There is little danger that Communist China will renew its military attacks on India in the near future, John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics and former U.S. Ambassador to India, told a Ford Hall Forum audience last night.

But the Indian government cannot afford to assume this, he said, and in a country with a per capita income of only $100 a year, the purchase of expensive war materials "hurts in the real physical sense of deprivation and hunger." This expense could also endanger the success of Indian's economic development program, unless she receives sufficient aid from abroad.

Long Range Feature

Galbraith acknowledged that the Chinese invasion had resulted partially from two long-range factors--jealousy of Indian social democracy, which "us until now has probably been more successful than the Chinese experiment," and a desire to gain territory, "pleading the righteousness of their 1000-year-old imperialism against the 100-year-old imperialism of the British which the Indians inherited."

But, he went on, the invasion was more directly motivated by India's effort to reassert her claims in Ladakh. By means of an "impressive military demonstration," the Chinese hoped to prove to the Indians how futile any attempts would be.

At the name time, Galbraith continued, the Chinese must have anticipated the Cuban crisis, and hoped it would distract the attention of the United States from anything they might do in India. This view is plausible, he said, since the Chinese withdrawal followed almost immediately upon the removal of missiles from Cuba by the Soviet Union.

Although the military demonstration suceeded, Galbraith said, the Chinese badly miscalculated the American reaction. Despite the Cuban crisis, the United States' response was rapid and carefully planned to avoid committing India to any part in the Cold War.

Communist Problems

This "scrupulousness" was very important, according to Galbraith, in making it difficult for the Indian Communist Party to complain about American interference. Instead, they were left "the not particularly enchanting task" of explaining the actions of the Chinese.

Galbraith emphasized the importance of American economic aid to India. He said the U.S. position is South Asia is their support is almost entirely urban, and they suffer from internal splits. They have "none of the peaceful internal homogeneity of the Democratic Party in Massachusetts--or of the Republican Party nationally," he said.

Galbraith recounted that, soon after still very strong, "not because of the power of our military machine or the eloquence of our diplomats, great as that is," but because of the aid program. He also stressed that India must "come to grips with the population problem."

Galbraith was optimistic over the future of democratic institutions in India and Pakistan, stating that the British had left "a very deep faith in parliamentary institutions" in both countries.

The Communists, he said, are not much of a political threat in India since the first Chinese attack he had forwarded a request for transport planes to the U.S. and was informed from Europe that they would start arriving at 4 p.m. Four planes did, in fact, arrive then, and eight more came in before midnight. About 1 a.m., he went to bed, only to be awakened an hour later to receive a message from Washington that the planes were on their way