President Johnson does not like to bat his head against stone walls. One of the most effective pieces of masonry in Congress is Rep. Otto E. Passman (D-La.), who for years has made a career of blocking the road between the treasury and the various foreign aid administrations. Last week Johnson decided to surrender rather than continue an increasingly risky political battle. Amidst protestations of impotence ("I think it is going to be very tough to get a good foreign aid measure through Congress this year"), Johnson asked for what he called "a great deal of money": $3.4 billion, or $15 billion less than President Kennedy asked last year. The request is about the same as last year's House authorization, which Kennedy termed "reckless" and "irresponsible." Congressional sources are predicting appropriations of as low as $2.5 billion and certainly not more than $3 billion.

Although opposition to foreign aid is becoming increasingly powerful--the House recently turned down a modest program for financing a World Bank affiliate--the President need not have presented the aid program to its opponents as a gift. Congressional cuts from Administration requests during the last decade have averaged nearly $850 million each year, and Johnson knows that something like that amount is sure to be cut this year, especially in view of the fall elections. But the bill is passed each year, even though it has become something of a political whipping boy. Staunch Administration stands have several times kept cuts to a minimum. In 1961 President Kennedy asked for $4.8 billion and received $4.4 billion plus the new administrative organization he proposed. He lost only on his controversial suggestion for treasury borrowing authority. Johnson, who has much more influence in Congress now than Kennedy did in 1961, could certainly have kept aid appropriations from hitting a new low if he wanted to. As things stand now, the Agency for International Development hasn't the least chance of receiving even as much as its pitifully low appropriations of this year.

Johnson has adopted the very same surrender tactics that proved such a disaster for his predecessor last year. When Kennedy accepted the recommendations of the Clay Committee last spring and reduced his own earlier request by $400 million he was met not with Congressional approval but with an additional $1.5 billion in cuts. Slashing the foreign aid budget had become a useful game, and Congress was not going to allow the the President to steal all its best plays. The same thing will no doubt happen this year.

It need not happen, however, if Johnson were to stand up for foreign aid instead of allowing its opponents to monopolize the debate. Johnson's public questioning of the soundness of AID's administrative structure, his amputation of the Alliance for Progress from AID's control, and his demand for less aid to fewer countries are all attempts to buy off the Congressional opposition. The last suggestion is even borrowed directly from the most vociferous of the opposition last year, who spent a good part of the summer trying to agree on the number of countries receiving U. S. foreign aid.

Johnson should make the necessity for foreign aid a basic part of the foreign policy program which will play a large part in his campaign. Instead of patting Otto Passman on the back, he should call his bluff. In the same television press conference in which he conceded that foreign aid would have a rough going this year, Johnson lashed out at those who thought all international problems could be solved by "mashing a button." These same people are opposing the AID program, and they should be attacked with equal energy.

Last year the House Republicans made foreign aid a partisan measure. Ignoring Speaker McCormack's call for a bipartisan approach, they lined up almost to a man behind their leadership in demanding deep cuts in the authorization. Johnson, who has quite a bit of skill at such matters, could accept this challenge if he wanted to. He could make foreign aid an essential part of his political program instead of leaving it in the no-man's-land of "bipartisan foreign policy." Foreign policy is not bipartisan in an election year, and if Johnson would be willing to expend a little of his already tremendous reserve of public support and Congressional good will, he could get a workable aid program through Congress. But to do so he would have to stop conceding every point before the contest even begins. A few judicious pats on the right Congressional elbows, combined with some enthusiastic public statements about the need for foreign aid, could make the difference. If Kennedy with his narrow 1960 victory fresh in Congressional minds could do it in 1961, Johnson with his 70 per cent Gallup ratings can certainly do it in 1964. It is only a question of will.