President Johnson has magnanimously offered to open U.S. gates to Cuban refugees and all "oppressed peoples." Castro's decision to liberalize Cuban emigration policy left the President no political alternative. From a humanitarian standpoint, however, our economic system and legal code are not geared to the large scale influx of Cubans which may follow.

Although special provisions in the new Immigration Bill will allow any number of Castro's discontents into the U.S., a clause in the same bill also renders it impossible for them to become permanent residents (or citizens) of the United States. Residency is particularly significant because it is very difficult to join a union without it. It follows that Cubans, who lack union protection and often speak no English, will have more trouble than even the Negro in finding a job.

Emigrating Cubans will be forced to live on federal relief with their relatives in the already over-crowded ghettos of Miami, New York City, and Newburg, N.Y. This kind of oversight does not seem to represent the best "humanitarian tradition" of the U.S.

Already perceiving some of the problems posed by a potential flood of 50,000-200,000 refugees, Johnson has asked Congress for 12.6 million dollars to conduct an "orderly systematic immigration" of the Cubans. Also, he has asked Castro to discourage (instead of encourgaging) a Dunkirk-like exodus which would violate U.S. immigration rules and health code. But these assuage merely superficial difficulties of transportation and processing.

The only serious attempt to cope with the basic economic problems, to date, has been a proposal submitted by Ward P. Allen, U.S. alternate delegate to the O.A.S., which invited all member nations to help provide a refuge for these hapless people. Two major stumbling blocks to Allen's plan are the inability of most Latin American nations to support any extraneous groups and the chance that Castro will send a core of "agitators" with each group of refugees.

It is interesting to speculate about the motives behind Castro's offer to cut down the "sugar cane curtain."

The immediate advantages of Castro's "open door policy" were that if we denied the refugees entrance, we would lose an enormous amount of prestige not only in Latin America but all over the world; if we accepted them, the U.S. would not only have to modify its blockade, but also have to foot the welfare bill. The plan was foolproof.

It is also logical to presume that Castro decided a liberal emigration policy could reduce internal tension. Economically this has been one of Castro's worst years; he concentrated on a huge increase in sugar exports the season the bottom dropped out of the sugar market.

With a sharp decline in revenue from non-Communist trade, Cuba has become even more dependent on Russia's million-dollar-a-day dole and bonus of five million dollars annually for military expenditures. Castro, a hard-headed nationalist, doesn't want to remain perpetually dependent on Russian aid; thus he plows a good deal of the capital into the development of an infrastructure to lay the base for future production.

Reportedly, Castro felt that he could streamline his revolution by allowing the very young, the old, and the discontent to leave, eliminating a large segment of the population which consumes without producing. Theoretically the remaining devotees would be enthusiastic enough to suffer through the painful stages of development. Castro had nothing to lose and everything to gain.