So far as really means experience able reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mustation

It makes no difference what pretensions the philosopher may parade as to the coersive nature of his arguments. Whatever principles he may reason from, and whatever logic he may follow, he is at bottom an advocate pleading to a brief handed over to his intellect by the peculiarities of his nature and the influences in his history that have moulded his imagination. William James

All men are fallible. Bertrand Russell is a man. Therefore, Bertrand Russell is fallible. This syllogism serves as a pragmatically valuable prelude to a discussion of the philosophy of James, Russell, like many other critics of pragmatism, greatly distorts the doctrine for the sake of a clever and cursory refutation. "It is obvious," he writes in A History of Western Philosophy, "that if I say "Hitler exists' I do not mean 'the effects of believing that Hitler exists are good'" Once one recovers from the polemical rabbit punch, the weakness is Russell's argument should be clear.

James sought to answer the question, What does a person say of a belief when he says that it is true? For him the truth of belief refers to its function of leading the believer toward something worth while.

The extreme repugnance of the typical reader to Hitler is of course exploited in Russell's illustration. Yet one must separate the good effects of a belief from the goodness or evil of the entity described. During the bombing of London, few Englishmen could have applauded the existence of Hitler. If the War Office had chosen not to believe that Hitler existed, how- ever, the counter-attack against Germany would have been seriously hampered. To discover whether the effects of believing in the existence of anything are good, one must consider the consequences of disbelief. Blithe disbelief in Hitler would have been disastrous, while the recognition of his existence led to effective combative action.

Evolution and Truth

An early interest in physiology, anatomy, and evolutionary theory surely predisposed James toward his pragmatic conception of truth. The phenomenon of consciousness fascinated him, and he speculated that it had evolved to regulate a nervous system that had grown too complex to regulate itself. In this context the purpose for seeking truth is a natural concern.

Unlike many philosophers James did not have so much of his life invested in abstract theorizing that he could feel compelled to enshrine truth as a self-evident end-in-itself. He did not hesitate to demand from logical systems the same credentials that he required from every other product of human endeavor. That is, he persistently demanded evidence of their value for life.

The term "pragmatism" derives from the Greek word for action. In 1878, Charles Sanders Pierce introduced the word into philosophy in an article entitled "How to make Our Ideas Clear." Peirce argued that beliefs are really rules for acting and that the meaning of having a belief can only be discovered by assessing its consequences for action.

When James took over the concept of pragmatism and made it famous, he scrupulously gave his friend Peirce credit for the notion. Yet so greatly did Peirce feel James had changed the term's meaning that he re-christened his philosophical method "pragmaticism." This word, he remarked, is so ugly that is should be externally safe from "kidnappers."

Rigor Versus Vigor

Peirce had received rigorous training in logic and mathematics from his father, the mathematician Benjamin Peirce. Like John Stuart Mill, he emerged from the strict regimen of paternal instruction years ahead of his contemporaries in intellectual development. Yet despite his acknowledged power and originally as a thinker, Peirce never cultivated sufficient tact or domesticity to appeal to Harvard under Eliot.

James befriended and encouraged him over a long period of lonely years --their correspondence is voluminous. But they were poles apart temperamentally. James wrote for a large, broadly educated audience; he stressed the general outline, the exhortation the sprightly analogy. Peirce strove fro precision, elegance and an impeccable logical structure.

The letters they wrote to one another illustrate this difference strikingly and often very amusingly. James is always telling Peirce that he is a genius, but beseeches him to write so that he can be understood. Peirce, on the other hand, reprimands James for his ambiguity--at one time even offering to give him a two week course in the elements of clear thinking.

Styles and Mediation

Differences of temperament among philosophers greatly interested James and he viewed his pragmatism as a method for mediating between contradictory philosophical styles. The history of philosophy, he believes, can be seen as an interminable battle between the "tender-minded" and the "tough-minded" types of philosopher. Of the numerous Jamesian dichotomies this the most famous. it is best represented in tabular form.

Tender-minded  Tough-minded Rationalities  Empirisist Intellectualistic  Sensationalistic Idealists  Materialists Optimistic  Pessimistic Religious  Irreligious Free-willist  Fatalletis Menistis  Pluralistis Degmatis  Skeptieal

The tender-minded individual seeks to live by principles; the tough- minded, by facts. "Clearness and simplicity thus set up rival claims," according to James, "and make a real dilemma for the thinker. A man's philosophic attitude is determined by the balance in him of these two cravings. No system of philosophy can hope to be universally accepted among men which grossly violates either need, or entirely subordinates the one to the other. The fate of Spinoza, with his barren union of all things in one substance, on the one hand; that of Hume, with his equally barren 'looseness and separateness' of everything, on the other --neither philosopher owning any strict and systematic disciples today, each being to posterity a warning as well as a stimulus--show us that the only possibly philosophy must be a compromise between an abstract monotony and concrete heterogenity."

