Nuclear physicist Edward Teller said Wednesday night that the United States should "unilaterally abandon secrecy" to help create "an open world without which a disarmed world is not possible."

Speaking in the Quincy House Junior Common Room, Teller, who strongly advocated development of the hydrogen bomb, maintained that the present U.S. security classification system does not protect the United States; "the Russians probably know all our secrets and all those we will discover in the next few years."

Teller, however, differentiated between technical data, which he wants declassified, and operational information on the deployment of American weapons, which he felt should not be disclosed. Teller differentiated between technical principles and specific blueprints; he stated that detailed blueprints of nuclear weapons should be withheld as secret information.

Secrecy Abandonment

As a first step in abandoning secrecy, Teller said the U.S. government should end its practice of classifying whole areas of research. The government should be required to demonstrate that a project ought to be classified, he said. Under the present system scientists must explain why their work should not be classified before they can publish it.

Teller also advocated a thorough review of all classified information with the aim of declassifying technical data on even the most advanced nuclear weapons.

If the United States reduced its secrecy, Teller continued, "we could use all kinds of pressure to get the Russians to reciprocate." He cited Russian participation in the Atoms-for-Peace conference of 1955 and the opening of Soviet non-military nuclear research facilities as indications that the Russians might abandon secrecy if the United States did so first. "The Russians do not want to appear backward or stubborn," Teller observed. "Their scientists enjoy talking about their advances."

Public Needs to Know

The reduction of U.S. secrecy would also permit a fuller public debate on defense policy and disarmament, Teller maintained. "Secrecy is a thoroughly undemocratic measure," he observed, "which makes it difficult for the citizen to fulfill the duty of making up his mind on important public question."

"We are talking nonsense when we speak of a national defense policy," Teller said, "because in this country the sovereign power--the people--remain uninformed."

Teller emphasized that in a democracy the public--not the scientists--should be responsible for the way in which scientific inventions are used.

"The responsibility of the scientist is to find out about the physical world," he contended, "and to increase our power over nature. How these tools are used is clearly not the responsibility of the scientist. For instance, a nuclear explosion can be used for aggression; it can also be used to deter aggression, build harbors, deflect rivers, or as a scientific tool to find out more about nature. By itself a nuclear explosion is neither good nor bad. The way it is used makes it either good or bad."

After the scientist obtains knowledge, Teller said, he has the task of "saying clearly what he has found, what his findings mean, and how this additional power can be used. Once these points are clearly and simply explained, his responsibility is ended."

Teller stressed that his own more restricted view of the scientist's responsibility does not make it less heavy. "In way it may be greater, for others cannot do these things; we scientists must them or the job will be undone."

If scientists claimed the responsibility telling the public what was good for Teller maintained, the world would returning to the conception of Plato's guardians.

"We should not follow the decisions of intellectual aristocracy," he declared. Historically, the best have also made best and biggest mistakes. In the long run the people are right."