The conclusion of the Labour Government's review of British defense policy, revealed February 22 in a Parliamentary White Paper, now provide Britain with a rationale for future defense decisions--the principle of economic pragmatism. The White Paper demands that Britain's economic health take precedence over extensive defense programs. In effect, the Ministry of Defense will be guided by the Treasury rather than by the Foreign Office. The government must limit its defense appropriations to 2,000 million pounds per year at 1964 prices. Given this limit, Defense Minister Denis Healy arrived at an "in-between" policy which restricts Britain's military commitments but will maintain her world role.

For thirteen years in opposition the Labour Party had condemned the Conservative Government's policies of intervention and over-extension, focusing on the Suez crisis in 1956. Labour members criticized American meddling in South Vietnam and were generally committed to a financial reform policy of "Britain First." Once in power, however, Prime Minister Wilson adopted a more traditional approach to defense problems. He resolved to support the Unted State's position in Vietnam, and continued the fight to keep British bases in Aden and Singapore.

But in 1964 Britain could no longer ignore the economic pressures at home which demanded a restriction of military committments. The newly-elected Labour Government initiated the extensive defense review to establish more economically pragmatic policies. According to the new program, the British plan to evacuate their troublesome base in Aden by 1968. Forces in the Persian Gulf area and the heavy commitment in Germany will be maintained only if the troubling deficit balance of payments is abolished. In Europe and the Middle East, then, Britain's policy is to withdraw.

The Labour Government has not, however, assumed the Gaullist posture of withdrawal. When France relinquished her colonies, she effectively abandoned all overseas military commitments. Moreover De Gaulle has now decided to withdraw France's troops from the NATO alliance. Britain, on the other hand, will seek to maintain her traditional presence east of Suez, though limiting the scope of her military potential.

Clearly Wilson is not about to abandon Britain's vital military interests in India, Malaysia, and East Africa. The Singapore base is the key to the defense of Malaysia against the hostile Indonesian government. Indian Ocean islands form a chain of British outposts from Australia to Africa.

Yet even in this eastern area, Britain will undertake no major military efforts without guaranteed assistance. In other words, no more Suez fiascos. Britain will not intervene in the affairs of an independent country without a formal invitation, and will not promise military aid unless granted facilities from that country which would make the aid effective. Britain, therefore, is forced into dependence on the only other allied power active in the East--the United States. Although Britain does not share America's vital interest in Vietnam, she will try to keep military influence in the other Far Eastern troublespots.

This in between policy of quasi withdrawal is sufficiently vague to allow for definite action in time of crisis. The realities of the British role will, however, be limited by her economic ability to carry it out. In the meantime, public reaction to the White Paper is still to be gauged. This question of defense, together with the Rhodesian crisis, will be the issues of foreign policy debates in the campaigns for the British General Election on March 31.

Public interest has focused on the Labour Government's proposals since the dramatic resignations of the Minister of the Navy and the First Sea Lord, in protest against the White Paper. Both men ostensibly opposed the purchase of fifty American F-111 swing-wing aircraft in lieu of building an aircraft carrier costing seventy million pounds. But objections to the defense policy run much deeper than the Royal Navy's rivalry with the Air Force.

Ex-Navy Minister Christopher Mayhew defended his resignation in Parliament. The new policy is unrealistic, he claimed, for the 2,000 million pound limit is arbitrary and inadequate for any real defense role. Instead of maintaining an equivocal "in-between" policy, Britain should effectively finance her international police force or else honestly admit that she cannot afford to be a world power. He publicly deplored the inevitable subjection of Britain's forces to American foreign policy leadership.

Such dependence on the United States is Britain's nemesis. Even the Labour Government is reluctant to admit that the old "tunes of glory" are now faint, and so the White Paper re-affirms a traditional Eastern influence. But as Mayhew, pointed out, the new defense program might be too ambitious for Britain to finance. Both the Labour and Conservative Parties are divided by factions favoring total withdrawal, or else a reincarnation of British supremacy--in either case a position independent of America. Leaders Wilson and Heath will find it difficult to reconcile these sentiments and to formulate precise campaign platforms on the defense issue. Obviously the Labour Party hopes that the economic pragmatism of the White Paper policy--possibly too much commitment but hopefully not too little--will appeal to the middle-of-the-road majority of Labour and Conservative supporters.

The question of defense will be important in the coming General Election in so far as it relates to Britain's economic situation. The election campaign will focus on domestic issues--industrial growth and organization, immigration, European integration. Given these problems, limitation of defense spending is quite in order. But the real foreign policy issue for the British--which will confront any elected government--is the long-term re-appraisal of Britain's international role. The White Paper on defense is the first attempt to rationalize the concept of overseas strength.