The flatfooted dismay with which enlightened liberal opinion in this country and Britain first greeted the coup in Nigeria is no doubt due to the complexity of politics in that country. An enlightened liberal who has mastered the names of Nigeria's four regions, two electoral coalitions, four major parties (there are lots of little ones), three major tribes (not to mention six semi-major and more than 200 minor ones), and top twelve political leaders, and who has dutifully memorized the phrase "Nigeria, symbol of democracy in tropical Africa", has surely exhausted his capacities for the assimilation of detail. To him the prospect of having to learn a new set of names and a new epithet is profoundly disturbing.

But the army has been more merciful than might have been expected. The regions, coalitions, parties, tribes and all but four or five of the top leaders remain. We need only change the epithet, which was grossly inaccurate in the first place. How much better now to recite: "Nigeria, unwieldy African giant groping for a manageable form of government."

That the country has been groping became fully evident a year ago, in the aftermath of the December 1964 Federal elections. It was then, in the expectation of civil war, that the President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, first began to count which members of the armed forces might be loyal to him; and it was then that the Prime Minister, "moderate" old Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, set an armed guard around the President's mansion and made plans to kidnap him and ship him out of the country.

That January crisis was settled by a compromise which provided, among other things, for the appointment of the President's choice, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, as commanding officer of the army; the appointment of the Prime Minister's choice, Admiral Wey, as commodore of the navy; the holding of "free and fair" elections in the Western region before the end of August; and before the year was out, the drafting of a new Federal Constitution.

The old Federal Constitution of 1960 was, of course, inspired by the experts of the British Colonial Office, who have established unworkable federations on which the sun never sets. It provided for the division of Nigeria into self-governing regions, one of which, the North, contained a majority of the population and more than half the area of the country. Since this region was also an oriental despotism and a one-party state, it was clear that a single band of scheming dynasts, the Northern People's Congress, could command at will a working majority in the Federal Parliament and dictate the terms of government to less ancient cliques in other regions.

In an article in the April 1965 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine President Azikiwe, whose party controls the Eastern and Midwestern Regions, alluded to this flaw and suggested the breaking up of the country into small units rather like those in the United States of America. The post of Prime Minister would be abolished and a strong executive President ("I have no personal ambitions," Azikiwe said) would head a powerful central regime.

The Prime Minister, the number two man in the Northern People's Congress, shrewdly refused to comment on this article. But his boss, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the North, and President of the Northern People's Congress, denounced the President and proclaimed (not for the first time), "Sooner or later we shall have a showdown."

The August elections in the West were held in October, and they were not "free and fair." The Constitutional Convention did not meet. As a result, the Azikiwe-Balewa compromise has failed and the "showdown" has come in a violent manner, precipitated by men who have grown tired of the broken promises of the politicians. The Sardauna and Sir Abubakar have been murdered, as has their ally, Chief Samuel Akintola, Premier of the West, and their friend Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the incredibly rich Federal Finance Minister who held the key to the balance of power in the Midwestern Region. Only the Ibo East has not lost a major leader.

But very little else has been settled. Nigeria is too big a country to be governed against its will by an insubordinate army of 8000 men drawn from several quarrelsome tribes. Had the hot-headed young Ibo officers who staged the assassinations won out, they would have soon discovered this. Now the less messianic, older men who have regained control of the army must quickly submit to the laws of Nigerian politics or else be faced with widespread local rioting.

The major civilian interests must still be placated: the Muslim part of the North must still be ruled by a Muslim Northerner--and in that part of Nigeria, there are always spare emirs and wazirs eager to take the place of an assassinated Premier; the West must have a popular Yoruba and the East a popular Ibo Premier; in the Midwest a balance of power among several tribes must the kept. Each region, each major tribe must be given a sufficient stake in the Federation to make the idea of secession unthinkable.

The Nigerian Government, like the New York City Council, must contain a balance of ethnic elements to guard against the charge of domination by a single clique. And as the coup has demonstrated, any tribe with a large representation in the army itself (or in the Federal police force) must not be allowed to think that it has been encircled or unscrupulously outmaneuvered. As for the minor tribes, one may expect some of them to rebel occasionally and to be pacified, as under the British, by a combination of administrative reform and armed force.

The scarcity of sophisticated military governors in Nigeria and the surfeit of lawyers, Cabinet ministers, journalists and savvy tribal chieftains would suggest that a constitutional structure may be the best means for carrying out this political task. So perhaps in time President Azikiwe will be recalled from London, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (the West's most popular Yoruba leader), will be released from Federal prison, and a new Federal Constitution will be drawn up to meet civilian demands.

But as enlightened opinion in America should be the first to recognize, even the wisest constitution is no guarantee against bloody civil war, threats of secession, blatant corruption in Government, racial and ethnic conflict, and economic stagnation. If we expect these things in Africa, and not stable democratic Government, we shall have less cause for shock and disappointment in the years of consolidation that lie ahead.