The confusion over Arthur J. Goldberg's impending visit has made it clear that the Kennedy Institute's Honorary Associate Program, at least in its original conception, took little account of the possible conflicts between carefully drawn educational plans and strong political feelings.

Late last summer, the Institute's director, Richard E. Neustadt, invited a group of distinguished public figures to come to Harvard "not to make speeches or give lectures but rather to engage in wholly informal interchange with students (and faculty) in a relaxed setting." The low-keyed nature of this program, Neustadt felt, would produce the most educational benefit for all concerned: students and faculty could find out how the minds of public officials worked, and the officials could see whether academically-oriented insights were truly relevant or useful in public affairs.

Neustadt came to feel that the value of the visits would be seriously jeopardized if critics of the visitors were able to force some sort of open and acrimonious confrontation. But the concern and, in many cases, disgust with which a substantial portion of the University community viewed the war in Vietnam threw a monkey wrench into the Institute's delicately wrought design.

And in the first three and a half months of the program, two of the Associates would be Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Ambassador Goldberg. both prominent spokesmen for, and advisors to, President Johnson on Vietnam.

Students for a Democratic Society felt that the Johnson Administration had consciously failed to confront those critics of the war who questioned its very premises, moral and political. SDS saw the McNamara visit and, later, the Goldberg visit as prime opportunities to force the long-awaited confrontation. But the policy-makers at the Kennedy Institute, until the disruptive demonstration on Mill St., underestimated the frustration and consequent furor of the anti-war movement. In keeping with the original formulation of the Honorary Associate Program, any debate with McNamara was categorically ruled out.

After the Secretary of Defense was forcibly detained outside Quincy House, the University Administration stepped into the controversy. It joined the Institute in negotiating with the SDS leadership. Dean Monro stated that any recurrence of the McNamara incident could lead to disciplinary action against student participants.

Yet on January 23, Michael Traugot, an SDS cochairman, wrote Neustadt to ask for an open debate between Goldberg, the next Associate, and "a serious critic of our government's Vietnam policy." Officials of the Institute, of course, continued to believe that a debate--with lengthy statements and rebuttals by Goldberg--would undermine the whole Honorary Associate program.

Another confrontation seemed inevitable--one with far more serious consequences in light of the Monro's statement that demonstrators might be disciplined.

Then, on February 2, Goldberg wrote Neustadt requesting a public meeting at which he would answer questions about American foreign policy. What motivated this request remains unclear, but an understated problem of "saving face" immediately arose: how could the Institute sponsor a public meeting without abandoning the position it had held to so firmly during the McNamara visit?

Don K. Price, dean of the Kennedy School of Government (of which the Institute is a part) came to the rescue by offering to release Goldberg for a limited period to the jurisdiction of Dean Ford, who would sponsor the meeting. The confrontation could then be held under the nominal auspices of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences--and when it was over, Goldberg would reach his original destination: the Institute.

SDS also faced some difficulty when it found out about Goldberg's request. Despite the vagueness of Goldberg's language, SDS quickly recognized that a formal debate was out of the question.

The SDS leadership perceived a moral conflict. Some members felt that the queries of the anti-war movement should dominate the meeting. After all, the consistency and intensity of SDS were probably responsible for the very existence of the meeting. On the other hand, SDS knew it didn't hold--and couldn't claim to hold--a monopoly on the different kinds of objections to Administration Vietnam policy.

Like the Institute, SDS saw that its original aims could not be achieved intact. So it agreed to participate in a meeting at which all views on the war could be voiced, in the hope that SDS members would still get a chance to press Goldberg. For its part, the Institute managed to escape the onus of sponsoring a meeting which violates one of its original guidelines--but the Honorary Associate program remains unchanged in many of its essentials. Both sides have compromised, and both have done so without appearing to compromise their basic positions.