large number of people. It is clear that a series of complementary activities would be generated by any program of large-scale arrests, and that through the crises of arrests a spirit could be generated to lift people out of their lethargv. It is even possible, though not probable, that the kind of national crisis which could be created before the fact would force Johnson to back down.

People who go to jail and stay should be accompanied by experienced organizers who will undertake political education in jail.

Throughout the demonstration we should articulate the need for immediately begining programs to create a larger and multi-class base for the anti-war movement, the need to integrate an anti-war line into present base building political organizing efforts, and the need to build connections between both types of programs. Hopefully, the force generated by the commitment to resistance involved in such a program of civil disobedience will provide the impetus to get anti-war base building programs significantly under way. We are convinced that no demonstration less serious than this will suffice to initiate these programs nationally. We are also convinced that no radical political organization can be built through a period of extended war without these programs.

In the meantime, some of us should begin to take on roles which will extend beyond the organization for civil disobedience, specifically to take an leadership and training responsibility in building local organization that ties the anti-war movement to radical base building activity. These are a number of good examples of what this could mean in poor and working-class communities as well as in middle-class ones. What is necessary is that people with an organizing perspective begin to work with these movements.

That, in essence, is our proposal. It is skeletal both because of time and space, but also because we understand that the problem must be worked