To the Editors of the Crimson

At the conference on "Understanding the Cold War" (sponsored, December 2 and 3, by the American Friends Service Committee, The Committee of Correspondence, and Tocsin), professor Stuart Hughee commented that during his visit to the USSR, just after the U-2 incident, many Russians assured him that they had no hostile images of the US: that indeed they objected to Khruschchev's demolition of the summit. From this evidence professor Hughes concluded that, if we could only rid our polley makers and ourselves of our own hostile image of the USSR, we would have made a major step toward world peace. I wish to protest against the frequent and facile mis-use of the word "image" in discussion of foreign policy, of which I believe professor Hughee's statement to be a typical example. His argument contains its won rebuttal: Khruschchev did demolish the summit (all Image-clusters to the contrary).

The "imagistic" approach to foreign affairs has inherent dangers. First, there is no necessary connection between a nation's policy and the stereotypes (a less modish synonym) that its citizens believe: assuming there is such a connection may lead one to either foolishly convert one's own policy into ineffective propaganda, or to try to assuage by dangerous connections a nation whose enemies attitude is actually maintained mere by the hostile propaganda of its own government than by the present injustice of ours. The assumption that Images are the spurs of policy may also create such misconceptions as the one (expressed by both professor Hughes and professor Riesman) that the only really significant difference between the US and the USSR is in their attitude towards personal liberty. This statement is untrue. In fact, if the significance is construed as pertaining to the cold war and the possibility of disarmament, then internal attitudes toward personal liberty become almost irrelevant. There is a final danger, "Image" is a Madison Avenue term, and an old advertising adage applies to its use: no matter how good the corporate image, a sum product only sells once.

Policy 'X'

Any approach to disarmament and disengagement that relies primarily upon the idea of electing peace by majority vote must necessarily fall. The problem of evolving national policy is very complex. For example, many decisions rest upon the solution of problems of the following kind: "we would not have another nation capable of carrying out policy 'X' willy-nilly without regard for us." (Russia does not want a reunited, re-armed Germany that might again, roll east: the US does not wish a Cuban government so allied to the USSR that it might allow Soviet missiles on its territory.) One solution is to deny the objection to policy 'X,' For example, professor Hughes argued that "we must realize that the balance between communism and quasi-capitalism will not come into any sort of permanent equilibrium until communism has advanced vastly further."

Intentions

A more important situation occurs when, although it is agreed that policy 'X' is clearly objectionable, one argues that the other nation would not carry it out, even if it could. Almost all the arguments for significant unilateral steps toward disarmament have this type of structure. Note, however, that in such cases it is not sufficient to castigate distrustful "images": rather, it is necessary to replace them with counter-images based upon a detailed analysis of the opponent's internal structure, national aims, and extant capacities. In other words we cannot simply insist that the US give up its conception of China and the USSR as aggressors--and even Dulles did not have such a naive view of our opponents. Instead, a full, complex, and trustworthy analysis of these nations must be produced, such that we can with confidence desist from needless threatening counter-moves.

But we, as peace- seekers, should never forgot the possibility that policy 'X' may indeed be unacceptable to our nation (solely because it ultimately would result in a painful decrease in our national security and well-being) and that another nation would indeed carry out policy 'X' if it could (because it would mean a gain in their security and well-being). I believe that the roots of the East-West conflict lie in exactly such situations--and that there are many of them. Obviously in this case an everly favorable image of the opponent is dangerous. The real problem is to find ways of denying a nation the capacity to harm us, without reserting to the threat of nuclear war. Solutions may involve developing alternative military or economic sanctions, proposing a mutually acceptable compromise, creating a commitment to an international Judicial body which proves so generally useful that particular disadvantageous decisions will be accepted In order to preserve the body, or finally, one of the other means for which the Friends, Sane, and Tocsin should new be searching.

Minor observations: Professor Riesman's statement that the men who produced the Daedalus symposium on arms control were "mad rationalists" Is incorrect, dangerously misleading, detrimental to his cause, and symptomatle of the under-current of panic which has affected some of our best minds. We have the good images: We need good ideas. The fall 1960 issue of contains Ideas in rich profusion. Professor Riesman's speech did not. His upon the importance of the virility age" In the American male, and its sense in American Motherhead, factors in our foreign policy, seems little everdone. He is correct, however about the prevalence of the unhead use of sexual imagery in popular and westerns.

"This trend toward a world of men directed by chines (both in the US and the USSR) ... will reach the point no return if we continue the race. Dangerous as our present is, we still have a chance put man back in the saddle... Erich Fromm: Unilateral ; in "," reprinted in AFSC's "Politics and peace")

'Wily-Nilly'

I.F. stone was, as always, fully . But he the exact error which, and many of fellow speakers, had warned us launched a moral tirade against West Germans, when ridiculing national for and authoritarianism. I share concern, but I would like to point that identical arguments can be against the Soviet Union. In case is relevant. Instead, "willy-nilly" argument applies; we remain in a situation such that can carry out the objectionable implied by the existence of the tendencies.

I would like to conclude with a of recommendations: (1) concentration upon image-manipulation (2) At any future conference a friendly audience, include a deal more material similar to Lynd's analysis of the origin cold war, or J. David singer's of possible negotiated (3) Begin an adequately conceptual technical appraisal of the factors economic, military, political, and ) which are involved in the and which must be re-structured to bring about a stable process national interaction; (4) Focus Jor effort along the lines of arms control and eventual armament with correlated compromises; (5) Search for modes of-and new motivations International cooperation; (6) at Harvard a course in disarms stressing original papers by groups, and taught by Professor man, if possible. (My intense object to his recent contributions are suit of a conviction that he is of extraordinarily Important work field--and that he is an excellent .) , Fall 1960, must be Organizations such as Sane, Tocsin the AFSC should be given the of this newspaper and the . No one is interested in cold war--they are interested in . Paul V.