To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

We of the November 9th Committee feel that the present war in Vietnam represents continuation of the efforts of the Viet Minh, a Community-controlled organization, to take control of this country; this war commenced formally in 1946. The balance in that war only really shifted to the Viet Minh as a result of crucial aid from Communist China. The partitioning of Vietnam as a result of the Geneva Accord of 1954 did not end that war, for the Viet Minh continued its hold on large areas in the South. We say it is basically this group, now called Viet Cong, which is fighting in South Vietnam.

We feel that the interests of the United States are opposed to a Communist victory in the South. The Johnson administration feels, and we agree with it, that allowing 30 million people to fall under the rule of a hostile power can and will upset the present balance of power. Our policy of containment, followed since World War II, intends to stop aggression whenever it occurs, even if it receives popular support as in Vietnam. Our experience shows that unchecked aggression, such as at Munich, leads ultimately to war. Furthermore, victory or defeat in Vietnam would have enormous propaganda value, for it will show to friend, foe and uncommitted alike our ability to check foreign and domestic aggression. Defeat in South Vietnam can result only in the weakening of our position in Asia and within a short time involvement in war elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

We feel that the long run interests and desires of the Vietnamese are incompatible with the aims of Vietnamese Communism. The Viet Cong is not as popular as some groups would have us belive. On this topic, Barry Zorthian, head of the USIA in Vietnam said, "Every bit of evidence we have points to an underlying truth-that if the peasant has a choice, he prefers the government's side in this war. The real hold the Viet Cong have over most of the countryside is through terrorism."

Communism has proved a disillusionment to many of the peasants living in North Vietnam. Our evidence for this is the short-lived peasant uprising, which began on November 9, 1956. Their demands-non-interference, land reform, freedom to travel, access to information-are strikingly similar to those of the South Vietnamese Communists offer no happy alternative to the present situation of the Vietnamese.

Independent Nationalism

The real solution in Vietnam is independent nationalism. Brain Crozier, a former British newspaper correspondent in Asia, says. "The French wrongly thought that the only alternatives before them in Vietnam were victory for the French or victory for the Vietnamese Communist; whereas another alternative existed; victory for the Vietnamese nationalists." To allow this, the Unites States is doing much to improve the social and economic levels within South Vietnam. The United States has built hundreds of classrooms, has provided field instruction in agricultural techniques, has sponsored the electrification of rural areas, and has constructed roads and bridges.

The South Vietnamese themselves are gradually achieving political sophistication. The period beginning with the overthrow of Diem has provided the only opportunity for national self-government these people have ever had. The U.S. policy of advice, rather than direct control, leaves considerable discretion for the South Vietnamese politicians and militarymen.

James S. Killen, AID director in Vietnam, evaluates the present situation: "In spite of the problems, there is a steady program of growth and improvement, better understanding, better training, and greater sophistication taking place in the processes of government."

Therefore, we feel that the role of the U.S. in Vietnam is basically to hold off a Communist take-over until the South Vietnamese, through their own development with continuing assistance from the United States, reach a point of sufficient stability to form a viable nation.

Last Friday an article prepared by members of the May 2nd Committee claimed that the U.S. is battling an indigenous peasant revolt in South Vietnam and advanced American withdrawal. These letters are part of the response. Paul R. DeRensis '66   Brain J. H. Lederer '67   November 9th Committee