Anyone who manages to read this book will quite likely become damned mad. Furthermore, if you do read it, the direction of your anger will depend almost solely upon your prior viewpoint.

This is hardly a take-it-or-leave-book for two reasons: (1) its content which, in discussing the actual prospects of thermonuclear war rather than leaving that cataclysm as a horrifying abstraction, is highly controversial, and (2) its length precludes any but the most interested from reading substantial portions of it.

The second point has particular bearing on any prospects that Herman Kahn will receive a blase reaction from those who indeed do absorb his voluminous and repititious points. Since only the very enthralled will bother with the book, they could naturally be expected to have violent reactions one way or the other; as for the rest--the apathetic public, silent generation, or whatever you want to call them--they neither actively care about nor know from such things, so their indifference matters little (at least at this stage).

Raises New Topics

Kahn has graphically pointed to several publicly untouched topics: conduct of a thermonuclear conflict; post-war recovery; concrete exploration of deterrence; how deterrence has failed in the past and might fail in the near future; the deepening significance of such phrases as "flexible strategy," "limited war capacity," "active and passive defense"; and prevention of pre-attack and post-attack blackmail.

Mere mention of some of these items causes a variety of neural firings in various persons' brains. More than any other author among today's galaxy of national strategy commentators, Kahn has caused a fecundity of vented spleens from that group he vaguely classifies as "Utopians." Simultaneously, from that group of observers Kahn wishes he could with a clear conscience call "sober analysts," he has ignited more than a few brushfires.

Kahn argues that the present United States defense posture hardly suffices to ward off the very thing it wants desparately to prevent: an agonizing choice between suicide and surrender.

For example, how could, should, or would the U.S. react to a Soviet ultimatum that tomorrow it would begin to take over Western Europe, one nation per month. In the hypothetical ultimatum, the Soviets decide to help the President make up his mind by picturing the consequences of either limited retaliation or all all-out strike. The first, according to the Soviet note, would bring devastation to each country where it was applied, and hence would likely be rejected by the countries themselves; the second would elicit all-out retailiation by Russia's ICBM and "SAC" forces against vulnerable U. S. bases and cities. Really, the Soviet note concludes, the only sensible course for the President would be acquiescence.

The key to this scenario (which, incidentally, is typical of some Kahn projections) is the time-lag. By giving the U. S. time to think things over, the Soviets make their point completely, namely that the existing U. S. defense structure simply cannot protect against such an extreme provocation short of a suicide move.

Kahn conjures up a similar picture for a Soviet destruction of our Polaris submarine force, not all at once (for that would yield retaliation), but softly one at a time. These hypothetical (we hope) cases are both beyond the usual conception of a limited or ambiguous Soviet move, like Korea, Laos, or the Congo.

Kahn labels such moves as the Polaris, or Western Europe thrusts as "extreme provocations," for which is required Type II Deterrence. Type I is deterrence of direct attacks upon the continental U. S.; Type II is deterrence of limited provocations like Laos, or more subtle areas of diplomacy, propaganda, and whatnot.

Presently, the U. S. has little more than a finite deterrent--a strategy that deters Russian provocation by threatening to hit their cities. Most critics of national strategy plead for some limited war forces and some counter-force capability.

More Thoughtful Preparation

But Kahn asks for a great deal more than these two systems. If we should face the Soviets with a hostage population, unprotected cities, vulnerable retaliatory force, and without a first-strike capacity, our bargaining position during the conceivable time-lags is distinctively inferior.

If we achieve the opposite of this list--evacuated cities, a mixed (mobile, concealed, hardened) invulnerable retaliatory force, and, for bargaining reasons only, a credible first-strike capability--then, Kahn argues, we will hardly be paralyzed.

This necessarily and grossly oversimplifies Kahn's arguments. For example, he uses phrase "alert our strategic forces," but does so in concrete detail; it is precisely this precision that separates Kahn from many writers who facilely ignore the chasm between conception and reality.

In the example cited here, "alerting our strategic forces" might involve any or all of the following: increase the number of planes on ground and air alert; begin the countdown on ICBM's; send decision makers to protected battle stations; verify communication channels; ground all commercial traffic, send some bombers off towards targets but give them orders to return they received coded "go-ahead" confirmation; initiate local counterforce operations which in Kahn's general usage of the might mean sending people to shelters and evacuating them; or finally initiate negotiations with the Russians designed to show them that (1) their attack, if it came, would be ineffective, and (2) we might strike the them unless they back down from their extreme provocation.

Apart from sheer deterrence and probably to many readers' surprise, Kahn presents an extremely intelligent (he would say " his term for himself and all other analysts who accept his approach) discussion of army control. He insists that any strategy we adopt whether his or one less complete must be able to incorporate arms control.

15 Proposals for Arms Control

He makes at least 15 concrete arms control proposals, that although they would hardly satisfy a missionary like Thomas nevertheless are more positive than Kahn's critics would readily admit, viz., peace-time surveillance teams, rejection of first of nuclaer weapons, qulitative bans on weapons testing.

To admit that these and other arms control measures can exist, when proposed in a context of increased deterrence, decreased Kahn's callousness; it detracts from the that he has sunk to the depths of human pravity, that by such detailed description thermonuclear war he makes it more like Kahn's position is simply that no what we and the Russians do, war come. Therefore we should think about beforehand if we expect to salvage more despair; for, as he argues, we might

I do not accept the view that Kahn war-monger. He certainly thinks he but states in his introduction that he this book in the "hope of decreasing the probability of catastrophe and alleviating the of thermonuclear war if it ...to all with the interest--and the courage to read (it)."

Yet, to really accept this book you first buy Kahn's underlying premise: thermonuclear war is potentially IF certain measures have been taken. figures, while valuable, unique, and true, must necessarily remain assertions rather, than accepted judgment.

Considering that many readers will this notion outright, that in this book least Kahn ignores the moral of his prescriptions, and considering the factor, this review's first statement stands: your reaction to Herman Kahn on your disposition toward his approach.