Civil defense authorities have designated the Boston area and the Route 128 industrial complex as a prime target, and Central Square, 4,800 feet from Widener Library, is considered the bulls-eye or "ground-zero."

Seven sirens and three factory whistles will announce to the people of Cambridge that they have between 10 and 25 minutes to take cover. As students descend into the basements of Quincy House, Wigglesworth Hall, and Houghton Library, they will be predicating their action on the hope that the enemy missiles will not be aimed at Boston. The Faculty report noted that if Boston were the target the shelters would be useless (see graph), but if the enemy fires on missile bases and airfields, the basements will protect against the radioactive debris that will begin to fall about one hours after the blast. Two such targets are Westover Air Force Base (74 miles from Cambridge) and Otis Air Force Base (60 miles). Megatons  Radius (miles) 1  4.50 5  10 10  14 20  20 50  32 100  45

The above chart indicates the radius (in miles) of the area of 100% mortality, with or without fallout shelters. For example, if a 10 megaton bomb burst over the Harvard Yard, Concord would be within the area completely destroyed.

Just what type of targets an enemy will select is a highly speculative subject. Presently it is estimated that the Soviet Union has 75 or more missiles, a force insufficient for a "pre-emptive" first strike. This means that the U.S.S.R. lacks the power to destroy U. S. retaliatory forces, even if the Soviets concentrate solely on these targets. Therefore the only way in which the Russians can hope to threaten America is to aim their missiles at the population centers of the U. S. and Western Europe. The 25 major metropolitan areas in the United States contain 60.8 million persons, and thus the Soviet Union can threaten immediate destruction for at least a third of the American people. This is a minimal estimate and leaves out over two-thirds of the Soviet striking force and post-attack deaths from fallout, starvation, disease and other factors.

Thus it seems illogical that an attack would be launched against military centers. Furthermore, if a missile is ever fired at Boston, the probable aiming error (of the order of a few miles) would make an accidental miss unlikely. The University's Civil Defense Committee noted that this might be the case, but felt that shelters were warranted by the possibility that a no-cities war might be fought or that a U. S. warhead might accidentally explode in the vicinity of Boston. In either of these events, shelters properly equipped and used, might save thousands of lives in the Cambridge area.

(This is the second of a series of articles on civil defense and the problems it presents for the University.)