To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

Mr.Beecher's article "Pakistan Palaver" in your issue of Nov. 12 has served a good purpose, in that it has brought before the Harvard community a picture of events in an important part of the world. I have felt it necessary to write you in order to clear some of the misconceptions engendered by the two letters that were published by you in your issues of Nov. 14 and 19.

First of all, regarding General Ayub Khan it is still too early to say what kind of a ruler he is going to turn out. It is true that conditions in Pakistan had come to such a pass that some drastic action was not only necessary but also probably welcome to the populace. It remains to be seen whether the leader of the so-called "best fighting force east of Suez" can also be the leader of the country with the worst political mess both east and west of Suez. I would like to chime in with Mr.Awan in hoping that "stagnation has given way to a new vitality and resignation has changed to constructive purposefulness." Hopefully this might also lead to a change in attitude and better relations between Pakistan and my country, India.

But one rock on which Gen. Ayub might flounder is Kashmir. Carrying on in the glorious traditions of his predecessors of the last eleven years, he has threatened to wage a war with India over Kashmir. If the Pakistanis who invaded Kashmir in 1948 had not done so, and had not shown their true colors by looting, plundering, and raping Hindus and Muslims alike, they would have some ground to stand on today. It is not surprising that in two elections the People of Kashmir have shown their determination to stay as an integral part of India. If the Indian leaders, like their Pakistani counterparts, had also misdirected the energies and frustrations of their people against another country, the political plight of India today would not have been too different from that of Pakistan. How long can a people be duped into laying the blame for all the misfortunes of Pakistan at the doors of India? As long as the Pakistani rulers do not see it fit to concentrate their own energies and those of their people on the task of developing their country rather than their army, it is doubtful whether the change of rulers will have done any good to the common man.

As a Pakistani gentleman pointed out the other day in a London daily, the so-called revolution in Pakistan is nothing but a shift of power from one part of the landed aristocracy to another, viz. the army, whose top officers are members of this landed aristocracy. The coming of the February elections, already postponed from year to year, threatened to turn over power to the representatives of the common class, who would necessarily be from the middle class. This would have, of course, led to much-needed land reforms--the anathema of the big feudal landlords--further reducing their power and their privileged position.

Regarding the role of military aid in these developments, it must be said that it is quite a significant one. A powerful, well-equipped army, especially when it has had the same commander for a long period, becomes a strong force, fully capable of interfering in the politics of the country. Partly also, the army, constantly kept in a state of excitement and a frenzy of war, needs an outlet for its pent-up energy. When this was not unleashed against India, very naturally it ate into the political structure of Pakistan. Of course, it was foreign military aid that made the army powerful. Indeed, it is a great disfavor to the people of Pakistan that most of the aid they receive from the U.S. goes to support their army rather than projects beneficial to them, for example, dams, factories, power-stations, schools and hospitals. It is an encouraging sign that even Secretary Dulles has admitted undue emphasis on military as compared to economic aid.

Moreover, military regimes have an understandable tendency towards self-perpetuation, and are, in general, reluctant to give up power. Once in, it is almost impossible to dislodge them; when they do leave finally, the situation is not much better than when they took over. There is no lack of instances: Hitler, Mussolini, Peron, Nasser, and even Kemal Ataturk. It is indeed ironical that even Ataturk was not able to instill a democratic spirit amongst the Turks, nor prepare Turkey for democracy, with constitutional rights and safeguards, as daily events there today illustrate.

Indeed, it is very disturbing that neither exiled President Mirza and Revolutionary President Ayub nor your two worthy readers from Pakistan had anything to say in favor of democracy and civil rights. This is in great contrast to the statement of Prime Minister Nehru that the answer to the stupendous development of Communist China is a "challenge to democracy to achieve equal progress without coercion," not a Mirzaesque approach that democracy is unfit for this challenge.

One wonders whether Western foreign policy experts have ever given thought to the idea that so far as the spread of democracy or even its preservation in many countries is concerned, they have failed most miserably and spectacularly. Lofty slogans are used against the U.S.S.R and against Communism, both inside the United Nations and outside. But, once again, one wonders, whether it is the interests of democracy that the United States has at heart, or merely its own special interests and privileged position, when it gives aid, particularly military aid, to foreign countries. Chitranjan Kapur '60.