West German politics has been a queer mixture of weakly defined parties since the country's formation fourteen years ago. Konrad Adenauer maintained a continuity of policy only by clever political infighting and force of personality. Ludwig Erhard, the new Chancellor, finds neither political manuevering nor asserting his will very pleasant. But if he is going to change West German policy as much as he would like, he will have to do plenty of both. Opposition to Erhard's ideas is much too strong for him to leave them to their own devices.

The major differences between Erhard and Adenauer center on their notions of Germany's role in Western Europe. Erhard will seek more intimate ties with the United States; Adenauer moved closer to France. Erhard favors the admission of Britain to the Common Market; Adenauer was not sure. Adenauer concentrated on resisting Russian pressures in Berlin and on keeping the hope of German reunification alive. Although Erhard will certainly not acknowledge the permanence of two Germanys, he is not so afraid of making friendly gestures to the Russians. He will move closer to the United States for economic reasons: to promote the growth of the "Atlantic Partnership." He does not think this involves giving up hope of German reunification.

Erhard's economic policies are quite popular in Germany. The Germans have no emotional enthusiasm for the idea of the Common Market, but they trust Erhard's economic judgement completely. Since 1948, Erhard has had a Midas touch with the German economy, and the people see no reason to think he isn't right this time.

Yet "Onkle Ludi's" economics have wide political implications. Support of the United States in Europe means support of U. S. foreign policy. Many Germans share Adensuer's suspicion about the current round of agreements between the Americans and the Russians. Their reasons are obvious. West Germans now take American military support for granted and are used to having their own army. They are not too concerned about nuclear disarmament and have shed most of their feelings of guilt about World War II. They worry about only one thing: the question of reunification. To them, any move to agree with the Russians is a move to recognize East Germany. Erhard's intimacy with the United States creates the fear of abandoning "the other half" forever.

As Chancellor, Erhard's primary task will be to case these fears. To combat the rhetoric of his political opponents who decry his "soft line," he will have to become a political leader. He seems unwilling to move in this direction. Erhard prefers delegating responsibility to Adensuer's method of one-man rule. He has given added freedom to his ministers, which will inevitably allow them to sound off more frequently.

Erhard said recently that he does not feel like "a transition chancellor." He obviously intends to lead his party in the national elections of 1965, but he must do much preparation before then. At present, the Christian Democratic-Christian Socialist coalition (of which Erhard is the leader) lacks a majority in the Bundestag. To gain a majority in 1965 and to beat Berlin's Social Democratic mayor Willy Brandt, Erhard must begin to clarify his party's position in the German political spectrum. In doing this, he will face two major issues.

First of all, Erhard must find some way of quieting Adensur's ideological descendants with in his own C.D.U. These outspoken parliamentarians, led by former foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano and the swarthy Bavarian Franz-Josef Strauss, are suspicious of Erhard's foreign policy. They favor further exploration of Franco-German unity and would not mind an independent nuclear force for Germany. Their fear of concessions to the Russians became obvious in this summer's debate over ratification of the Moscow atom-bomb pact, when they directly opposed Erhard.

Erhard cannot merely squash these critics. They are quite strong within the party and obviously express the sentiment of many Germans. Instead, Erhard must clarify his realignment within the Common Market. He must assure his opponents that a pro-U. S. economic policy has no bearing on the future of West Berlin or East Germany.

The Problem of Social Security

The political importance of this clarification is emphasized by the new stance of the opposition Social Democrats. A recent speech by Fritz Erler, co-leader of the S.D.U. in parliament, echoed quite closely Erhard's argument for European integration. The Socialists' strategy is obvious. They hope to label the C.D.U. as a force of reaction, an ally of de Gaulle left behind by the European movement. Erhard is caught in the middle with his pants down, and must seek a further definition of the issue.

"Der Dicke" faces a similar problem in a more domestic area, that of social security. German wages have sky-rocketed in the past few years, and a good part of the increases have been due to the benefits received by every German laborer and low-income white collar employee. Welfare payments comprise about 20 per cent of the German national income; in the United States, they are only 6 per cent. The worker is so pampered, in fact, that the Socialists began looking for other issues long ago.

There is now considerable evidence that Erhard would like to trim welfare benefits. Wages are currently so high that a considerable amount of German industry is leaving the country in search of cheaper labor and higher profits. But if Erhard tries to ease this problem by welfare cuts, he will not only give the Socialists an issue for 1965, but he will arouse opposition in the left wing of his own party. He will again face the problem of unifying his party and clarifying its image before the election.

Throughout all this, Erhard will have to manage his parliamentary coalition with the Free Democratic Party very delicately. Erich Mende, leader of the Free Democrats, is now Erhard's vice-chancellor and will undoubtedly try to influence policy more than he has in the past. As a primarily business-oriented party, the Free Democrats will be especially uneasy about the Kennedy round of tariff negotiations and Erhard's intentions to push for lower trade barriers.

At the moment, then, the Fat Man's problem seems incredibly difficult. If he becomes too closely associated with the U. S. and its moves to agree with the Russians, he will incur the wrath of the C.D.U. right wing and seem dangerously close to the policies of the opposition party. If he moves to cut back social security, he will give the Socialists a legitimate issue for the 1965 campaign. In either case, he would need consummate political skill to manuever around his opponents and toward his policies. He has shown distinct reluctance to taint his hands with such manuevers, but he will have to. The cry of "let the Fat Man handle it" will surely be repeated. It is not so sure that he will want to.