The Soviet Union agreed in January to three annual inspections on her territory for the purpose of policing nuclear test-ban treaty. They had previously made this same proposal from 1959 to 1961.

Shortly after the Russian announcement, the U.S. stated that it considered 10 to 12 inspections necessary for enforcement of a test-ban, a position which the American Geneva delegation had held since 1959. A few weeks later the United States reduced this number to 10 and finally to seven.

With these Soviet and U.S. concessions and the new proposals for "black-box" detection, a test-ban settlement seemed possible. However, the talks soon reached a headlock. The U.S.S.R. refused to allow more than three inspections and the U.S. felt that at least seven were required: therefore, no test-ban.

The United States maintains that while atmospheric and oceanic tests can be detected from outside the Soviet orders, underground tests with a yield below five kilo-tons could be concealed. The U.S. government considers seven inspections yearly necessary to ensure that such clandestine tests are not made, but in recent years advances in seismological detection have made the U.S. insistence on on-site inspection appear unwarranted. According to the Washington Post:

The American position that international [on site] inspection is essential has run into the flat disbelief of most neutrals here, and even some Allied representatives have made it clear that they are backing the United States stand only with reluctance.

The AEC has claimed reportedly that weapons detonated by the United States have gone undetected, and variably the AEC claims were proved false by seismological stations thousands of miles from the test sites. The Rand Corporation held that if a weapon were detonated in a large cavern the blast might escape detection, but this theory has also been disproven. In the face of new detection advances, Arthur E. Dean, head the United States delegation to the Geneva talks, stated last July that "it might become possible to dispense with international [on site] control stations." The Kennedy administration quickly declared that Dean's mark did not reflect U.S. policy, but it is becoming increasingly clear to both scientific and political authorities that Dean was correct. By asking for seven on-site checks, the U.S. has tacitly admitted that only a minimal number of inspections are really needed for a treaty.

In turn, the U.S.S.R. has tacitly admitted that these may be necessary for an effective treaty. Despite its claims that the United States wishes to use inspectors for espionage, the Russians now seem to think that three annual inspections will not hurt them.

Thus the number of on-site inspections can no longer be considered a substantive issue. The difference between seven and three inspections cannot have a qualitative significance for either nation, and if there continues to be a deadlock over this matter, then clearly the Geneva negotiations are not being conducted with sincerity. The conferees should agree on a compromise number in order that they can move to the other issues, such as the nature of the inspection team, as soon as possible.