Why did President Johnson order Sunday's air strikes against North Viet Nam? The official reason is unsatisfactory, and rather frightening. Secretary McNamara has characterized the action as "a clear and necessary response to a test of American and South Vietnamese determination...by the aggressor, North Viet Nam." He was referring to Saturday's Viet Cong raid on a U.S. Army camp and airfield at Pleiku.

While the Pleiku attack was certainly a test of our determination, it was no more so than the hundreds of similar raids executed by the Viet Cong in the past several years. Saturday's raiders employed traditional guerilla tactics and, as has become usual, mounted their short, lethal offensive with stolen or captured American arms. In no way did the incident resemble last summer's Tonkin affair, where American bombing answered clearly defined aggression by the North Vietnamese government.

If, because of the Pleiku raids, North Viet Nam deserves bombing, then such action should logically follow every large Viet Cong victory. By construing the air strikes as retaliation, Secretary McNamara is directly equating South Vietnamese civil war with North Vietnamese aggression, an equation unsupported by evidence and indicating that the United States does indeed "seek a wider war."

More Subtle Than Vengeance

But, more than likely, the Secretary was less defining policy than offering a simple justification for it. President Johnson is not known for impulsiveness, and behind his decision to order the bombings, there probably lay more subtle motives than vengeance. Furthermore, he knows as well as the press that Sunday's air strikes, and more systematic escalation, will affect but little the Viet Cong's capacity to wage war. The New York Times estimates that the Viet Cong receives less than 20% of its personnel and arms from the North.

But the strikes may temporarily slacken the enemy's will to wage war. While not depending on North Viet Nam for supplies, the rebels certainly look to Hanoi for strategy and inspiration. It is therefore plausible that the President ordered the air attacks to stun the North into caution, thereby gaining for the tottering regime in Saigon a short recess in the hostilities. The second wave of strikes yesterday bears out this interpretation, for these attacks were not preceeded by fresh North Vietnamese or Viet Cong provocation; they cannot be construed as "retalliation."

In this light, the air strikes appear much less unreasonable and dangerous than is implied by Secretary McNamara's "explanation;" they seem, in fact, nearly inconsequential. The United States cannot end the South's civil war by bombing North Viet Nam. It is academic to argue, as the Administration repeatedly has, that Ho Chi Minh "started" the rebellion. The rebellion now exists, and it will not disappear, even if North Viet Nam is methodically bombed into military impotence. And, though air strikes may win the Saigon government several days of peace, they can never win the regime political stability.

Opportunity for Diplomacy

The bombings have, however, indirectly--and probably inadvertently--expanded a whole area of opportunity which American diplomats would do well to explore. Just hours before the American jets flew over their targets, Russian Premier Kosygin arrived in Hanoi. He travelled there to foster Russian interests in South East Asia, out Russian interests, in this situation, coincide rather closely with American interests.

Since the Tonkin affair, the Soviets have gained favor with many highly placed Hanoi politicians and strategists. For the Tonkin bombings substantiated the Russian contention that America is not a "paper tiger" and that Chinese promises of support are hollow. Sunday's bombings re-emphasized the validity of this position and, we may assume, served to increase Russian influence in Hanoi.

For two reasons, the United States should welcome Soviet influence in North Viet Nam. First, unlike China, Russia favors a negotiated settlement of the war and is reluctant to spread the "peoples' rebellion" to neighboring Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. Eventually America will have to go to the conference table to end this war, and Russian intervention brings that table one step closer.

A Stubborn Reality

Second, growing Russian influence in South East Asia means, nearly by definition, diminishing Chinese influence. And Chinese influence--not Communism per se--is what the United States is combatting in South East Asia. A negotiated peace may result in the communization of all of Viet Nam, but Russian influence could conceivably prevent the Sinitization of the country and impede further Chinese expansion. In the long run, this is the best America can hope for, a stubborn reality that the recent air strikes should not be allowed to obscure.