The assassination of such a young and vital man as John F. Kennedy tragically demonstrates the great vulnerability of the President of the United States. For the fourth time this century, a President has died or been killed while in office. Furthermore, both former Presidents Truman and Eisenhower have been threatened by possible fatal dangers: Truman by an assassination attempt, Eisenhower by a heart attack.

Should something happen to President Johnson, he would be succeeded by John McCormack, 71-year-old Speaker of the House. Following him in line for the Presidency is 86-year old president protempore of the Senate, Carl Hayden, and then the Cabinet beginning with the Secretary of State.

In the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, however, the current order of Presidential succession has come under critical examination. The deficiencies and obscurities of the present law become more obvious when the succession to the Presidency of the Speaker of the House is a viable possibility. Actually there is little chance that the line of succession would ever go beyond the Speaker, If he were ever elevated to the Presidency, the House would immediately elect a new Speaker, who would supersede the present pro tem of the Senate as next in line. Therefore most of the criticisms of the present order of succession focus on the several disadvantages of having the Speaker as the second man to succeed the President.

First, the Speaker is the product of partisan politics and seniority, which are not necessarily linked to his political ability. True enough, there have been great Speakers like Henry Clay and Sam Rayburn, but by far the majority, including McCormack, have been mediocre. Because most Speakers become acclimated to the slow procedural process of House activity, they simply do not have the energy and initiative required of a President. Besides, the House's seniority system makes the Speaker too old to endure the pressures and demands of the Presidency. Speakers are chosen for reasons other than being men of Presidential stock. It is hard to imagine the House choosing McCormack if they had imagined he might become President.

A second objection is that the Speaker is not a representative of the whole nation. In formulating the present succession law in 1947, President Truman recommended the substitution of the Speaker for the Secretary of State as second man in the line of succession because the Speaker is an elected official. But actually the Speaker, like any other Representative, is elected by only his own Congressional District, not the total electorate. And since a Congressman's term is only two years, a Speaker could still be serving as President after his term of office as granted by the voters had ended.

Another objection to the present succession law is its doubtful constitutionality. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution empowers Congress to declare "what officer" shall act as President in the event of the President's death or removal. A series of Supreme Court decisions, however, seems to imply that members of the legislature are excluded from this group of "officers." Several experts on the Constitution contend that the succession law, by declaring the Speaker in the line of succession, violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

A final objection is that the Speaker may be of a different party and political philosophy than the President he succeeds. In becoming President following a national disaster he might destroy the continuity and stability so important to the national welfare after a President's death. Johnson's smooth takeover of presidential power was possible because he was kept well-informed in all areas of domestic and foreign policy. But the Speaker of the House with a full-time job of his own will be unable to attend the endless policy meetings and briefings. Moreover, if the Speaker were not of the same party as the President he would be excluded from certain confidences. All this would make orderly transition during a national emergency difficult if not impossible.