The political weakness of Chancellor Erhard should not deter the administration from delivering the coup d'grace to the Multilateral Fleet, and other related plans for nuclear sharing, during the German leader's visit this week. Despite the criticism this move will arouse in Germany, the U.S. must make clear its unwillingness to give Germany control over nuclear weapons. This position is essential to the success of negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have insisted that the U.S. formally renounce all plans to give Germany a hand on the trigger of nuclear weapons. Plans for nuclear sharing such as the MLF were designed originally to satisfy and forestall Germany's supposed craving for atomic weapons. Although the MLF would give the Germans no more than a veto on the use of certain ship-borne missiles, the Soviets suspect that this might lead to more extensive German control in the future. They do not believe that Bonn will be content with such veto-power.

The formal burial of the MLF will add to the Chancellor's political problems in Germany. Erhard's position has become increasingly delicate as a result of his Christian Democratic Union's defeat in the important North Rhine Wesphalia state elections. The Armed Forces crisis over the pressure from German generals for more authority within the defense establishment has furnished the Social Democratic opposition with powerful ammunition against Erhard's government. And Germans in general are worried about the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawals, and doubt the determination of this country to defend them in case of Russian attack.

But the MLF is already acknowledged to be dead by most Germans, and the impact of a formal announcement should not be as damaging as it might have been in December of 1965, during Erhard's last visit. The ominous threat of nuclear proliferation, moreover, requires that this country make every effort to remove the remaining obstacles to a treaty with the Soviets. The visit this week will not provide an opportunity for fully defining Germany's nuclear role. But the U.S. can at least affirm that it has abandoned schemes for nuclear sharing.

To help restore the popular support that the announcement would cost the Chancellor, the U.S. could ease the terms of the off-set agreements, which require Germany to buy a total of $675 million in military equipment this year to balance U.S. dollar expenses in keeping troops in West Germany. The Germans want to count missile purchases in fulfilling their obligation, and have pointed to their worsening balance of payments in pleading for this change in the agreements. So far they have bought only one half of the necessary equipment, but the U.S. has refused to allow them any modifications.