So far as really means experience able reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mustation

It makes no difference what pretensions the philosopher may parade as to the coersive nature of his arguments. Whatever principles he may reason from, and whatever logic he may follow, he is at bottom an advocate pleading to a brief handed over to his intellect by the peculiarities of his nature and the influences in his history that have moulded his imagination. William James

All men are fallible. Bertrand Russell is a man. Therefore, Bertrand Russell is fallible. This syllogism serves as a pragmatically valuable prelude to a discussion of the philosophy of James, Russell, like many other critics of pragmatism, greatly distorts the doctrine for the sake of a clever and cursory refutation. "It is obvious," he writes in A History of Western Philosophy, "that if I say "Hitler exists' I do not mean 'the effects of believing that Hitler exists are good'" Once one recovers from the polemical rabbit punch, the weakness is Russell's argument should be clear.

James sought to answer the question, What does a person say of a belief when he says that it is true? For him the truth of belief refers to its function of leading the believer toward something worth while.

The extreme repugnance of the typical reader to Hitler is of course exploited in Russell's illustration. Yet one must separate the good effects of a belief from the goodness or evil of the entity described. During the bombing of London, few Englishmen could have applauded the existence of Hitler. If the War Office had chosen not to believe that Hitler existed, how- ever, the counter-attack against Germany would have been seriously hampered. To discover whether the effects of believing in the existence of anything are good, one must consider the consequences of disbelief. Blithe disbelief in Hitler would have been disastrous, while the recognition of his existence led to effective combative action.

Evolution and Truth

An early interest in physiology, anatomy, and evolutionary theory surely predisposed James toward his pragmatic conception of truth. The phenomenon of consciousness fascinated him, and he speculated that it had evolved to regulate a nervous system that had grown too complex to regulate itself. In this context the purpose for seeking truth is a natural concern.

Unlike many philosophers James did not have so much of his life invested in abstract theorizing that he could feel compelled to enshrine truth as a self-evident end-in-itself. He did not hesitate to demand from logical systems the same credentials that he required from every other product of human endeavor. That is, he persistently demanded evidence of their value for life.

The term "pragmatism" derives from the Greek word for action. In 1878, Charles Sanders Pierce introduced the word into philosophy in an article entitled "How to make Our Ideas Clear." Peirce argued that beliefs are really rules for acting and that the meaning of having a belief can only be discovered by assessing its consequences for action.

When James took over the concept of pragmatism and made it famous, he scrupulously gave his friend Peirce credit for the notion. Yet so greatly did Peirce feel James had changed the term's meaning that he re-christened his philosophical method "pragmaticism." This word, he remarked, is so ugly that is should be externally safe from "kidnappers."

Rigor Versus Vigor

Peirce had received rigorous training in logic and mathematics from his father, the mathematician Benjamin Peirce. Like John Stuart Mill, he emerged from the strict regimen of paternal instruction years ahead of his contemporaries in intellectual development. Yet despite his acknowledged power and originally as a thinker, Peirce never cultivated sufficient tact or domesticity to appeal to Harvard under Eliot.

James befriended and encouraged him over a long period of lonely years --their correspondence is voluminous. But they were poles apart temperamentally. James wrote for a large, broadly educated audience; he stressed the general outline, the exhortation the sprightly analogy. Peirce strove fro precision, elegance and an impeccable logical structure.

The letters they wrote to one another illustrate this difference strikingly and often very amusingly. James is always telling Peirce that he is a genius, but beseeches him to write so that he can be understood. Peirce, on the other hand, reprimands James for his ambiguity--at one time even offering to give him a two week course in the elements of clear thinking.

Styles and Mediation