To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

This may not be the time to bring up such things, but I felt someone might be interested in figures on Vietnam.

The Defense Department claims that since 1960 the Vietcong has captured 39,000 weapons from the South Vietnamese forces. During the same period, the Vietcong has lost 25,000 weapons to the government army. This leaves them with a net of 14,000 weapons. The Vietcong has 38-46,000 regulars and approximately 100,000 irregular troops. These men would need 145,000 weapons. Then where did they get the rest of their arms?

It is true that most of the Vietcong weapons are of American, French, and Japanese manufacture. However, the French were allowed to evacuate their equipment under the terms of the Geneva agreement and it is unlikely that they left many behind. The largest source of American weapons would be the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, which received substantial amounts of weapons captured by the Chinese Communist Army in Korea.

The Defense Department has definitely identified one battalion of the North Vietnamese army, 2/101, 325th Division, operating in South Vietnam since at least February 7, 1965. The South Vietnamese intelligence forces believe five battalions may be inside the country. This is indeed different from the minimal involvement the North Vietnamese are supposed to have in the war.

In spite of the derision that some have heaped on the idea that major infiltration has been taking place via sea lanes, I think this conclusion is justified. Let us consider.

South Vietnam has 1000 miles of seacoast, most of it so indented that only local fisherman know it with any degree of intimacy. This 1000 miles does not include the inland waterway navigable by sampans, which in the case of the Mekong Delta alone in 4700 miles. The South Vietnamese Navy's Junk Patrol, primarily responsible for preventing infiltration by sea, has 500 boats. Since 40 per cent of any fleet is tied up in ports for repairs, re-provisioning, liberty, training, etc., the Junk Patrol would have about 300 boats to patrol more than 6000 miles of coast and waterway. Most of the Junk Patrol boats do not have radio, leave alone radar (only 12 of their ships have radar).

There are an estimated 80,000 vessels of all kinds plying the South Vietnamese coasts. The Junk Patrol is reported to conduct 12,000 searches per month. This would mean each boat is searched only 1.8 times a year. If a gun carrier is approached by a South Vietnamese vessel intent on a search, what would be simpler than slipping the evidence quietly over the side? And if the gun carrier were operating by night, there would be no earthly way to catch it.

Mr. I. F. Stone, in his "Reply to the White Paper," tends to dismiss the discovery of a ship running arms on February 16, 1955 as being insignificant. This one ship had enough arms aboard her to re-equip approximately 15 per cent of the hard-core Vietcong force and enough ammunition for 20 full scale battalion actions lasting 24 hours each. One hesitates to think about the effect just ten such shiploads would have on the course of the Vietnam war.

I do hope some people who are uncommitted will appreciate the fact that figures can be interpreted in more ways than one. Ravi Rikhye '68