A whole string of cliches has come into being since the Republican Party's defeat in the November elections. A minority faction grabbed control of the minority party. A candidate outside the you-know-what of American politics antagonized millions of independent and Republican voters. The only solution is for the Republican Party to turn back toward the center, starting right down at the precinct level, to unify the party around a man like Ike Eisenhower or Dick Nixon, to present constructive alternatives to Democratic proposals, to get young energetic candidates, etc., etc.

This orthodoxy receives its most complete exposition in Robert J. Donovan's The Future of the Republican Party, which is just what you would expect from a former head of the New York Herald Tribune's Washington bureau. It is fact-filled, forceful, and facile. But Donovan, even midst his forecasts of resurgence from the depths, recognizes grave flaws in the Party.

He is forced to admit that, even if William Scranton had been nominated at San Francisco, he would not have run much better than Goldwater. Right-wing zealots and Midwestern conservatives, foiled for the seventh straight time in as many national conventions, would not have done much for the young Governor from Hotchkiss and Yale. It is conceivable that the Republican candidate might have won fewer electoral votes than Governor George Wallace could have.

The orthodoxy inevitably glosses over the split it depicts between "moderates" and "conservatives." Their terminology is misleading. If we look at the Republican Party we find three, not two, kinds of politicians competing for leadership and control. There are the Gubernatorial Republicans like Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, and Scranton (men like Senator Kuchel and Congressman Lindsay also belong in this group). Then there are the Congressional and legislative leaders like Everett Dirksen, Charlie Halleck, and Robert Taft Jr. and Sr. Finally there is the Goldwater group, including Barry himself, Senator Tower and a host of cold-eyed ideologues who do not hold public office.

There has been a deep split in the Republican Party for at least fifteen years, but it has been--and will be--far more difficult to mend after Goldwater's victories in the California primary and at the San Francisco convention. The Congressional leaders sensed the difficulties and rallied to the Senator's support after the primary. His convention victory has raised the more ideological Goldwater group's expectations to the point where they will be satisfied only with another such victory in 1968.

The possible defection of the Goldwaterites points up another flaw that even young, energetic, Gubernatorial Republicans cannot ignore. In most states, Republicans are in the minority. A successful Republican candidate must win the votes of independents and Democrats, but unless he has a great many of these, he must count on the Republican bedrock.

Even exemplars of the Gubernatorial group, like Rockefeller, Scranton, and Romney, have to count on voters who would prefer Congressional or Goldwater Republicans. And their legislative programs must to a large extent be tailored to the wishes of the rural, backward Republicans who dominate their legislatures. More significantly, Gubernatorial Republicans need the votes of Congressional and Goldwaterite delegates to win the Republican Presidential nomination.

The real struggle for control of the Republican Party--that is, for its Presidential nomination in 1968--will take place within each of the fifty state parties. The outcome is by no means certain.

Underlying the Donovan orthodoxy is the assumption that the Party will automatically repudiate Goldwater and his curious crew. But Goldwater's renomination, though unlikely, is not impossible, and Goldwaterites will continue to control many state organizations. Meanwhile, most Republicans have lost the expectation of victory that they managed to cherish throughout the New Deal and Fair Deal days. To avoid another disaster like 1964, Gubernatorial Republicans must work hard to win a nomination which seems to be worth very little.