When Senator Robert Kennedy and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey disagree, or seem to disagree, on the possibility of Viet Cong participation in a provisional or permanent Vietnamese government, thoughts automatically turn to 1972. Of course, we have been reassured since their recent interchange of statements and press conferences that both men are actually supporting the Administration's policy. But it is the tone and not the substance that counts in this kind of squabble. And the difference in tone was so sharp that one had to view the incident as round one of a fight that will probably end in the Democratic National Convention of 1972.

There is plenty of evidence that the participants are aware that they are being measured against one another. The Vice-President, while discharging his duties, has taken care to make himself attractive to the public. During his Asian tour, he seemed to be following carefully the instructions of a confidential memorandum on "improving his image" that was reprinted in Newsweek several weeks ago. Humphrey's enthusiasm for the current South Vietnamese government and his natural ebullience seemed a little out of place in a country that has been at war for twenty years, especially in comparison to the sombre mood of his more experienced companion, Averell Harriman. But the pictures of the Vice-President exchanging cheery small talk with infantrymen and returning the salutes of Vietnamese Boy Scouts fit in perfectly with the memorandum's recommendation that:

The missing elements of yourself must be put back into the picture. They are you in physical action: moving, traveling, visiting, climbing, worshipping, hunting, fishing, sailing, boating, hobbying, reading, studying, thinking, sitting, gazing, looking, working, shirt-sleeving, gardening, flying and cooking.

Robert Kennedy's remarks about the Viet Cong gave Humphrey a chance to follow the memo's instruction to add "a touch of the harder and sterner side of your make-up which [is] in need of showing to more people."

Whether the showing of his harder and sterner side to more people has helped Humphrey to improve his "image" is hard to say. Humphrey's main problem is no secret: he is simply not so popular as Robert Kennedy. The confidential memorandum, after all, was precipitated by a Gallup Poll which showed that many more Americans would like to see (and could imagine seeing) Robert Kennedy than Hubert Humphrey as President of the United States.

Although any long-range prediction is subject to error, the urge to predict is overwhelming when the Presidency is at stake. By now it is hardly possible to doubt that the voters will have to choose between the two--presuming that they remain in good health, etc. Humphrey will certainly be running hard, and there will be too many people pushing Kennedy forward for the Senator to resist, if he cared to.

That means a series of Humphrey-Kennedy primary battles, with Kennedy likely to come out ahead. Humphrey will inherit all the Administration's unpopularities--a back-breaking burden if the Vietnam war is still going on. Kennedy will have a clear advantage of the already-begun do-se-do maneuvering--Bobby to the left, Hubert to the right. Kennedy can keep making more and more liberal statements and never risk his standing with basically conservative big-city Roman Catholic voters that form the bedrock of his support. Humphrey, on the other hand, can lose the temperamental self-conscious liberal vote all too easily. There is evidence--boos at the California Democratic Council convention, for instance--that this group is already slipping away from him.

Kennedy's vote base should give him solid leads in primaries north of the Potomac and the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. He will win almost no delegates from the South, but he is likely to carry the big-city delegations. Humphrey has recently taken to courting New York and Philadelphia Democratic machines, but it is unlikely that their present defeat-prone leaders will be around in 1972. In any case, city bosses will be inclined to support the candidate more likely to do well in their bailiwicks, and they will not fall to notice that Kennedy will be far ahead of Humphrey among their Negro and Catholic constituents.

It may seem early to be counting convention votes and foolish to ignore a very canny President's ability to name his Vice-President as successor. (After all, even Eisenhower could do that.) But as a lame duck, Lyndon Johnson will find his political capital gravely diminished. He will not be able to play his 1964 trump, for there is no reason whatever to believe that Hubert Humphrey in 1972 will have anything like the popular support LBJ had in 1964.

Meanwhile, commentators will be able to note that Robert Kennedy will be snagging on the shoals and stubbing his toes on the rocks of New York politics--and so, supposedly, will be unable to mount a Presidential drive for want of a secure "home base." It is true that the junior Senator will probably not be able to name the Democratic candidate for Governor, who has an excellent chance for defeating Nelson Rockefeller this fall; or choose the man who should fail miserably to defeat Senator Jacob Javits in 1968; or select the Democrat who may or may not be able to beat Mayor John V. Lindsay in 1969. Kennedy will probably not be able to win the trust of the Liberal Party bosses or take over the Kings County (Brooklyn) organization or make something coherent out of the endless jabbering and squawking that calls itself the Reform Movement. State politics has never been the Kennedy's game, and even the most skillful, experienced, and interested players can do little more than keep themselves in the running, the way the game is played in New York.

What the Kennedys have always been very good at is piling up huge majorities for themselves in state-wide elections. All Robert Kennedy's failures in New York will mean nothing next to the margin he will amass in winning re-election in 1970--something like two million votes. All Presidential Candidate Kennedy needs from his "home base" is its convention votes, plus evidence of his personal vote-getting ability. Robert Kennedy should find it possible to travel the road to the White House without ever learning his way around the crooked back hallways of Albany.