The recent bombing raids on Hanoi and Haiphong did more than pour burning oil on the troubled waters of Vietnam. The decision to bomb the oil depots close to civilian centers sparked a domestic and international debate with highly explosive overtones.

The announcement and execution of the bombing came practically simultaneously with qualified assurance from the Administration that the United States was winning the military war. Immediately after the bombing, additional assurance came from Pentagon experts that China would not enter the war as a result of the air attack.

Step up the Ladder

In spite of the official optimism, many people were more concerned than elated over our tactical coup. Some felt it was another step up the ladder of escalation in a futile war. Others were worried over headlines indicating that North Korea had pledged support to the Viet Cong and that Great Britain, until now one of our staunchest allies, drew the line at attacks on civilian centers.

Although in general critics became more critical, and supporters more enthusiastic, both factions were asking the same questions:

* Are we really winning the military war, and if so how will it effect our chances of negotiating a successful peace?

* Was the bombing a military necessity, what was the reason for timing it at this juncture, has it simply entrenched the North Vietnamese more firmly than ever?

* Is the slogan that we are fighting to raise the price of aggression an accurate description of our war effort in Vietnam?

* What are the international consequences of the bombing; is the U.S. becoming more isolated while North Vietnam draws sympathetic support?

* Is there a significant split emerging in our government between politicians and generals who would prefer to push our serial tactical advantage as far as possible?

At Harvard opinions differed radically. Albert M. Craig, associate professor of Japanese History, said that although he read the same newspapers everyone else did, he did not see any new evidence that we are winning the war. The Viet Cong seem to be stepping up their enlistments, so that one can't judge how well we are doing by the number of enemy dead. On the other hand, he continued, thousands of villagers are leaving the countryside and coming to the cities, which would imply that the Viet Cong will have fewer people to fall back on. The United States will probably be able to control major territories if it sends in upwards of 450,000 ground troops, but Craig wondered if this would be winning the war.

George H. Quester, instructor in Government, and head tutor in Government, disagreed. "We won't be driven out of Vietnam--the figures are credible that the North is losing more troops, and they will have to stop before we do." Quester said that the Viet Cong had been expecting a military victory, and that the reversal will probably cause hem to lose the momentum they have had until now. But he admitted that prospects still remain uncertain.

Of course, bombing the oil depots in the North, Craig said, won't help the Viet Cong. What bothers him more are the reports that from two to six civilians are killed for every Viet Cong on our regular bombing runs in the South. Craig added that it was perfectly possible that our bombing Hanoi and Haiphong had simply entrenched the resistance of the North Vietnamese. More crucial is whether we really know what we would negotiate for. If U.S. terms are a coalition government, Craig said, than the Viet Cong should be perfectly willing to negotiate with us because it would be virtually impossible to keep them from gaining complete control. On the other hand, if we expect to "clear the Communists out of South Vietnam," then the job is of impossible dimensions and negotiations are futile.

Weakened Position

Quester said that although it could be impossible to get rid of all the Communists, they might be forced into abandoning the revolution as they did in Greece. As to Craig's objection that we didn't really know what our negotiation terms would be if we ever got to a peace table, Quester pointed out that it would weaken our bargaining position if we let the opposition know "what we would bargain for." You can't do much haggling, he explained, if the other party knows your limits.