Last week the Political Committee of the United Nations began discussion of "the Cyprus problem." This is the fifth straight year that the matter has come before the UN; and it would be difficult to find any real progress achieved in all this time. Among the many knotty colonial problems begging for some kind of solution today, Cyprus is certainly one of the most insoluble.

Originaly Cyprus involved only Great Britain and Greece. Greek Cypriots (comprising four-fifths of the 500,000 total population of the island) claimed the right of self-determination, which everybody knew would mean eventual "enosis"--union with Greece. Not surprisingly, the Athens government supported this claim. Britain, on the other hand, was reluctant to surrender control of the island--because of its military importance, she said. Also behind the British stand, one suspects, was an unexpressed feeling that her colonial world was crumbling on all sides, and that somewhere the business had to be stopped.

One thing led to another and soon there was open violence on Cyprus. A shadowy organization of Greek resistance-fighters ("patriots" or "terrorists," depending which side you're on) took shape in the mountains, gave itself the name of EOKA, and began ambushing British soldiers and policemen. The colonial administration responded with a stern program of security measures: strict curfews, mass arrests, fines levied on whole villages, and even, it is said, the use of torture to secure information from "suspects."

In the late summer of 1955 Britain called a conference with the aim of improving, in some fashion, this rapidly worsening situation. She invited Greece and herself--and, most important, Turkey. Turkey, one could say, has a legitimate interest in Cyprus, since the island lies within sight of her southeastern shore and since one-fifth of the Cypriot populace is Turkish; but the government in Ankara had, to this point, been quite nonchalant about the whole affair. Confronting Greece with Turkey was like waving a red flag in front of a bull. In no time at all the struggle for Cyprus had a third participant.

In the last three years there has been only one real change in the situation. Britain has decided she doesn't need the island so desperately after all, and now seems willing to give considerable ground toward effecting a compromise solution. She must retain control of her all-important military installations, but apparently can dispense with the rest of Cyprus. This change in attitude came a bit too late, however; for in drawing Turkey into the mess, Britain had added a force fully as intransigent as she herself was before.

Now each of the three countries has a different plan for Cyprus. The Greeks propose independence (they have recently muffled their cries for "enosis"). The Turks urge partition. And the British advocate a three-power government, "an adventure in partnership" as they call it. All of which adds up to a real snafu.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Cyprus issue (at least for Americans) is the extremely awkward position in which it places the United States. All the governments directly involved are U.S. allies and all are members of NATO. The "backside" of NATO is already beginning to tear apart at the seams because of Cyprus. And it is very much in the United States' interest that the matter be settled fast--before NATO is further weakened, and before we are forced to make a clear-cut choice between allies.

The Greeks have never quite understood why their case did not elicit more sympathy in the United States. The principles for which they fight, self-determination and freedom from colonial rule, have in the past been pre-eminently associated with the U.S., they argue. They are fond of drawing parallels between the eighteenth-century struggle of Americans to throw off British rule and their own efforts today. They strongly resent American use of the word "terrorists" to refer to EOKA, declaring that this group is the Cypriot equivalent of our own "Minute Men."

To Greeks, Cyprus is wholly a question of ideals. They are aware that the living standards on the island will almost certainly fall if Britain pulls out; but this practical consideration is unimportant, they feel, when set alongside the "principles" at stake. Greeks are puzzled and hurt that Americans do not always see it the same way; and the extent to which they conceive of America as standing for principle is almost frightening. Their image of the U.S. is really a nineteenth-century one--we are still, above all, a country dedicated to "the ideals of '76," still the land of opportunity for the downtrodden of Europe. These words have a distinctly embarrassing ring in the ears of many Americans; and it is an interesting comment on the U.S. today that foreigners should take them more seriously than we do.

In Washington, foreign-policy planners feel compelled to level their sights somewhat below the ideals, and to assess the practical consequences of U.S. support for Greece over Cyprus. Turkey and Great Britain are more important allies than Greece; and we need all the strength we can get in the current "cold war." Too bad about the ideals, they might say, but really, we just can't do better than try to stay neutral--given the circumstances, you understand.

As it becomes more and more apparent in Athens that U.S. policy will be based on "expedients," popular disillusionment with America is mounting. Three years ago there was no anti-Americanism in Greece; now there is a good deal. Eventually this kind of feeling may become strong enough to topple the pro-Western government there, and to propel Greece right out of NATO. Even a Communist government is not entirely beyond the bounds of possibility, if the Cyprus controversy becomes sufficiently acrid.

So far as the current UN debate is concerned, Greece has given up hope of explicit U.S. support, and simply asks that we remain truly neutral. She is not primarily concerned about our own vote on the matter, but worries lest we try to pressure Latin American countries into backing a resolution favorable to Britain--as the English, of course, want us to do.

But the worst of it is that no matter what happens in the UN, the Cyprus problem will still be a long, long way from a final solution. There just isn't any easy way out.