Philosophy as Antidote

For James philosophical pursuits possessed great personal value as a means to overcome his own temperament. It is no anomaly that the author of rousing essays on free-will and the "will to believe" should have been a man afflicted at time with through-going skepticism and melancholia. The speculations of James in philosophy served as a tonic, an antidote for his pessimism and constitutional incredulity.

Better living, rather than better thinking, was the primary objective of his philosophizing. That is, his basic concerns lay in the realm of ethics. Pragmatism often repels students on account of the apparent confusion between descriptive statements and statements of value. Although James occasionally deserves criticism for this kind of fault, the confusion usually lies in the mind of the be-holder. James did not haphazardly mingle statements of fact with statements of value but rather regarded truth systems and statements as means for realizing values.

Some students of mathematics delight in ridiculing the Jamesian theory of truth on the grounds that the results of mathematical operations are either true or false, regardless of their capacity to give satisfaction. One plus one does not equal three, even if a mathematician could earn a fortune--or tenure--by showing it. James was well aware of this sort of example and dealt with it explicity:

"In the realm of mental relations, truth again is an affair of leading. We relate one abstract idea with another, framing in the end great systems of logical and mathematical truth.... Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of out thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the results."

Parietal Math

It would be mistaken to view the remarks of James about mathematics as a renunciation of his pragmatic theory of truth. Consider the question, Why are parietal hours limited at Harvard? The answer, Because one and one make two, would be irrelevant. If, however, the response were Because one and one at times make one and then, nine months later, make three, the person who asked the question would recognize the reason for the University policy.

Such a statement, the mathematician will say, involves a flagrant abuse of the concept of number. Yes--just as the moral and religious writings of Nietzsche involve the flagrant abuse of ethical and theological concepts. The ironical misuse of terms often draws attention to concealed weaknesses and camouflaged absurdities.

In the above case, the misuse of numbers pinpoints the inadequacy of any model that describes the two elements of the initial set as rational and discreet. Clearly the elements of such sets are often irrational--and consequently indiscreet.

Under certain conditions, then, it is more useful to state that one and one make three than that they add up to two. This curious state of affairs by no means looms as a grave threat to mathematics. It should serve as a warning, though, against the unsophisticated application of mathematical concepts and formulae to phenomena in the world of experience.

James could assent to the rigors of logical and mathematical truth systems and still employ pragmatic criteria in utilizing such systems. Indeed, mathematicians can easily ignore two questions with which the Jamesian theory of truth is particularly well-suited for dealing: 1) Why learn mathematics? 2) What mathematical model is best for describing a given empirical situation?

Errors in applying mathematical concepts to problems in the sciences are as common as parietal misadventures--and potentially no less dipterous. Only examing the practical consequences of various models can the scientist ultimately select the most satisfactory one. Similarly, in defending the pursuit of mathematics against the charge that it is a "frill," or pay-chosis-inducing, or, for some other reason, unsuitable for study, it champions must marshal evidence that conforms to pragmatic conceptions of proof.

Inescapable Choice

Illustrations from the field of mathematics usually cause pragmatists the most difficulty because they involve complex systems of value-free symbols. The necessity for moral choice, for deciding to hold on goal uppermost, and for acting in such a way that a goal be realized--these are teleological concerns too easily obscured by the intricacies of logical systems.

Yet the importance even here of decision and commitment becomes obvious when the two previous questions are put into the following forms Ought I to study mathematics? Which mathematical model ought to apply to this problem? James viewed logic and mathematics from the perspective of the evolutionary biologist. What purpose do they have How are they used?

Strangely, James thus made a valuable contribution to the very disciplined in which he felt least skillful. His pragmatic doctrine provides criteria for selecting among various axiom and, hence, for influencing the development of logical structures at their foundations. But, unlike Pierce, would not revel in the systems their such a program might generate.

For James the sights, sounds, smells and tastes of immediate experience held too much allure. Systematically thinking he deemed valuable in as much as it facilitates effective action action bearing desirable consequence in the realm of pure, raw, personal experience. Although he blamed hear lecture commitments for his failure to write a "syllogistic" metaphysic his own temperament most probability was the real culprit. The beatific vision of William James is not one of regular polygons and concatenate syllogisms, but a paradise of pine woods aromas, Italian Renaissance art, and home-cooked food.